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THESIS ABSTRACT
One of the novel aspects of the European debate in the post-Cold War era is the 
deliberate attempt by scholars and policy-makers to articulate a more meaningful idea 
of Europe. Such an idea, it is hoped, would enhance the legitimacy of the European 
Union and could provide the basis for a European identity capable of mitigating 
against the rise of nationalist and racist violence in Europe. After more than a decade, 
however, a compelling vision of Europe that would fulfil these aspirations is still 
widely deemed to be lacking. The question that arises, therefore, is why, in fact, it is 
proving so difficult to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold 
War era, and how, concomitantly, this difficulty might be addressed. In response to 
this question, the present thesis offers a detailed analysis of the largely unexplored 
European thought advanced by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche towards 
the end of the nineteenth century. For, the thesis argues, Nietzsche’s thinking about 
Europe can still significantly illuminate our understanding of the current impasse by 
contextualising the latter within the larger problem of European nihilism, or 
meaninglessness, resident in the cultural configuration of European modernity. On the 
basis of this understanding, moreover, the thesis subsequently turns towards a 
consideration of Nietzsche’s own idea of the ‘good European’ which he developed in 
response to the experience of meaninglessness in modem European culture. This idea 
of what it means to be a ‘good European,’ the thesis concludes, can assist 
contemporary scholars of European affairs in delineating a response to the current 
impasse which neither posits an essentialist idea of Europe, nor falls back onto a 
technical and functional approach to European governance.
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In a word -  and it should be our word o f honour! -  we are good Europeans, Europe’s 
heirs, the rich, superabundant, but also abundantly obligated heirs o f two millennia o f  
the European spirit....
-  Friedrich Nietzsche (1886)1
[I]t is necessary to make ourselves the guardians o f an idea o f Europe but o f a Europe 
that consists precisely in not closing itself o ff in its own identity and in advancing 
itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the other heading or the 
heading o f the other, indeed -  and this is perhaps something else altogether -  toward 
the other o f  the heading, which would be the beyond o f this modem tradition, another 
border structure, another shore.
-  Jacques Derrida (1992)2
A guest, the most ‘unheimlich’ o f all, the most disturbing because the most familiar 
(and the least known), is standing at the door: nihilism. He is already there; he has 
entered even before having knocked. ... it is thanks to its exclusion, its annihilation, 
that, like a fantom [s/c], it can cross the most closed off walls o f an intimate interior, 
or o f a nation (and even a ‘Europe’) that we believe to be very much our own, 
cemented, like before, by a Wall.
-  Marc Froment-Meurice (1998)3
1 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974, 
377, p. 340.
2 Jacques Derrida. The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Michael B. Naas. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 29.
3 Marc Froment-Meurice. That is to Say: Heidegger’s Poetics. Trans. Jan Plug. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998, p. 129.
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INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING OF EUROPE
Over two thousand years ago, Plato once raised the important question of 
whether it would be possible to imagine a city where the idea of a city was no longer 
recognisable at all.1 Similarly, the question that has been confronting European 
policy-makers over the course of the past decade, is whether a peaceful and united 
European community can be brought about without the articulation of an underlying 
idea of Europe. What is more, a plethora of scholars and policy-makers have recently 
chosen to answer this question in the negative, expressing their doubts as to whether 
the political project of Europe can advance in the absence of such an idea. As a result, 
the idea of Europe has also once again become the subject of considerable public 
debate and academic discourse. Indeed, as one scholar of European affairs has noted 
in this regard “[a]t no time in history have people talked more about ‘Europe’ than 
today.” Yet another concurs, observing that “[n]ot since the end of the last ‘World’ 
War has the notion of Europe in its totality been so incessantly interrogated.”3 
Importantly, then, the debate on Europe is no longer confined solely to the technical, 
legal and economic aspects of European integration that have traditionally tended to 
dominate the domain. Rather, in the course of the 1990s, many scholars and policy­
makers alike have consciously sought to shift the debate on Europe into the cultural 
realm by debating the meaning of the European idea itself.4 This growing engagement 
with the ‘idea of Europe,’ moreover, can be said to constitute one of the most 
significant and novel developments of contemporary European affairs.5 By way of 
introduction, it is worth considering in greater detail both the motivations which 
underlie the emergence of this literature, as well as the reasons why an analysis of 
Nietzsche’s European thought is pertinent within this context.
1 See, for example, Hans Georg Gadamer. “The Idea of the University -  Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow” 
in David Misgeld and Graeme Nicholson (ed.) Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and 
History: Applied Hermeneutics. Trans. Lawrence Schmidt and Monica Reuss. Albany, New York: 
State University o f New York Press, 1992, p. 54.
2 Gerard Delanty. Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 145.
3 J. Peter Burgess. “On the Necessity and the Impossibility o f a European Cultural Identity” in J. Peter 
Burgess (ed.) Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern Europe. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1997, p. 19.
4 See, for example, Peter Gowan and Perry Anderson (eds.) The Question o f  Europe. London: Verso, 
1997, p. ix.
5 Victoria A. Goddard, Joseph R. Llobera and Cris Shore “Introduction: The Anthropology o f Europe” 
in Victoria A. Goddard, Joseph R. Llobera and Cris Shore (eds.) The Anthropology o f  Europe: Identity 
and Boundaries in Conflict. Oxford: Berg, 1994, p. 26.
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1. The Legitimacy o f the European Union
The recent wave of interest in the idea of Europe derives, in the first instance, 
from the pragmatic consideration on behalf of European policy-makers that a more 
compelling vision of Europe is needed in order to ensure the continued legitimacy of 
the institutions of the European Union. As early as 1989, Francois Mitterand had 
already argued in a press conference that “[t]he Europe of the Community will not 
work, in the short-term, if it doesn’t have a vision, a perspective.”6 The European 
Union, in this account, needs to articulate a compelling and visionary idea of Europe 
if  the project of European integration is ultimately to prevail over those who, in 
Mitterand’s words, “grumble, put the brakes on, and pull up in front of any obstacle, 
however, small” because they are not in favour of political union.7 The wager 
underlying this conviction is that the articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe 
will endow the European institutions with a greater sense of direction and purpose and 
will thereby also enhance their public legitimacy and political influence. Long-term 
vision, it is hoped, will help to ensure short-term policy success.
That the institutions of the European Union can indeed benefit from a greater 
sense of public legitimacy emerged particularly clearly during the debates following 
the signing of the Maastricht treaty. These debates did much to expose the underlying 
fragility of the prospects for uniting Europe in the 1990s and often drew attention to 
grave fears of technocratic domination and the democratic deficit inherent in the 
chosen approach to European integration. During these Maastricht debates 
Europeanists were, of course, quite willing to inform their respective populations 
about the detailed aspects of the treaty, including the merits of creating a central 
European bank and maintaining limited public deficits. Nevertheless, they faced great 
difficulty in convincing their constituents of the benefits of the European Union on
6 Cited in Alan Clark “Francois Mitterand and the Idea of Europe” in Brian Nelson, David Roberts, and 
Walter Veit (eds.) The Idea o f  Europe: Problems o f  National and Transnational Identity. Oxford: Berg, 
1992, p. 156.
7 Clark, “Francois Mitterand and the Idea of Europe,” p. 156.
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these grounds alone. For, as one scholar insisted, how can one possibly “ask millions 
of citizens to think in European terms, to give up the usual national state framework 
and to adopt a new entity with a symbolic value reduced to rules, regulations and 
quotas?”9 More meaningful representations of Europe were largely seen to be lacking 
in the Maastricht provisions and supporters of the European cause had to learn the 
value of a more symbolic and meaningful representation of the European project from 
first hand experience.
Not surprisingly, then, the Maastricht treaty has also been retrospectively 
reproached for its inability to engage the imagination of the European publics.10 The 
treaty is now frequently seen as having exposed the limits of a solely functional 
approach to European integration. Joseph Weiler, for example, has expressed his 
concern about the current status of the institutional project of Europe, noting that the 
disillusionment surrounding the Maastricht treaty might extend much deeper than the 
mere content of the treaty. Indeed, he notes, “[t]he Europe of Maastricht suffers from 
a crisis of ideals. The Member States of the European Community are being swept by 
an electorate which is increasingly frustrated, alienated and angry with politics as 
usual. And ‘Europe,’ once avant-garde, has, it seems, become just that -  politics as 
usual.”11 Nor is Weiler alone is voicing his scepticism about the functional approach 
to European integration. Michael Brenner has similarly argued that “Maastricht, the 
ultimate embodiment of benign technocratic management, is in one sense the endpoint 
of a logic that places material gain at the apex of social values. However, it may be a 
dead end as far as political union is concerned.”12 There is, then, a growing conviction 
amongst Europeanists in the post-Cold War era that the functional wager on European 
integration has reached its limits.13
8 Zaki Lai'di. A World Without Meaning: The Crisis o f  Meaning in International Politics. Trans. June 
Burnham and Jenny Coulon. London: Routledge, 1998, p. 76.
9 Ariane Chebel D ’Appollonia. “National and European Identities between Myths and Realities” in U lf 
Hedetoft (ed.) Political Symbols, Symbolic Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 65.
10 La'idi, A World Without Meaning, p. 76.
11 Joseph Weiler. “Europe After Maastricht -  Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?” Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Papers. Vol. 12. 1995.
12 Michael Brenner. “EC: Confidence Lost.” Foreign Policy. No. 91. Summer 1993, pp. 26-27. See also 
Ralf Dahrendorf. Whose Europe? Competing Visions fo r  1992. London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 
1989, p. 8 and William Wallace. The Transformation o f  Western Europe. London: Pinter RIIA, 1990, 
p. 55.
13 Brigid Laffan, “The Politics o f Identity and Political Order in Europe.” Journal o f  Common Market 
Studies. Vol. 34. 1996, p. 81.
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The most prominent response, in turn, to this post-Maastricht Treaty 
ratification crisis has been to insist that the institutions of the European Union need to 
provide Europeans with a more meaningful vision of Europe with which they can 
identify and which might inspire their loyalty along lines that are not purely 
economic.14 Exemplary of this response is Jacques Vandamme who, in his function as 
the president of the Trans-European Policy Studies Association, has argued quite 
explicitly that “[a] political entity such as the European Union is inconceivable 
without the existence of a collective identity for its citizens.”15 Vandamme, too, is not 
alone in expressing this conviction. Throughout the course of the 1990s, Jacques 
Delors himself, in his position as President of the European Commission, similarly 
and repeatedly urged scholars to identify and articulate a more meaningful idea of 
Europe -  a task that has subsequently been assisted through the financing of several 
research programmes. These programmes, in turn, have spawned several academic 
studies from political scientists and historians through to sociologists and 
intellectuals.16
One such intellectual, and now also a policy-maker, is the Czech president 
Vaclav Havel. In a speech delivered to Trinity College, Dublin in 1996, Havel noted 
quite correctly that the European Union currently finds itself at a difficult crossroads. 
For, he argues, on the one hand the European Union is conducting important 
negotiations which will greatly influence the future of Europe.17 On the other hand, 
there are also growing doubts about the whole integrationist cause in the post-Cold 
War era. Havel thus shares the concern exhibited by many promoters of European 
integration about how little public legitimacy the institutions of the European Union 
seem to enjoy amongst Europeans at large. In light of this predicament, moreover, 
Havel too insists on the need for greater reflection on the meaning of the European 
enterprise. Indeed, his appeal is that “Europeans should give deeper thought to the
14 Jo Shaw. “Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-National Membership?” Collected Courses o f  the 
Academy o f  European Law. 1995. Vol. VI. No. 1. The Hague: Kluver Law International 1997/1998, p. 
251.
15 Cited in Celine Belot and Andy Smith, “Europe and Identity: a Challenge for the Social Sciences” in 
Hedetoft, Political Symbols, p. 83.
16 Belot and Smith, “Europe and Identity,” pp. 84-85. They refer, for example, to the research 
programme on the history o f European identity and consciousness.
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historical significance of their magnificent unification effort, that they should look for 
the true and innermost reason behind it and for its broader mission, that they should 
reflect upon their relationship to the world as a whole, to this future, to nature, and to 
the grave dangers looming over humankind today.”18 In Havel’s account, then, it is 
imperative that promoters of the European unification effort urgently engage in 
profound reflection on the underlying meaning of the European idea. He finds that as 
Europe goes ahead with its unification, “it has to rediscover, consciously embrace, 
and in some way articulate its soul or its spirit, its underlying idea, its purpose, and its 
inner ethos.”19 In doing so, moreover, Havel exhibits particularly clearly the 
conviction that the articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe is now necessary 
m order to enhance the legitimacy of the European project. This aspiration for 
greater public legitimacy constitutes the first important reason for the growing interest
A  1
m the meaning of the European idea in the post-Cold War era.
2. The Desire fo r  a European Community
At the same time, however, this more pragmatic desire to enhance the relative 
influence of the European institutions also hides a deeper and more conceptual 
conviction that informs much of the writing on the political project of Europe. This 
assumption is that the creation of a united European community ultimately entails the 
articulation of a common idea of Europe that can be shared by its various citizens. To 
this extent the preambulatory clause to the Treaty of Rome had already stated very 
clearly that European integration is about “[a]n ever closer union among the peoples
99of Europe.” Moreover, for many supporters of the European cause, both past and
17 Vaclav Havel. The Art o f  the Impossible: Politics and Morality in Practice: Speeches and Writings 
1990-1996. Trans. Paul Wilson. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997, p. 248.
18 Havel, The Art o f  the Impossible, p. 248.
19 Havel, The Art o f  the Impossible, p. 247.
20 Indeed, the European Commission itself has repeatedly argued that “... political union must not be 
seen simply as a legalistic exercise but rather as a humanistic enterprise; a ‘union among peoples’ 
rather than just formal treaties between states.” See Commission o f  the European Communities. 
Treaties Establishing the European Communities (abridged ed.). Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications o f the European Communities, 1983, pp. 109, 113. Cited in Shore and Black, “Citizens’ 
Europe and the Construction of European Identity,” p. 275.
21 Soledad Garcia. “Europe’s Fragmented Identities and the Frontiers o f Citizenship” in Soledad Garcia 
(ed.) European Identity and the Search fo r  Legitimacy. London: Pinter, 1993, p. 2.
22 See, for example, Stanley Henig. The Uniting o f  Europe: From Discord to Concord. London: 
Routledge, 1997, p. 28.
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present, the traditional wager on economic and institutional strategies for European 
unification has often been seen only as a prelude, or a means, for bringing about a 
deeper and more peaceful union amongst the various peoples of Europe. In the view 
of Jean Monnet, for example, the point behind the project of European integration was 
not primarily to bring states together, but rather to unite men.23 Similarly, Robert 
Schuman had argued in his memoirs that “[t]he unity of Europe will not be achieved 
solely or principally by European institutions; their establishment will be an 
intellectual journey ... Europe cannot and must not remain an economic and 
technocratic undertaking. It must have a soul, awareness of its historical affinities and 
its present and future responsibilities and political determination in the service of a 
single human ideal”24 To the founding fathers of the institutional project of Europe, 
then, the quest to unite peacefully the various peoples of Europe seemed to also entail 
precisely this ability to articulate and make relevant, in the minds of Europeans, an 
idea of Europe that mitigates against national identities, or, at a minimum, 
complements them.
Several decades after the institutional project of Europe was initiated, 
however, contemporary scholars of European affairs note that this larger task still 
remains to be achieved. According to Oliver Schmidtke, for example, the 
contemporary European Union is no different in this regard from other institutional 
orders which depend on collective identities in order to delineate the criteria for 
membership and loyalty. He, too, doubts whether the European Union can flourish on 
the basis of mutual instrumental interests alone or on the basis of the strategic 
interests of business and political elites. What is at stake in the contemporary debate 
on Europe, Schmidtke argues, “beyond the functional integration of economic, 
political, and legal processes, is the substantiated notion of a European citizenry 
which may possibly create bonds between individuals and institutions of the EU.” 
The quest to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe that can be shared by
23 See D ’Appollonia, “National and European Identities between Myths and Realities” in Hedetoft, 
Political Symbols, p. 65.
24 Robert Schuman. Memoirs: ‘Pour VEurope.’ http://www.proeuropa.gr/euroreader/schuman.html. 
Emphasis added.
25 Wallace, The Transformation o f  Western Europe, p. 55. See also Sven Papcke. “Who Needs a 
European Identity” in Nelson, Roberts, and Veit, The Idea o f  Europe, pp. 61-74, p. 73; Oliver 
Schmidtke. “Obstacles and Prospects for a European Collective Identity” in Hedetoft, Political 
Symbols, p. 45; and Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 1.
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Europeans at large, then, is not at all seen to be tangential to the project of European 
integration. Rather it is seen to stand at the very centre of a process of the formation 
of a European community. Indeed, if the notion of community informing the political 
project of Europe is one consisting of a group of people with shared values and 
identities, then bringing about a European community, in turn, would seem to entail
9*7the articulation of an overarching idea of Europe which embodies these values. In 
addition, therefore, to the more pragmatic goal of enhancing the legitimacy o f the 
European institutions, the debate on the idea of Europe has also recently emerged 
because the notion of community underlying the political project of Europe ultimately 
seems to require such an idea.
3. The Spectre o f  Violence
What is more, and closely related to the previous point, many of the bellicose 
episodes witnessed in the course of the 1990s have actually been taken as testament to 
precisely what can occur when a common idea of Europe is not shared by its citizens. 
In this regard, the articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe is also seen as 
being able to contribute towards a more peaceful European order in the twenty-first 
century. “Because Europe was not united,” the Schuman Declaration had already 
proclaimed in relation to the Second World War, “we have had war.”28 Throughout 
the past decade, Europe’s bellicose history has confronted it once more within the 
context of the events surrounding the collapse of the former Yugoslavia -  events
9 0which had not been seen in Europe since the 1940s. The view perpetuated by many 
commentators, that there was somehow a Balkan Sonderweg to history, that those 
involved in the violent outbursts were not part of Europe,30 could not obscure the 
underlying fact that Sarajevo had also been a cosmopolitan city which was home to 
members of four different religions.31 To many, irrespective of whether it was openly
26 Schmidtke, “Obstacles and Prospects for a European Collective Identity” p. 45.
27 This is the view o f community espoused, for example, by William Wallace. See, for example, his 
The Transformation o f  Western Europe, p. 55.
28 Cited in Henig, The Uniting o f  Europe, p. 22.
29 Timothy Garton Ash. ‘T en Years in Europe.” Prospect. July 1999, p. 22.
30 See R. Ali and L. Lifschulz (eds.) Why Bosnia? Writings on the Balkan War. Stony Creek, Conn.: 
Pamphleteer’s Press, 1993. Cited in Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 158.
31 Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 158.
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admitted or not, the inability to avert the extent of the Bosnian crisis symbolised all 
too readily how divided Europe remained and how a pronounced and cultivated 
European responsibility was utterly lacking.32 It is in this sense, then, that the events 
in the former Yugoslavia have also been taken as testament to the challenges which 
Europe still faces, and the potential risks that the absence of a commonly held 
European identity entails.
Nor have Europeanists overlooked the fact that these nationalist and racist 
sentiments are not confined to the former Yugoslavia, but can rather be found in the 
very countries which sought to differentiate themselves from the events that occurred 
in the former Yugoslavia. The signs, in other words, of racist and nationalist violence 
come, as the French philosopher Jacques Derrida has noted, from “everywhere in 
Europe” and not only from the former Yugoslavia.33 Over the course of the past 
decade, there has indeed been ample evidence of well-known European pathologies 
resurfacing within many of the countries associated with the project of European 
unification.34 The persistence of such eruptions of violence and discriminatory hatred, 
moreover, has, in many cases, only served to strengthen the conviction that the 
articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe is increasingly necessary if  the 
political project of Europe is to succeed. Much in this vein, one scholar, for example, 
has argued quite explicitly that “[w]e might quite well even ask if we need a European 
identity. The answer must be yes. We need it in order to protect us from the 
secularised remnants of Christendom: the dark and atavistic forces of nationalism and 
racism with threaten to engulf us.”35 There is, then, a growing sense in which a 
meaningful vision of Europe needs to be articulated not only in order to enhance the 
legitimacy of the European institutions, and in order to bring about a genuine 
European community, but also in order to ensure the emergence of a more peaceful 
European community in the twenty-first century. This underlying conviction, in turn,
32 Stanley Hoffmann. “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited.” Daedalus Vol. 123. No. 2 Spring 1994, p. 2. 
See also Brenner, “EC: Confidence Lost,” p. 24; Burgess, “On the Necessity and Impossibility,” p. 20; 
and Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. viii.
33 J. Derrida. The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe. Trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and 
Micheal B. Naas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 6.
3* See, for example, Jacques Julliard. Ce Fascisme qui vient... Paris: Seuil, 1994.
35 Gerard Delanty. “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today: From Ideology to the Politics o f  
Identity and Beyond” in Hedetoft, Political Symbols, p. 33.
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constitutes the third reason why the debate on the idea of Europe has re-emerged in 
post-Cold War era.
4. The European Imagination in Crisis ?
Despite this widespread aspiration for the articulation of a more meaningful 
idea of Europe, however, the task of actually doing so has proved profoundly difficult 
for scholars and policy-makers in the post-Cold War era. The Swiss writer Denis de 
Rougement once noted in his study of the European idea that “[t]o search for Europe 
is to find it.” This insight notwithstanding, and despite more than a decade of 
searching, a more compelling vision of Europe that could enhance the legitimacy of 
the European institutions and that could serve as the basis for a European identity is 
still widely deemed to be lacking. Thus, in his 1994 article entitled “Europe’s Identity
* •  •  • 1 7Crisis Revisited,” for example, the Harvard Professor of European affairs Stanley 
Hoffmann ‘revisited’ an essay he had published thirty years earlier and in which he 
had concluded that “Europe today has no clear profile other than that which a process 
of industrialisation and a process of economic integration have given it. Europe today 
has no sense of direction and purpose.” In 1964 Hoffmann had concluded that a 
meaningful idea of Europe informing the European project was lacking. Writing thirty 
years later, Hoffmann’s discouraging conclusion is that this judgement remains as 
valid today as it did during the 1960s. Thirty years later, the word ‘Europe’ continues 
to pass through the lips of countless commentators and policy-makers on a daily basis, 
and yet there is also a growing awareness amongst scholars and observers of 
European affairs that the European idea remains largely vacuous in the post-Cold War
IQ
era and on the verge of the twenty-first century. If anything, Hoffmann argues,
36 Cited in Christopher Coker. Twilight o f  the West. Oxford: Westview Press, 1998, p. 104. See also de 
Rougement’s earlier previous statement: “To seek Europe is to make her!” The Meaning o f  Europe. 
Trans. Alan Braley. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1965, p. 19.
37 Stanley Hoffmann published his original article in Daedalus Vol. 93. No. 4. Fall 1964. In light o f the 
article’s thirty year anniversary, Hoffmann revisited this article and published his reflections under the 
title o f “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited” in Daedalus Vol. 123. No. 2 Spring 1994.
38 Stanley Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis,” p. 1244, cited in Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis 
Revisited,” p. 1.
39 Indeed, the necessity to use the cumbersome term ‘post-Cold War era’ over a decade after the 
collapse o f the Berlin Wall is itself testament to this vacuity. It is also for this reason, moreover, that it 
is not actually possible, at the outset o f this thesis, to define in greater detail what the notion o f  
‘Europe’ actually means in the contemporary context. For, it is precisely the question o f  the meaning o f
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contemporary Europe is characterised by an acute lack of leaders and elites with a 
daring vision of Europe and it is this shortcoming which, in turn, has led some 
Europeans to question whether the process of European integration still has a higher 
purpose. In his view, moreover, it is also unlikely that such an identity will emerge in 
the near future, given that many of the transnational ideas which once underpinned the 
European project, such as social democracy, Christian democracy or even 
communism, have become decreasingly credible or have suffered from the corrosive 
effects of power.40 Europeans, Hoffmann concludes, now simply lack the ‘solid bed 
of beliefs’ that is, for example, provided by liberalism in the United States.
Hoffmann, moreover, is also clearly disappointed by the inability of Europe to 
articulate a more meaningful vision of itself. Indeed, he concludes his article on a 
sombre note, pointing out that “[i]n 1964 I wondered about Western Europe’s 
spiritual vitality. I still do.”41 Underlying Hoffmann’s account, therefore, is also an 
implicit yet crucial assessment of what constitutes a culture’s ‘spiritual vitality.’ 
Indeed, while Hoffmann, like many other commentators on European affairs, does not 
explicitly define what, in his view, would actually constitute a more ‘meaningful’ idea 
of Europe,42 it does nevertheless emerge from his article that what he variously sees 
lacking in the contemporary project is a clear ‘purpose,’ a ‘sense of direction,’ a ‘clear 
identity,’ a ‘higher purpose,’ and a ‘common enterprise.’43 The absence of such 
attributes, in Hoffmann’s account, signals an absence of ‘spiritual vitality.’ It will be 
recalled, moreover, that these terms are not at all dissimilar from Havel’s earlier plea 
for an idea of Europe that entails the delineation of Europe’s historical significance, 
its broad mission, its relationship to the whole, to mankind, to nature and to the future.
the European idea which is being raised by policy-makers and scholars and which this thesis wishes to 
address.
40 Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” p. 16. See also Anthony D. Smith. “A Europe o f  
Nations -  or the Nation o f Europe” Journal o f  Peace Research. Vol. 30 No. 2, p. 134.
41 Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” p. 22.
42 As Patocka observes, “[w]e often speak of the meaning of particular human events, o f the meaning 
o f life, o f history, o f various institutions, o f democracy, without either defining or attempting to define 
the concept of meaning -  evidently because, on the one hand, we sense we need such a concept but, on 
the other hand, it seems somehow self-evident. ... it is undoubtedly its difficulty and at the same time 
its inescapability which leads us frequently to resort to a time-honored way o f sparing ourselves closer 
analysis, which is to assume the self-evidence of such inescapable conceptual tools.” See his essay 
“Does History Have Meaning?” in Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History. Trans. Erazim 
Kohak. Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 53. The difficult question o f the meaning o f the term ‘meaning’ 
will, therefore, be addressed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
43 Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” pp. 1,1,1,15, 18.
16
Both Hoffmann and Havel converge, in other words, in their observation that a 
common, compelling and future-oriented idea of Europe is lacking,44 and that this 
absence is indicative of a culture which lacks ‘spiritual vitality.’ This implicit 
assumption about what constitutes a culture’s ‘spiritual vitality,’ moreover, represents 
the fourth reason for the recent emergence of the debate on the idea of Europe. 
Hoffmann, after all, is far from alone in relying on this underlying conception of 
‘spiritual vitality.’
Already in 1984 Milan Kundera had voiced similar concerns about the state of 
the European imagination in his widely read article “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” 
published in The New York Review o f Books. At a time when Europe was still divided 
by the Cold War, Milan Kundera lamented that a meaningful conception of Europe no 
longer existed in ‘western’ Europe. In order to illustrate his argument, Kundera 
recalled the plight of the director of the Hungarian News Agency who, in November 
of 1956, dispatched a telex to the world alerting them of the Russian attack on 
Budapest. The dispatch ended, Kundera reminds his ‘western’ European readers, with 
the following words: “We are going to die for Hungary and for Europe.”45 In order to 
make this latter claim intelligible, o f belonging to Hungary and to Europe, Kundera 
emphasised that to a Hungarian, a Czech or a Pole, and unlike a Russian, the word 
‘Europe’ is not a geographical expression but a “spiritual notion synonymous with the 
word ‘West.’”46 Consequently, in Kundera’s view, the plight of the director of the 
Hungarian News Agency revealed that the:
real tragedy for Central Europe, then, is not Russia but Europe: this Europe 
that represented a value so great that the director o f the Hungarian News 
Agency was ready to die for it, and for which he did indeed die. Behind the 
iron curtain, he did not suspect, that the times had changed and that in 
Europe itself Europe was no longer experienced as a value. He did not
44 For empirical research confirming the lack o f a European identity see Sophie Duchesne and Andre- 
Paul Frognier. “Is there a European Identity?” in Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Sinnott (eds.) Public 
Opinion and Internationalized Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 223. For a 
more recent survey with a similar conclusion see Stefania Panebianco “European Citizenship and 
European Identity: from the Treaty of Maastricht to public opinion attitudes.” Jean Monnet Working 
Papers in Comparative and International Politics. No. 3, 1996. Finally, see also Anthony D. Smith, 
“National Identity and the Idea of European Unity,” p. 319.
45 Milan Kundera. “The Tragedy of Central Europe.” The New York Review  April 26, 1984, pp. 33-38, 
p. 33.
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suspect that the sentence he was sending by telex beyond the borders o f his 
flat country would seem outmoded and would not be understood.47
Kundera’s plea, of course, was not to forget ‘central’ Europe. Culturally, he argued, 
central Europe undoubtedly belonged to Europe, whereas Russia did not. 
Consequently, the political frontier had, in his view, clearly been misplaced following 
the Second World War and even the passage of time should not be allowed to obscure 
this fact. Yet, the article would also strike a chord in western Europe, where it did 
indeed appear that Europe, as an idea, was no longer being consciously cultivated by 
its citizens.
These very concerns have now resurfaced within the debate surrounding the 
European idea in the post-Cold War era. In his recent book Modernism as a 
Philosophical Problem, the American scholar Robert Pippin, for example, has chosen 
to emphasise the contemporary and pervasive dissatisfaction of European high culture 
with itself and its ideas.49 In the 1990s, Pippin observes, “[a] culture of melancholy, 
profound skepticism and intense self-criticism had become official high culture and 
the dominant academic one in the European W est....”50 Pippin describes, in other 
words, a European culture immersed in scepticism and criticism and which is unable 
to articulate a more meaningful vision of itself. Much like Hoffmann, Havel, and 
Kundera, moreover, Pipin similarly understands this inability to be a pessimistic 
indicator for the state of European culture in the post-Cold War era. In this account 
too, therefore, Europe’s current ‘spiritual vitality’ seems to be a matter of 
considerable concern.
In Agnes Heller’s view, in turn, Europe has similarly been engaged, over the 
past decades, in “a crash course in relativising its own culture, so much so that it 
arrived at a stage of advanced cultural masochism.”51 The image that Heller associates
46 Kundera, “The Tragedy o f Central Europe,” p. 33.
47 Kundera, “The Tragedy o f Central Europe,” p. 38.
48 See Ole Waever “Europe since 1945: Crisis to Renewal” in Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen 
The History o f  the Idea o f  Europe. London: Routledge 1995, pp. 179-180.
49 Robert B. Pippin. Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfaction o f  European High 
Culture. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p. xii.
50 Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem , p. xi.
51 Agnes Heller. “Europe -  An Epilogue?” in The Postmodern Political Condition. Cambridge: Polity, 
1988, p. 154.
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with contemporary European culture, is that of “a corpse whose hair and nails, wealth, 
and cumulative knowledge are still growing, but the rest is dead.” Europe, she 
observes, lacks any future-oriented social fantasy apart from its technological forms 
of governance. It has become a theatre without performers, a place where “[g]rand 
narratives of another, better future in politics, social questions, or anything else, are 
no longer forged...” and where, moreover, “[redemption is deemed undesirable, and 
sociopolitical progress [is] ridiculed.”53 Heller does not wish to deny that Europe still 
retains a prominent position in the realm of philosophy and that Europe still produces 
interesting philosophy and artworks, but she also wishes to draw attention to the fact 
that increasingly most of the attractive contributions tend to originate in the periphery 
rather than in Europe.
Furthermore, according to Heller, the focus of that which is produced in 
Europe tends to revolve around the past, on preserving the past, and on cultivating 
past traditions. In light of the fact that the present is incapable of yielding a more 
meaningful idea of Europe, she observes, the search now centres solely on the past 
because it is only there that a more meaningful way of life can be discerned. “Old 
cities,” she notes, “are rebuilt, ancient castles are refurbished, old artefacts are 
exhibited, old books are republished -  Europeans tiptoe in their cities as in museums 
because their cities are museums.”54 This, in her view, is surely an admission of 
defeat on behalf of European culture. Indeed, the emphasis on Europe’s past is not 
seen by her as the gateway to a more meaningful idea of Europe, but rather as an 
admission of defeat in the contemporary quest to articulate a meaningful idea of 
Europe commensurate with the times. Europe, in her account, has lost, either 
temporarily or for good, its trend to orient itself towards a meaningful future, to 
articulate a meaningful idea towards which to work and to discuss its future at great 
length. “European culture,” Heller starkly concludes therefore, “can legitimately be 
considered the cadaver of its own self-image.”55 In Heller’s view too, then, there is 
within contemporary European culture a pervasive inability to articulate a more
52 Heller, “Europe -  An Epilogue?”, p. 154.
53 Heller, “Europe -  An Epilogue?”, p. 154.
54 Heller, “Europe -  An Epilogue?”, p. 155.
55 Heller, “Europe -  An Epilogue?”, p. 155.
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meaningful vision of itself, and this, in turn, is taken by her as a worrying indicator of 
the vitality of contemporary European culture.
Finally, this theme of disappearing meaning has recently also received a book- 
length treatment by the French Professor of International Relations, Zaki Lai'di. In his 
book A World without Meaning: The Crisis o f Meaning in International Politics, this 
absence of ‘meaning’ is taken to be the defining characteristic of post-Cold War 
international relations. If, Lai'di argues, we understand ‘meaning’ to consist of three 
inter-related notions -  a foundation, a sense of unity and a final goal -  then 
international relations in general, and European relations in particular, can properly be 
described as ‘meaningless’ in the post-Cold War era.56 With reference to 
contemporary European affairs in particular, Lai'di insists that “the need to project 
ourselves into the future has never been so strong, while we have never been so 
poorly armed on the conceptual front to conceive this future, which leaves a wide gap 
between the historic rupture that confronts us and our difficulty in interpreting it.”57 
Lai'di too, then, wishes to emphasise that contemporary cultural developments in 
Europe seem to prohibit the articulation of a more meaningful idea o f Europe along 
which both policy-makers and citizens could unite, claiming that Europe “risks 
becoming a heritage site rather than a project, thereby sliding gently from an exercise 
of will to passivity. Meaning, in this case, would no longer be a projection towards the
C Q
future, but a nostalgic allegory of the past.” Indeed, Lai'di notes, “[t]he European 
idea has suffered as a result of the teleological deconstruction at work today.”59 The 
result of this process, Lai'di’s argument continues, has been that “[pjolitical actions no 
longer find their legitimacy in a vision of the future, but have been reduced to 
managing the ordinary present.”60 Europe, in this account, is suffering from an acute 
crisis or loss of meaning; “it has trouble metaphorising its own destiny, dramatising
f i  1it....” It is, moreover, an observation which, he points out, we all make today.
56 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p. 1. Laidi further defines his terms in the following manner: 
‘foundation’ is meant as the basic principle on which a collective project depends, unity is meant that 
‘world images’ are collected into a coherent plan of the whole; end or final goal is meant to denote a 
projection towards an elsewhere that is deemed better.
7 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p .l.
58 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p. 75.
59 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p. 75.
60 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p. 7.
61 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p. 76.
62 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p. 80.
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Laidi, too, then wishes to draw attention to the pervasive inability to articulate a more 
meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era and this inability leads, again, to 
a pessimistic assessment of contemporary European culture. His response to 
addressing this situation, moreover, is to insist that there is “no task more urgent than 
the reconstitution of a symbolic separation between the sphere of daily experience and 
the tracing of a new horizon of expectation.”63 He, too, in other words, insists that the 
articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe is necessary in the post-Cold War 
era.
What all these prominent writers share, then, is a considerable scepticism as to 
whether Europeans currently possess what Stanley Hoffmann has referred to as the 
requisite ‘spiritual vitality’ for actually articulating a more meaningful idea of Europe 
in the post-Cold War era. It is precisely this underlying assumption that a culture’s 
‘spiritual vitality’ resides in its ability to identify common purposes and to project 
these into the future which, in turn, constitutes the fourth reason behind the 
emergence of the debate on the idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, in 
this regard the recent debate on the idea of Europe has been driven forward not only 
by the previously mentioned arguments in favour of articulating such an idea, but also 
by an intuitive aversion against the implications entailed by the inability to actually 
articulate such an idea. In driving this debate forward, moreover, these writers have 
also demonstrated their conviction, in relation to Plato’s initial question, that it would 
be very difficult indeed to imagine a united and flourishing Europe without the 
articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe.
To conclude this section, then, there is, on the one hand, an evident desire for 
the articulation of a more meaningful vision of Europe in the post-Cold War era. This 
desire derives initially from the pragmatic consideration of policy-makers wishing to 
enhance the legitimacy of the European institutions. Underlying this move, however, 
one can also detect two deeper and more conceptual assumptions which have been 
equally important in driving this debate forward, namely a conception of a peaceful 
community which emphasises the importance of shared ideals, and a conception of a 
culture’s ‘spiritual vitality’ which is based on the ability to articulate common goals
63 Laidi, A World Without Meaning, p. 178.
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and to project these into the future. Yet, on the other hand, there is also an increasing 
realisation amongst scholars and policy-makers that the articulation of a more 
meaningful idea of Europe remains profoundly difficult, if not impossible, in the post- 
Cold War era, and this realisation, in turn, has lead to a proliferation of pessimistic 
accounts of contemporary European culture. As Jacques Derrida has noted in this 
regard, “we no longer know very well what or who goes by this name [of Europe]. 
Indeed, to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity would this 
name be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?”64 It is, moreover, unclear 
how those still interested in the European idea are to proceed. “Must they re-begin?” 
Derrida asks. “Or must they depart from Europe, separate themselves form an old 
Europe? Or else depart again, set out toward a Europe that does not yet exist? Or else 
re-embark in order to return to a Europe of origins that would then need to be 
restored, rediscovered, or reconstituted, during a great celebration of ‘reunion’ 
[retrouvailles]?65 The central question, in short, that emerges from the contemporary 
debate, is why it is actually proving so difficult to articulate a more meaningful idea 
of Europe in the post-Cold War era, and how, concomitantly, this difficulty might be 
addressed. It is also precisely this impasse which the present thesis wishes to explore 
further.
5. Nietzsche’s European Thought
In seeking to address this current impasse, the following thesis provides a 
detailed analysis of the European thought advanced by the German philosopher 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) towards the end of the nineteenth century. This 
thought consists primarily of his analysis of the advent of European nihilism, or 
meaninglessness, and his response to this development in European culture in the 
form of his idea of the ‘good Europeans.’ There are at least four reasons why 
Nietzsche’s European thought, despite the fact that it was written towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, still constitutes one of the most appropriate intellectual 
frameworks within which to further explore the current debate on the meaning of the 
European idea. The first reason derives from the fact that Nietzsche was himself
64 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 5.
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amongst the first to problematise the collapse of an overarching and teleological idea 
of Europe within the cultural configuration of European modernity. Indeed, Nietzsche 
anticipated that one of the greatest dangers likely to confront Europeans in the course 
of the twentieth century would be the loss of their European voice. In the twentieth 
century, Nietzsche postulated, Europeans would lack the means with which to 
cultivate a European spirit.66 It is this crucial insight which also explains why, long 
before he was thought of primarily as a ‘postmodern’ thinker, Nietzsche was 
internationally recognised for his profound insight into the cultural pathology of the
f f lWest and the onset of the “afterglow of European civilisation.” Nietzsche, then, 
suggests himself to the question at hand, firstly, because he was amongst the early 
thinkers to contemplate the collapse of an overarching idea of Europe as well as the 
wider implications of this development.
In light of this realisation, moreover, Nietzsche also placed the question of 
‘Europe’ at the centre of much of his thinking and it is this fact, in turn, which 
constitutes the second reason why Nietzsche remains one of the most appropriate 
sources within which to explore the present question further. On the most basic of 
levels, this interest of Nietzsche’s in the idea of Europe is revealed by the sheer 
frequency with which he comments on the idea of Europe. According to the index 
compiled by Jorg Salaquarda to the standard German edition of Nietzsche’s writings,
£ O
Nietzsche used the word ‘Europe’ over four hundred times. Beyond this more 
formal observation, however, Nietzsche was also a thinker who consciously cultivated 
a profound interest in the European idea and who accorded the notion of ‘Europe’ a 
central role in much of his thinking.69 Not least, Nietzsche styled himself as “a thinker 
who has the future of Europe on his conscience,”70 and who once wrote of himself
65 Derrida, The Other Heading, p. 8.
66 Josef Nolte. Wir guten Europaer: Historisch-politische Versuche iiber uns selbst. Tubingen: Narr, 
1991, p. 207.
67 Robert B. Pippin. “Nietzsche’s alleged farewell: The premodem, modem and postmodern 
Nietzsche.” The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche. Edited by Bemd Magnus and Kathleen M. 
Higgins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996,p. 255.
68 In addition, Nietzsche uses the noun ‘European’ around 280 times and the adjective ‘European’ 320 
times. Moreover, when he does use the term he tends to use them with strong emphasis. See Nolte, Wir 
guten Europaer, p. 199.
9 Nolte, Wir guten Europaer, pp. 198, 203, 206.
70 Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f  the Future. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1966, 251, p. 188.
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that, “even if I should be a bad German, I am at all events a very good European”11 
Indeed, Nietzsche even occasionally referred to his “European mission”72 and one of 
his most important works, The Gay Science, was dedicated to the future Europeans 
which he envisaged. Nietzsche can, therefore, also be seen as one of those 
philosophers and poets who, as Heinrich Mann once observed, have made such a 
pivotal contribution to the invention, cultivation and maintenance of the European 
imagination.73
Already as early as 1935 J. P. Mayer had noted, in his introduction to an 
anthology on Nietzsche’s writings, that it may be necessary to explore Nietzsche’s 
pan-European perspective which transcends volkisch and nationalist divisions.74 Yet, 
as recently as 1991, Josef Nolte has pointed out that Nietzsche’s copious remarks 
about ‘Europe,’ ‘European’ and ‘Europeanness’ remain largely ignored and 
unexamined both within the discipline of International Relations in particular and 
within Nietzsche scholarship in general, as do their connections with such closely 
related subjects such as his views on the Germans, his criticism of the German Reich, 
and of modem nationalism.75 This oversight appears particularly regrettable given 
that, as two scholars have recently concluded, “Nietzsche still seems to have been 
astonishingly prescient about the new Europe and its old predicaments. His overriding 
concern was that the ‘nations and fatherlands’ of old Europe not obstruct forever the
• • n(\historic process of European unification.” Not ignoring these parts of Nietzsche’s 
corpus, moreover, reveals that Nietzsche was not only a sophisticated thinker, but also 
one who was intimately concerned with the question of how to conceive of a 
meaningful idea of Europe and who deliberately styled himself as a ‘good European’ 
-  a fact which helps to account for why his thought has found nourishing roots in
71 Written by Friedrich Nietzsche to his mother from Sils-Maria on August 17th, 1886. Cited in David 
Farrell Krell and Donald L. Bates. The Good European: Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and Image. 
Chicago and London: The University o f Chicago Press, 1997, p. v.
72 See Friedrich Nietzsche. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-J885. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, 
KSA 11, 29[4], p. 337. My translation, Passim.
73 Paul Michael Liitzeler. “Writers on European Identity.” In Europe after Maastricht: American and 
European Perspectives. Edited by Paul Michael Liitzeler. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1994, p. 296.
74 J. P. Mayer. Kritik und Zukunft der Kultur. Aus Friedrich Nietzsches Werken fu r die Gegenwart 
ausgewahlt. Leipzig: Rascher, 1935. Cited in Nolte, Wir guten Europaer, p. 196.
75 Nolte, Wir guten Europaer, p. 195.
76 D. Krell and D. Bates. The Good European: Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and Image. Chicago: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1997, p .l.
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\virtually every European country.77 Not only, then, did Nietzsche anticipate the 
collapse of the European idea in the course of the twentieth century, but much of his 
thought was deliberately European in scope and character, reflecting the fact that 
much of it was directly devoted to confronting this very impasse.
Yet a third reason why Nietzsche suggests himself, perhaps more than any 
other thinker, to the question at hand, is because he deliberately cast the question of 
Europe in terms of ‘meaning.’ It is, in other words, not fortuitous that Nietzsche spoke 
not only of nihilism in general, but specifically of European nihilism. Already towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche was moved to observe that the modem 
European had begun to reveal an “unspeakable poverty and exhaustion” in whose 
inner self “grey impotence, gnawing dissatisfaction, busiest boredom, and dishonest
• 7Rmisery” prevailed. In Europe, Nietzsche maintained, the overall aim was lacking
7 0and the question ‘Why?’ no longer found an answer. This widespread condition of 
not being able to experience a meaningful existence Nietzsche termed European
OA
nihilism and referred to it as “the really tragic problem of our modem world....” 
Robert Pippin, of course, observes quite rightly that “[o]ne could frame the problem 
of modernist negativity, dissatisfaction, or despair [in] any number of ways and could 
make use of any number of attempts at a diagnosis, from Holderlin to Kierkegaard to
o 1
Marx to Weber to Adorno to Heidegger....” And yet, as Pippin subsequently points 
out, it is Nietzsche’s discussion of this problem, especially in his passage 125 of The 
Gay Science, “that has as good a claim as any to be considered a locus classicus for
87 *the expression of the general feature of these constellation of themes....” Nietzsche, 
however, did not only seek to document the emergence of these sentiments, but he 
also sought to understand the processes by which they had come about. In his 
discussion of European nihilism, in particular, Nietzsche illustrated the method
77 The currently standard edition o f Nietzsche’s works, for example, was compiled by two Italian 
scholars, Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari.
78 Cited in Karl Jaspers. Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding o f  His Philosophical Activity. 
Trans. Charles F. Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmitz. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997, p. 240.
79 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1968 ,1, 2, p. 9. The present study only draws upon The Will to Power as a source for 
English translations o f some of Nietzsche’s posthumously published fragments.
80 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA Vol. 12, 7[8], p. 291.
81 Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, p. 144.
82 Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, p. 144.
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through which European existence had traditionally been endowed with a greater 
^ense of meaning, and how, within the context of European modernity, this very 
method had become intellectually unconvincing, thereby giving rise to the European 
experience of meaninglessness. The third reason, therefore, why Nietzsche’s 
discussion of European nihilism seems to be the most suitable context for exploring 
the present question on the meaning of the European idea further, is that he was not 
only concerned with the collapse of an overarching idea of Europe and with the 
question of how to confront this historical development, but that he also deliberately 
cast his discussion in terms o f ‘meaning’ and ‘meaninglessness.’
A fourth and final reason why Nietzsche still constitutes one of the most 
suitable frameworks within which to further pursue the contemporary impasse, 
derives from the fact that he straddles precisely those academic debates which bear so 
decisively on the contemporary reception of Europe’s historical heritage. As Ernst 
Behler has noted in this regard, Nietzsche can be drawn into current debates within 
the academy as if he were a ‘contemporary.’ Another scholar concurs, noting how 
Nietzsche’s “philosophical system is now over a century old yet he still sounds 
contemporary. He needs no translation into the present. His problems are still our 
problems, his predicament our own.”84 In particular, Nietzsche is largely associated, 
although perhaps erroneously, with the ‘postmodern turn’ in the European and
Off
American academy. Thus, Jurgen Habermas, for example, takes Nietzsche to mark 
“the entry into postmodemity” and to be a thinker who “bids farewell to the dialectic
RAof Enlightenment.” Nietzsche therefore also stands at the centre of those academic 
debates which affect the contemporary reception of Europe’s intellectual heritage and 
it is this circumstance, in turn, which constitutes the fourth reason why Nietzsche’s 
intellectual corpus still remains one of the most appropriate frameworks within which 
to further explore the question of how to articulate a meaningful idea of Europe in the 
post-Cold War era. “[E]veryone who thinks today,” the German philosopher Martin
83 Ernst Behler. Confrontations: Derrida, Heidegger, Nietzsche. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1991, p. viii.
84 Nimrod Aloni. Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche’s Healing and Edifying Philosophy. Lanham: University 
Press of America., 1991, p. 195.
85 For a discussion o f this issue see Clayton Koelb (ed.) Nietzsche as Postmodernist: Essays Pro and 
Contra. New York: SUNY, 1990.
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Heidegger once insisted in this regard, “does so in Nietzsche’s light and shadow, 
whether they are ‘for’ him or ‘against’ him.”87
By way of concluding this introduction, then, an analysis of Nietzsche’s 
European thought may well still have great contemporary relevance for the question 
of whether and how to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold 
War era. Indeed, as will emerge in the course of the thesis, it is even possible to 
suggest that, at bottom, the contemporary question of how to articulate a more 
compelling vision of Europe, is still essentially Nietzsche’s question of how to 
confront the onset of European nihilism. If this is indeed the case, then his analysis of 
European nihilism and his concomitant notion of the ‘good Europeans’ are of all the 
more contemporary interest. That this should indeed turn out to be the case, moreover, 
is perhaps not as surprising as it might initially appear. After all, many of the 
problems facing scholars in the contemporary world are still rooted in the 
philosophical world of the nineteenth century. The French writer Jacques Darras, for 
example, has noted that “[i]n many respects our century, the twentieth, is but an 
annex, a footnote to the nineteenth century.. ..”88 This is particularly true for much of
• o ncontemporary thinking informing the political and economic project of Europe. It is 
in this vein, then, that it is also possible to suggest that Nietzsche’s detailed study of 
European nihilism, in conjunction with his concomitant notion of the ‘good 
Europeans,’ can still enhance our understanding of the current impasse and can assist 
in delineating a response to it. In order to further substantiate this thesis, however, the 
next chapter turns towards a more detailed consideration of Nietzsche’s discussion of 
European nihilism. Such a consideration not only prepares the ground for a later 
analysis of Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good Europeans,’ but also allows for a more 
subtle understanding of our contemporary predicament.
86 Jurgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Cambridge, Mass.: 
The MIT Press, 1996, p. 86. See also David Michael Levin. The Opening o f  Vision: Nihilism and the 
Postmodern Situation. London: Routledge, 1988, p. 3.
87 Cited in Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 1.
88 Jacques Darras. Beyond the Tunnel o f  History. London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 72.
89 See Luc Ferry. The System o f  Philosophies o f  History. Trans. Franklin Philip. Chicago and London: 
The University o f Chicago Press, 1992.
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‘GOD OR NOTHINGNESS ?’ NIETZSCHE’S DISCUSSION 
OF EUROPEAN NIHILISM
Nietzsche’s European thought revolves primarily around his detailed analysis 
of the advent of European nihilism, or meaninglessness. Familiarity with this 
discussion of European nihilism is of great importance for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, it helps to ensure a deeper and more sophisticated understanding of his notion 
of the ‘good Europeans’ at a later stage in the thesis. For, this idea of the ‘good 
Europeans’ constitutes Nietzsche’s direct response to the advent of meaninglessness 
in European culture. At the same time, however, Nietzsche’s discussion of European 
nihilism is also additionally useful because it can actually illuminate the origins of the 
current impasse in the European debate in at least three important ways. In the first 
instance, Nietzsche identified, within the context of this discussion, the mechanism 
through which European existence had traditionally been endowed with a greater 
sense of meaning and also showed how this mechanism had become unconvincing in 
modem times, thereby giving rise to the experience of meaninglessness. In this sense, 
Nietzsche’s account serves to demonstrate that the current problem is actually part of 
a much longer and deeper problem that can be traced back at least to the end of the 
nineteenth century, if not earlier. Secondly, Nietzsche’s analysis can help to explain 
why, as the previous chapter highlighted, the desire for a more meaningful 
representation of European existence actually persists in modem times, and why the 
absence of such an idea frequently leads to pessimistic accounts of Europe’s ‘spiritual 
vitality.’ Thirdly and finally, by exposing the true depth and magnitude of the 
problem, Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism can also explain why, despite 
several valiant efforts, it continues to prove so difficult to actually articulate a more 
compelling vision of Europe in the post-Cold War era. Importantly, then, the present 
chapter turns towards a detailed consideration of Nietzsche’s discussion of European 
nihilism not only because it forms an essential part of coming to terms with 
Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘good Europeans,’ but also because this discussion can 
actually go a substantial way towards answering the question o f why Europeanists are 
currently confronting the impasse highlighted in the introduction to this thesis.
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1. The Historical Context o f  Nietzsche’s Corpus
Nietzsche is probably most widely known for his famous proclamation that 
‘God is dead’ and for his deliberations about the impact this event would have on 
European culture in the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. That this 
should be so, comes as less of a surprise if  one bears in mind that Nietzsche lived 
towards the end of the second wave of European atheism. The first phase of atheism 
in Europe had been initiated by the scientific advances of Galileo and his followers, 
and had culminated in a more mechanistic understanding of the universe. Importantly, 
however, while this understanding of the universe did indeed diminish the role played 
by God, it had not denied this role altogether. Thus, philosophers and scientists such 
as Descartes, Boyle and Newton, while no longer conceiving of God as immanent in 
the world, did not exclude the possibility that God existed externally to it.1 By 
refusing the explicit denial of God, moreover, it was still possible, as Leszek 
Kolakowski notes, for many people to “live without realising that they were denizens 
of two incompatible worlds and, by a thin shell, protect the comfort of faith while 
trusting progress, scientific truth and modem technology.”2 It was a fragile balance, 
indeed, but one which was facilitated by the fact that during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries there was still a considerable gap between the conduct of 
scientific research and the noticeable impact of such knowledge on the daily lives of 
Europeans.3 For several generations, therefore, it was indeed possible to deny the 
explicit conflict between the scientific and theistic world-views.
What made the time during which Nietzsche wrote unique, however, was the 
fact that the philosophies of Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, which, despite their 
differences, each sought to address this emerging rift between science and theology, 
had all seemed to have spent themselves.4 What is more, Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory was now gaining in prominence, while scientific theories and applied
1 David Ray Griffin. “The Reenchantment o f Science” in Lawrence Cahoone (ed.) From Modernism to 
Postmodernism: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 666.
2 Leszek Kolakowski. Modernity on Endless Trial. Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1990, p. 
8.
3 Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, p. 99.
4 Walter Kaufmann. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. 4th Edition. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974, p. 96.
30
technology similarly made great advances, creating yet more inroads into the popular 
and intellectual reception of Christianity. Indeed, the great temporal distance between 
the advances of modem science and their application to the improvement of everyday 
life had narrowed substantially in the course of the nineteenth century,5 giving rise to 
a growing sense of scientific and progressive optimism that characterised much of the 
times.6 These developments, moreover, also ensured that Nietzsche found himself 
standing at the end of this second wave of atheism which had now transformed itself 
from the initial and weaker version, into a much deeper and suspicious form of 
atheism which sought to radicalise the denial of God.7 In the latter form, atheists 
arrived at the conviction that the concept of a God was merely a fiction created by 
human beings, and in the process tried to elucidate the psychological processes by 
which this fabrication had come about.
In this vein, the generation prior to Nietzsche had also rebelled, in its own 
view often heroically, against what it perceived to be the excessive Pietism evident in
• omany European societies. Often the question now preoccupying this generation was 
no longer whether or not God existed. This question now seemed to be settled for 
them. Rather, they were much more interested in understanding why Europeans had 
postulated the existence of God in the first place. It is precisely this important shift of 
emphasis which Nietzsche himself saw as being so characteristic of the intellectual 
climate in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth century. “Formerly,” Nietzsche 
observed:
one sought to prove that there is no God -  nowadays one indicates how the 
belief that there is a God could arise and how this belief acquired its 
weight and importance: a counter-proof that there is no God thereby 
becomes superfluous. When in former times one had refuted the ‘proofs o f  
the existence o f God* put forward, there always remained the doubt
5 Kolakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial, p. 99.
6 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 96.
7 Keiji Nishitani. The Self-Overcoming o f  Nihilism. Trans. Graham Parkes with Setsuko Aihara. 
Albany: SUNY, 1990, p. 71.
8 Keith Ansell-Pearson. An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 24.
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whether better proofs might not be adduced than those just refuted: in 
those days atheists did not know how to make a clean sweep.9
This important intellectual shift, moreover, would later contribute towards the 
collapse of clerical authority in 1848 as well as the subsequent and rapid de- 
Christianisation amongst European Protestants.10 As a result, it was left to Nietzsche’s 
generation, in turn, to consider the ramifications of this decisive shift.
One of the central aspects, then, that set Nietzsche’s generation apart from the
previous one was that it could no longer solely portray this struggle against
Christianity as heroic and liberating; rather, the task confronting Nietzsche’s
generation was to come to terms with the potentially profound implications of
European secularisation.11 This entailed, above all, the attempt to render existence
meaningful and intelligible in a world where God no longer credibly existed in their
imagination, in an intellectual climate where God was deemed to be ‘dead.’ As one
biographer has noted with respect to Nietzsche’s generation, “[secularisation
threatened to leave them displaced and rootless, yet enticed them forward with the
1
alternative of a post-religious identity as the first of the ‘new men.’” In light of the 
fact that Nietzsche himself had been raised in firmly Protestant surroundings it is, 
perhaps, not altogether surprising that he did not consider himself to be immune from 
the task of exploring the cultural implications of secularisation. Indeed, it is precisely 
Nietzsche’s position at the end of this second wave of European atheism that makes 
him such a pivotal figure in the quest to trace the origins of the modem European 
experience of meaninglessness. For, Nietzsche effectively approached his intellectual 
maturity in an age when the traditional meaning of the European idea, that of the 
Christian continent, had lost much of its credibility.
In his attempts to think through the challenge of secularisation, moreover, 
Nietzsche was not .convinced that the optimism triggered by the material and
9 Friedrich Nietzsche. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices o f  Morality. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 95, p. 93.
10 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 24.
11 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 24.
12 P. Bergmann. Nietzsche: The Last Anti-Political German. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1987, p. 29.
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1 "Itechnological advances of his age could sustain European societies in the long run. 
Nietzsche preferred to offer an assessment of his age that was far more ambivalent. 
The diagnosis of modem, European culture that he advanced instead, was one of 
nihilism. “Nihilism,” Nietzsche maintained, “stands at the door.” But “[w]hat does 
nihilism mean?” he asked, then providing his readers with the answer that it means 
“| t]hat the highest values devaluate themselves.” It means, moreover, that in Europe 
the overall “aim is lacking” and the question ‘Why?’ no longer finds an answer.”14 
Nietzsche, in other words, uses the word nihilism to denote that state in which it is no 
longer possible for a society or culture to experience a meaningful existence because 
its ‘highest values’ have become incredible. In the case of Europe, it signified that 
stage of its historical development, towards the end of the nineteenth century, during 
which the theistic universe of Christianity was finally starting to lose its grip on the 
European imagination. “God,” as Nietzsche had both Zarathustra and the madman in 
the market place famously proclaim, “is dead.”15 It is, moreover, precisely this 
‘decline of the faith in the Christian god, [and] the triumph of scientific atheism,” 
which Nietzsche took to be the most decisive “European event” of modem times, and 
which the remainder of this chapter analyses in greater detail.16
2. The ‘Death o f  God’
The analysis of modem European culture which led Nietzsche to make these 
observations and which allowed him to anticipate the advent of European
1 7meaninglessness is complex and sophisticated. Indeed, as one Nietzsche scholar has 
pertinently observed in this regard, “[t]o attempt to sort out what Nietzsche meant by
13 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 96.
14 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1968,1.2., p. 9.
15 Nietzsche’s famous proclamation occurs first in Book 3 of The Gay Science, Section 108, which 
appeared in the year 1882. Here, the analogy with the death o f Buddha is drawn: “there may still be 
caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. -  And we -  we still have to vanquish 
his shadow, too. It reappears in section 343 as the greatest recent event. The Gay Science. Trans. 
Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974. It can also be found at the end o f Section 2 o f the 
Prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1961.
16 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 357, p. 306.
17 Most o f Nietzsche’s fragmentary notes on the nature o f European nihilism from 1883 until 1888 
were published posthumously under the title The Will to Power.
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nihilism is to confront a tangle of issues that must be teased out with great 
• 18 •delicacy.” A widely-recognised starting point for undertaking this task, however, 
can be found in Section 125 of The Gay Science. In the passage Nietzsche presents his 
readers with his famous tale of the ‘Madman ’ -  a passage which, it will be recalled 
from the previous chapter, still represents for many scholars the most eloquent 
description of the experience of meaninglessness characteristic of modem times.19 
The passage anticipates, in a poetic and metaphorical fashion, the existential 
discomfort and lack of orientation which might ensue for Europeans following their 
eventual realisation of the full implications of the ‘death of God.’
Due to the central importance of the passage to the remainder of the thesis, 
and the intellectual history of the twentieth century in general, it is worth quoting it at 
some length. The passage begins by having the ‘madman’ draw attention to the ‘death 
of God:’
Have you not heard o f the madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning 
hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly: ‘I seek God! I seek 
God’ -  As many o f those who did not believe in God were standing around 
just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he 
lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid o f  
us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated? -  thus they yelled and laughed.
The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes.
‘Whither is God?’ he cried; ‘I will tell you. We have killed him -  you and 
I.20
The announcement that ‘God is dead’ and the consequences this entails for European 
culture is made by a ‘madman.’ He is mad in the sense that he has understood, unlike 
his contemporaries, the far-reaching nature of this development in European culture. 
Moreover, like many of Nietzsche’s contemporaries, the atheists standing around the 
market place no longer believe in God, and view religion as an obsolete superstition 
in a Europe which has discovered the power of science. In this sense, and as William
18 Karen L. Carr. The Banalization o f  Nihilism: Twentieth Century Responses to Meaninglessness. 
Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1992, p. 26.
19 Robert B. Pippin. Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfaction o f  European High 
Culture. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p. 144.
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Connolly has pointed out, their very laughter at the madman also “reveals unwittingly 
the truth of his proclamation.”21
It is important to note, however, that Nietzsche and the ‘madman’ are not 
primarily concerned throughout this passage with traditional arguments about the 
existence of God, such as the cosmological and ontological arguments, or that from 
design, but rather with the cultural ramifications of this event.22 Strictly speaking, 
Nietzsche does not even maintain that God does not exist. Rather, God did once exist 
in the European imagination but no longer does so, and it is this development, this 
experience of withdrawal, which would have profound consequences for the viability 
of much of European culture. Indeed, the fact whether there had been a god or not is 
fairly irrelevant given that the actual experience of loss and disillusionment brought 
about by secularisation is certainly real enough.24 When, therefore, Nietzsche has the 
madman proclaim that ‘God is dead,’ he is much rather insisting, as Connolly further 
argues, that on the level of European culture, “a common faith anchored in a common 
set of experiences can no longer secure and protect itself from widespread revision, 
skepticism, doubt and unbelief.” Indeed, Nietzsche himself continues the passage 
much in this vein:
All o f us are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could we drink 
up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon?
What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither 
is it moving now? Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we 
plunging continuously? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is 
there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite 
nothing? Do we not feel the breath o f empty space? Has it not become 
colder? Is not night continuously closing in on us? Do we not need to light 
lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet o f the noise o f the 
gravediggers who are burying God? Do we smell nothing as yet o f the
20 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 125.
21 See William E. Connolly. Political Theory and Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, p. 9.
22 See Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 7.
23 Thomas L. Pangle. “The Roots o f Contemporary Nihilism and Its Political Consequences According 
to Nietzsche.” The Review o f  Politics. Vol. 45. No. 1. 1983, p. 46.
24 Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, p. 150.
25 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 9.
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divine decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God remains dead. And we 
have killed him. . . .26
The apocalyptic language that Nietzsche invokes here, serves to draw attention to the 
great discomfort and disorientation that would be likely to befall European culture as 
Europeans increasingly became aware of the ramifications of the ‘death of God.’ 
Indeed, the implications of this event, as Nietzsche metaphorically anticipates them in 
this part of the passage, are far-reaching, entailing the potential for a vast 
disenchantment of European culture. Following the ‘death of God’, Christianity could 
no longer provide Europe with an overarching meaning, severing Europe, so to speak, 
from its sun and pushing it towards what Nietzsche metaphorically referred to as its 
‘great noon.’ The advent of European nihilism, Nietzsche noted in this vein, 
represented “a crisis without equal on earth.”27 Indeed, the appearance that “nothing 
has any meaning” represented the “[t]he danger of all dangers” for European 
culture.28
Why, though, did the ‘death of God’ promise to constitute such a cataclysmic 
event for European culture in Nietzsche’s account? The reason, Nietzsche argued, 
derives, in the first instance, from the fact that so much of European culture had 
previously been based on, and revolved around, the Christian faith. Traditionally, 
Nietzsche noted, it was precisely Christianity and its faith in the existence of God 
which had served to endow much of European existence with meaning and value, and 
which had made life, including its suffering and disappointments, intelligible to 
Europeans. Thus, despite his prominent criticism of Christianity, Nietzsche was well 
aware of its ability, for some time, to avert the experience of meaninglessness. “What 
were the advantages of the Christian moral hypothesis?” he inquired in one of his 
notebooks, and articulated four different responses.29 Firstly, he argued, “[i]t granted 
man an absolute value, as opposed to his smallness and accidental occurrence in the 
flux of becoming and passing away.” Within the Christian worldview, man was
26 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 125, p. 181.
27 Friedrich Nietzsche. Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1967, ‘Why I am Destiny,’ 1, p. 326. See also Nietzsche, Gay Science, 343, p. 279 and 
Will to Power, Preface, 2, p. 3.
28 Friedrich Nietzsche. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, 2[100],
p. 110.
9 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 4, pp. 9-10.
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deemed to be, even if fallen, God’s most important creature, bestowing upon man an 
important dignity and value in a world otherwise characterised by flux and instability. 
Secondly, Christianity “conceded to the world, in spite of suffering and evil, the 
character of perfection -  including ‘freedom’: evil appeared full of meaning.” By 
positing a perfect deity which shines through all suffering and evil, Christianity, in 
other words, was able to endow even such instances with meaning and value. Thirdly, 
Christianity “posited that man had a knowledge of absolute values and thus adequate 
knowledge precisely regarding what is most important” while, fourthly and finally, 
Nietzsche also noted that “[i]t prevented man from despising himself as man, from 
taking sides against life; from despairing of knowledge; it was a means o f  
preservation.” Christian morality, Nietzsche therefore concluded, “was the great 
antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism” in that it “protected life against 
despair and the leap into nothing” among the underprivileged, powerless and 
oppressed. By invoking the existence of a true and divine world beyond earthly 
existence, Christianity was able to bestow life with dignity and endow much of 
European existence with a deeper meaning capable of ‘redeeming,’ and thus also 
making tolerable, even suffering and death.
The initial meaning of the ‘death of God,’ however, is that precisely this 
avenue for addressing human suffering and rendering it meaningful would no longer 
be available on a pervasive basis. Following the collapse of the Christian worldview, 
modem Europeans could no longer easily see themselves as God’s most important 
creatures, nor could they readily believe in the reality of a redeeming afterlife. What is 
more, the impact of the ‘death of God’ on European culture is exacerbated by the fact 
that the influence of the Christian faith was not confined to the Churches, but was 
translated into virtually all aspects of European existence: into architecture and 
sculpture, literature and painting, music and philosophy, as well as ethics and law. As 
the Harvard sociologist Pitirim Sorokin has summarised, medieval culture was a 
unified system in the sense that it constituted “a whole whose parts articulated the 
same supreme principle of true reality and value: an infinite, supersensory and super- 
rational God, omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient, absolutely just, good and
30 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 55, p. 36.
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beautiful, creator of the world and of man.”31 This is, of course, not to imply 
Novalis’s romantic vision that medieval culture was a monolith and that there was not 
a wide array of Christian interpretations. It is, however, to insist, with Connolly, that 
“there was, nonetheless, ample room within its diversity for many to experience the 
world as enchanted, to discern, darkly and obscurely, the will o f God in the things, 
words, deed, and events of the world.”32 Indeed, Connolly here echoes a sentiment 
expressed earlier by Nietzsche himself, when he claimed, in one of his aphorisms, that 
in an earlier time “experiences shone differently because a god shone through them.
... ‘Truth’ was experienced differently, for the insane could be accepted formerly as 
its mouthpiece -  which makes us shudder or laugh.”33 It is, then, by virtue of the 
central role previously played by Christianity in European culture and in endowing 
European existence with meaning, that Nietzsche concluded that the ‘death of God’ 
would constitute a cataclysmic event and provoke the European experience of 
meaninglessness.
One of the far-reaching effects of the ‘death of God’ would be that Christian 
morality itself would also be increasingly called into question. The ‘death of God,’ in 
other words, would not only entail the possible disenchantment of European 
existence, but would also entail the calling into question of many of the moral and 
ethical precepts which had been derived from it. In Nietzsche’s view, “Christianity is 
a system, a consistently thought out and complete view of things. If one breaks out of 
it a fundamental idea, the belief in God, one thereby breaks the whole thing to 
pieces....”34 Indeed, he noted further in The Twilight o f the Idols, “Christian morality 
is a command’ its origin is transcendent; it is beyond all criticism, all right to 
criticism; it has truth only if God is the truth -  it stands or falls with faith in God.”35 
Much, then, like Dostoyevsky, whom he had read in French translation, Nietzsche 
argued that in a godless world, everything might ultimately be permitted. “[H]ow 
much must collapse,” Nietzsche subsequently went on to ask, “now that this faith has
31 Pitirim Sorokin. The Crisis o f Our Age. Oxford: Oneworld, 1992, p. 18.
32 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, pp. 7-8.
33 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 152, pp. 196-197.
34 Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight o f  the Idols. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1990, 
“Expeditions o f  an Untimely Man,” 5, pp. 80-81.
35 Nietzsche, Twilight o f  the Idols, “Expeditions o f an Untimely Man,.” 5, p. 81
36 Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Genealogy o f  Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. 
New York: Vintage Books, 1967. Third Essay, 24, p. 150.
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been undermined because it was built upon this faith, propped up by it, grown into it; 
for example the whole of our European morality.”37 The most immediate meaning, 
then, of Nietzsche’s declaration that “God is dead” is “that the belief in the Christian 
god has become unbelievable....”38 and the recognition that this might entail the 
eventual collapse of both the moral framework and worldview which was built around 
it.
In light of his own reflections on the unsettling implications of the ‘death of 
God,’ moreover, Nietzsche was astonished, even frustrated, that the majority of his 
contemporaries were as yet unwilling to confront these ramifications honestly and
• 7 Q  ■directly. Thus, the famous passage from The Gay Science concludes with the 
‘madman’s’ recognition that his message was still premature:
Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners; and they, too, 
were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern 
on the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. ‘I have come totf 
early,’ he said then; ‘my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on 
its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears o f men. Lightening 
and thunder require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though 
done, still require time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant 
from them than the most distant stars -  and ye t they have done it 
themselves. ’
It has been related that on the same day the madman forced his way into 
several churches and struck up his requiem aetemam deo. Led out and 
called into account, he is said to have replied nothing but: ‘What after all 
are these churches now if they are not tombs and sepulchers o f God?’40
Whereas Nietzsche’s madman understood very well the implications of the eventual 
consequences entailed in the ‘death of God,’ the atheists standing around the market 
place could not yet envision the impending catastrophe for European culture. It is for 
this reason, moreover, that Nietzsche felt that the madman had come too early, and
37 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 343, p. 279.
38 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 343, p. 279.
39 Bruce Detwiler. Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Aristocratic Radicalism. Chicago: University o f  
Chicago Press, 1990, p. 71.
39
why Nietzsche himself also thought that he was going to be bom ‘posthumously,’ i.e. 
that the importance of his corpus would become recognised only after the 
implications of the ‘death of God’ had begun to spill out of the salons and into the 
streets of European culture.41
To conclude this section, then, in Nietzsche’s view the ‘death of God’ was the 
decisive, even defining, event of modem European history in the sense that modernity 
is characterised by a lack of the unperturbed confidence in the reality of God and 
Christian morality which characterised much of pre-modem Europe. What is more, 
Nietzsche’s discussion of the ‘death of God’ represents the first step in the approach 
to trace, genealogically, the origins of the contemporary inability to articulate a more 
meaningful idea of Europe. For, it was precisely this notion of a common Christian 
faith which had traditionally underpinned the European idea.42 If, however, the idea of 
Europe could no longer be sustained under the auspices of Christianity in the 
aftermath of the ‘death of God,’ then it also comes as less of a surprise that the 
question of how to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe might preoccupy 
European scholars for quite some time to come, even to this very day. In this way, 
moreover, Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism illustrates how the European 
experience of meaninglessness noted by contemporary scholars is not novel, but is 
actually part of a much longer development which can be traced back at least to the 
end of the nineteenth century when it surfaced within the context of the ‘death of 
God.’
3. The ‘Meaninglessness’ o f  Modern Science
A natural starting point in attempting to answer this last question about how to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the aftermath of the ‘death of God,’ 
would seem to lie within the realm of modem science itself. For, to the extent that 
modem science has largely displaced the Christian understanding of existence as the
40 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 125, p. 182. Zarathustra comes to much the same conclusion in §5 o f the 
Prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
41 See, for example, the Preface to the Antichrist, p. 125 and Ecce Homo, ‘Why I am a Destiny’, 1.
42 See D. Hay. Europe: The Emergence o f an Idea. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1957.
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defining characteristic of modem European culture, it is only appropriate to inquire 
what, if anything, modem science proposes as a replacement along these lines. Much 
in this vein, Nietzsche himself turned toward investigating whether or not modem 
science could, at least in principle, serve as the basis for the articulation of a more 
compelling vision of Europe following the demise of Christianity. Nietzsche’s 
investigation of modem science, however, led him to conclude that the scientific 
account of existence could not easily endow European existence with a sense of 
meaning in the way Christianity had previously done. If anything, he argued, 
scientific and mechanistic accounts of existence give “the impression of 
meaninglessness.”43 Indeed, he wished to draw attention to the “[njihilistic tendency 
in the natural sciences. (‘Meaninglessness’) Causality, Mechanism. The ‘law-like 
regularity’ ....”44 Modem science, according to Nietzsche, lacked an easily 
recognisable goal and thus could also not easily fulfil the human desire cultivated by 
nearly two millennia of Christian thinking. Much in this vein, Nietzsche drew 
attention to the “nihilistic consequences of contemporary science.... Since Copernicus 
man has been rolling from the centre toward X ”45 As Glen Martin explains, prior to 
Copernicus, Europeans perceived themselves to be centred in the universe spiritually; 
they occupied centre stage in the cosmic drama of revelation and redemption. At the 
same time, however, Europeans had also perceived themselves to be centred 
physically in the universe, with the heavenly bodies rotating in perfect circles around 
their privileged position. As modem science advanced, it increasingly called into 
question this status, and perpetuated a displacement from this unique and privileged 
position towards a yet unknown ‘X.’46
Indeed, in light of the growing influence of the ‘Darwinian’ understanding of 
evolution, Nietzsche now found modem Europeans to understand themselves as 
standing in much closer relation to the animal kingdom than to the kingdom of God. 
With the rise of modem science, Europeans had been relegated from the status of 
God’s most important creature, to that of a sophisticated animal. Thus, Nietzsche 
noted, for example, how “[a]las, the faith in the dignity and uniqueness of man, in his
43 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, 7[54], pp. 312-13.
44 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, 2[131], p. 130.
45 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 1, p. 8.
41
irreplaceability in the great chain of being, is a thing of the past -  he has become an 
animal, literally and without reservation or qualification, he who was, according to his 
old faith, almost God (“child of God,” “Godman”).”47 What is more, this process, 
rather than reversing itself, seems instead to be continually perpetuating itself further. 
“Since Copernicus,” Nietzsche wrote in this regard, “man seems to have got himself 
on an inclined plane -  now he is slipping faster and faster away from the centre into -  
what? into nothingness? into a ‘penetrating sense of his nothingness’? ...”48 The 
discoveries of modem science and technology, Nietzsche thought, were increasingly 
carrying the modem European away from his traditional position in the ‘great chain of 
being’ and pushing him into an unknown region, without a clear goal or direction. 
Indeed:
All science (and by no means only astronomy, on the humiliating and 
degrading effect o f which Kant made the noteworthy confession: “it 
destroys my importance”...), all science ... has at present the object of  
dissuading man from his former respect for himself, as if  this had been 
nothing but a piece o f bizarre conceit.”49
Not surprisingly, Nietzsche would ultimately conclude that “the most universal sign 
of the modem age” is that “man has lost dignity in his own eyes to an incredible 
extent.”50 Modem science, in his view, could not easily provide the metaphysical 
comfort demanded by a European culture which had been accustomed to the balm of 
faith; it “never creates values” itself.51
Nietzsche, then, also saw the modem, scientific worldview as posing a 
considerable obstacle to those Europeans who wished to experience a more 
meaningful existence. Indeed, modem science had helped to destroy the concepts of 
‘purpose’ and ‘unity’ which had traditionally been of central importance in endowing
46 Glen T. Martin. From Nietzsche to Wittgenstein: The Problem o f  Truth and Nihilism in the Modem  
World. New York: Peter Lang, 1989, p. 12.
47 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 25, p. 155.
48 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 25, p. 155.
49 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 25, pp. 155-56.
50 Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 18, p. 16.
51 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 25, p. 153.
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European existence with a greater sense of meaning.52 To the extent, moreover, that 
modem European culture embraces, indeed even puts a primacy on science and 
scientific methodology, it will also find it difficult to answer the question of meaning 
in general, and the question of Europe’s meaning in particular. It is also precisely this 
inability of modem science to adequately address the question of meaning, in turn, 
which represents the second step in the attempt to trace genealogically the impasse in 
which the contemporary debate about the meaning of the European idea finds itself.
For, it will be recalled from the previous chapter that it is precisely the technical and
scientific nature of both modem European culture, and the form that the process of 
European integration has taken over the past decades, which several scholars have 
openly lamented within their discussions of the European idea in the post-Cold War 
era. A technocratic or functional idea of Europe seems insufficient for stimulating the 
European imagination. Taken together, moreover, these two interrelated processes, 
i.e. the challenge of Christianity through the rise of modem science and the 
subsequently perceived meaninglessness of a scientific European culture, can be seen 
as constituting the first phase of Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism. These 
first two steps of Nietzsche’s genealogy, in turn, can be distinguished from a second 
phase within Nietzsche’s genealogy of European nihilism which proceeds to an even 
deeper level, and towards which the next section turns.
4. Modern Science and the Will to Truth
Nietzsche’s investigation into the nature of modem science does not cease 
with the observation that it cannot endow European existence with a greater sense of 
meaning in the manner in which Christianity had previously done. Rather, Nietzsche 
provides another and more penetrating reason why, even if, and contrary to his own 
argument, modem science and its methodology could hypothetically serve as a 
unifying and meaningful source of European identity, its status would still remain 
problematic. It is here, moreover, that Nietzsche’s genealogy of modem European 
nihilism can be seen as entering into its second and deeper phase. The more profound 
problem, Nietzsche argued, that modem science confronts following the ‘death of
52 Cited in Henning Ottmann. Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987,
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God,’ is that of grounding its activities without recourse to the very language of 
traditional Christianity which it has contributed toward displacing. Crucial to this 
more sophisticated argument, is the recognition that modem science, despite its claim 
to be objective and without presuppositions, still rests on an underlying value. Indeed,
according to Nietzsche there is “no such thing as science ‘without any
presuppositions.’”53 Rather, he insisted that despite its appearance to the contrary, 
science actually “requires in every respect an ideal of value, a value-creating power, 
in the service of which it could believe in itself....”54 In Nietzsche’s account, the 
value still underlying the entire endeavour of modem science is that of ‘truth.’ Thus, 
in the Genealogy o f  Morals, for example, he argued how:
[t]hat which constrains these men [the modem scientists], however, this 
unconditional will to truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal itself even if  as an 
unconscious imperative -  don’t be deceived about that -  it is the faith in a 
metaphysical value, the absolute value o f truth, sanctioned and guaranteed 
by this ideal alone (it stands or falls with this ideal).55
The enterprise of modem science, in other words, is seen by Nietzsche to still rely, 
ultimately, on the underlying value of ‘truth’ and on the conviction that the 
knowledge that science yields is intrinsically good and worth being known.
Where, though, Nietzsche subsequently inquired, does science derive this 
overriding value from and how does it justify it? Ironically, according to Nietzsche, 
the value of tmth under which modem science heralds its research and expends its 
resources, is still ultimately derived from a much longer Christian-Platonic heritage 
that prevailed in Europe and which itself revolved around the ‘will-to-truth.’ “[W]e 
men of knowledge of today,” Nietzsche wrote in this vein, “we godless men and anti­
metaphysicians, we, too, still derive our flame from the fire ignited by a faith 
millennia old, the Christian faith, which was also Plato’s, that God is tmth, that tmth 
is divine.”56 The dedicated cultivation of tmth as an overriding value can, in other 
words, so Nietzsche argues, already be found in Platonic philosophy and the Christian
p. 343.
3 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 151.
54 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 25, p. 153.
55 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 151.
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faith, the later being, in his view, itself only a form of “Platonism for the ‘the 
people.”’ That the importance of telling the truth forms an important component of 
the Christian faith can, for example, be discerned by considering the importance of 
the Ten Commandments or by bearing in mind the important role played by 
confession in Christianity. Moreover, and as Bruce Detwiler further explains, because 
both Platonic philosophy and Christianity “assume that knowledge of ultimate truth is 
knowledge of the divine, both indirectly promote the quest for truth that gives rise to
c o
modem science.” Modem science, therefore, also remains continuous with one of 
the defining aspects of Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage, namely in its belief in the 
overriding value of tmth.
Not only, however, is modem science’s emphasis on the importance of tmth 
continuous with the Christian-Platonic cultivation of tmth in Nietzsche’s argument, 
but he sought to demonstrate how it was precisely the Christian emphasis of the 
importance of tmth which, over time, actually gave rise to scientific accounts of 
existence which, in turn, subsequently challenged the Christian worldview. Nietzsche, 
in other words, wished to draw attention to the ironic circumstance that it was
precisely Christian piety which, in the end, demanded that Europeans give up their
Christianity. It was man’s Christian commitment to the tmth that later compelled him 
to admit that the concept of God is a lie.59 As Nietzsche explains:
You see what it was that really triumphed over the Christian god: Christian 
morality itself, the concept of truthfulness that was understood ever more 
rigorously, the father’s confessor’s refinement o f the Christian conscience, 
translated and sublimated into a scientific conscience, into intellectual 
cleanliness at any price. Looking at nature as if  it were proof o f the 
goodness and governance of a god; interpreting history in honour o f some 
divine reason, as a continual testimony o f a moral world order and ultimate 
moral purposes; interpreting one’s own experiences as pious people have 
long enough interpreted theirs....60
56 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 152.
57 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Preface, p. 2.
58 Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Aristocratic Radicalism, p. 74.
59 Carr, Banalization o f  Nihilism, p. 39.
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The irony, then, is that it was Christianity’s very own moral hierarchy, with its 
emphasis on truth at any price that gave rise, over time, to a naturalistic account of 
events which, in turn, called into question the very metaphysical framework out of 
which it emerged.
Importantly, however, such an account also implies that the ‘death of God’ is 
not simply the result of Europeans having turned their back on Christianity. Rather, 
and this is often seen to be one of the very strength’s of Nietzsche’s account, the 
European experience of nihilism results from the sincere and consistent application of 
Christian values, rather than a simple and deliberate abandoning of them.61 “We 
outgrew Christianity,” Nietzsche maintained in this vein, “not because we lived too 
far from it, rather because we lived too close, even more because we grew out of it. It 
is our strict and over-indulged piety itself that today forbids us still to be 
Christians.” This, in turn, also accounts for why Nietzsche detected a kind of logic 
behind the advent of modem nihilism, why he asserted that nihilism is the necessary 
consequence of our valuations so far and why he claimed that the highest values 
devalue themselves.
What is more, the view that modem science still remains continuous with, and 
indeed arises from within, Europe’s Christian-Platonic tradition centred around the 
‘will-to-truth,’ also necessitates a reassessment of the radical break that science 
purports to constitute with relation to Christianity. While, on the one hand, modem 
science does indeed break with Christianity’s belief in a divine world, its overarching 
moral hierarchy and teleology of tmth has, on the other hand, still been retained from 
its Christian predecessor, which is why Nietzsche concluded that “[i]t is still a 
metaphysical faith that underlies our faith in science.”63 Indeed, he insisted, “[n]o 
doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed 
by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and 
history; and insofar as they affirm this ‘other world’ -  look, must they not by the same
60 Nietzsche, Gay Science 357, p. 307. See also The Will to Power where Nietzsche remarks that 
“[m]orality itself, in the form of honesty, compels us to deny morality.” 404, p. 219.
61 Carr, Banalization o f  Nihilism, p. 39.
62 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente J885-1887, p. 165. Trans. Carr, Banalization o f  Nihilism, p. 
40.
63 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 152.
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token negate its counterpart, this world, our world?”64 In this sense, then, the rise of 
modem science is, in fact, only the most recent manifestation of the much longer will- 
to-truth evident in the majority of post-Platonic European thought. Indeed, Nietzsche 
insisted, “[unconditional honest atheism ... is therefore not the antithesis of that ideal 
[the will to truth], as it appears to be; it is rather only one of the latest phases of its 
evolution, one of its terminal forms and inner consequences -  it is the awe-inspiring 
catastrophe of two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally forbids itself 
the lie involved in belief in God”65
If Nietzsche is correct in asserting that the value of truth which scientists 
pursue still ultimately derives from Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage, then the 
crucial question that arises is how modem science actually justifies its activities, 
indeed its underlying worldview, without recourse to the prior Christian framework 
which it has itself contributed towards displacing? How, in other words, does modem 
science propose to prioritise and ground the belief in the overriding value of tmth 
following the ‘death of God’? For, while the pursuit of tmth is certainly intelligible 
within a Christian framework that posits a supreme God which guarantees the 
existence of tmth, this pursuit of tmth becomes much more difficult to sustain once 
this metaphysical system collapses. This question is, in fact, not easy to answer. 
Indeed, Nietzsche himself was actually quite sceptical as to whether, in the aftermath 
of the ‘death of God,’ modem science could easily justify its elevation and prioritising 
of the value of tmth over any other possible value. As the Nietzsche scholar David 
Owen explains, modem science cannot actually accomplish this task: “science as the 
will to tmth cannot itself articulate a ground on which to assert the value of tmth;”66 
indeed, “[s]cience can neither create values nor ground the presuppositions of its own 
value....” The justification of modem science’s emphasis on the value of tmth is, 
then, in Nietzsche’s view not easily sustained following the ‘death of God’ and the 
demise of Christianity.
64 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 344, pp. 282-283.
65 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 27, p. 160.
66 David Owen. Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault, and the Ambivalence o f  Reason. 
London: Routledge, 1994, p. 59.
67 Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 90.
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In Nietzsche’s account, therefore, the ‘death of God’ also marks a critical and 
decisive juncture for modem scientists. Either scientists can refuse to problematise the 
‘will-to-truth’ and continue with the scientific enterprise as they have done in the past. 
The problem with this response, however, is that it is not very scientific, if by 
‘scientific’ one understands the open and critical evaluation and examination of all of 
one’s assumptions. Max Weber would later draw attention to this very problem in his 
famous lecture entitled “Science as a Vocation” when he observed that “[sjcience ... 
presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is 
‘worth being known.’ In this obviously are contained all our problems. For this
/TO
presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means.” In a sense, the unwillingness 
to scmtinise the prioritising of the value of tmth over all other values can, strictly 
speaking, even be said to constitute a breach of the scientific intellectual conscience. 
Nevertheless, Nietzsche anticipated that many scientist would simply opt, either 
consciously or unconsciously, for this strategy. In this case, however, science’s 
inability to ground the values to which it subscribes leads to the paradoxical situation 
whereby the scientists having “got rid of the Christian God, ... now feel obliged to 
cling all the more firmly to Christian morality,” i.e. to the notion of tmth.69 
Importantly, however, this was not the only option left to the modem scientist.
An alternative path for the modem scientist, one which would remain true to, 
and consistent with, the principles of the scientific spirit, would be to problematise the 
will-to-truth itself, and to subject it to critical scmtiny. It is in this vein that Nietzsche 
asserted that “the value of tmth must for once be experimentally called into
K\ *question.” It is a move which he further corroborated in the Genealogy o f  Morals, 
where he noted that:
[a]t this point it is necessary to pause and take careful stock. Science itself 
henceforth requires justification (which is not to say that there is any such 
justification). Consider on this question both the earliest and most recent
68 Cited in Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 89.
69 Nietzsche, Twilight o f  the Idols, “Expeditions o f an Untimely Man,” 5, p. 80. This reference is made 
by Nietzsche in relation to George Eliot and the English, but it can also be seen as applying to modem 
scientists more generally.
70 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 153. In an unpublished note written after Nietzsche had 
completed Part 3 o f Zarathustra, he had the latter claim that “We are conducting an experience with
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philosophers: they are all oblivious of how much the will to truth itself first 
requires justification; here the ascetic ideal has hitherto dominated all 
philosophy, because truth was posited as being, as God, as the highest 
court o f appeal -  because truth was not permitted  to be a problem at all. Is 
this ‘permitted’ understood? -  From the moment faith in the God o f  the 
ascetic ideal is denied a new problem arises: that o f the value o f truth.71
The problem, however, with following this strategy, in turn, is that while it arguably 
does remain true to the scientific spirit, it also, paradoxically, potentially opens the 
floodgates to the undermining of the basis of the scientific endeavour itself, at least in 
its modem rendition. For, now the ‘will-to-truth’ begins to put itself into question and 
even begins to prey on itself. As Nietzsche noted:
Christianity as a dogma was destroyed by its own morality ... [a]fter 
Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after another, it must end by 
drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself; this will 
happen, however, when it poses the question '‘what is the meaning o f  all 
will to truth?’ And here I again touch on my problem, on our problem, my 
unknown friends (for as yet I know o f no friend): what meaning would our 
whole being possess if  it were not this, that in us the will to truth becomes 
conscious o f itself as a problem ?2
It is at this very point, where the will to truth begins to question itself, that the 
experience of modem nihilism also reaches its highest stage. As David Owen rightly 
points out, “[njihilism emerges in that moment in which the will to tmth abolishes the 
ground of its own value and becomes conscious of itself as a problem.” For, now it 
is not only Christianity which becomes problematic, but the entire Christian-Platonic 
legacy of the will-to-truth, including those ‘secular’ practices which ultimately still 
derive from its moral hierarchy, such as modem science.
This deeper realisation, then, also helps to explain why Nietzsche understood 
himself to be standing at such a crucial turning point in the entire history of the West.
the truth!” Cited in Laurence Lampert. Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. Chicago: University o f Chicago 
Press, 1996, p. 23.
71 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, pp. 152-53.
72 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 27, p. 161.
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In modem Europe, Nietzsche argued, and after nearly two millennia, the pursuit of 
truth had finally begun to turn against the very metaphysical framework that made it 
intelligible in the first place and subsequently showed this framework to be both false 
and untenable. As Nietzsche summarised:
among the forces cultivated by [Christian] morality was truthfulness: this 
eventually turned against morality, discovered its teleology, its partial 
perspective -  and now the recognition of this inveterate mendaciousness 
that one despairs o f shedding becomes a stimulant. Now we discover in 
ourselves needs implanted by centuries o f moral interpretation -  needs that 
now appear to us as needs for untruth; on the other hand, the value for 
which we endure life seems to hinge upon these needs.74
To Nietzsche, in other words, the history of Western thought is characterised by the 
development of the will-to-truth culminating in the will-to-truth’s “putting itself in 
question.” The result of this development is not only that modem science cannot 
easily fill the spiritual vacuum left behind by the ‘death of God,’ but that modem 
science itself loses its grounding following this event. Importantly, however, it is also 
with this recognition that, as the next section illustrates, the deeper implications of the 
‘death of God’ and the advent of European nihilism finally begin to emerge.
5. European Nihilism and Europe’s (Christian-Platonic’ Heritage
Indeed, with the preceding discussion in mind, it is now possible to arrive at a 
more detailed and comprehensive understanding of what Nietzsche was referring to 
when he took, as was noted at the outset this chapter, the advent of European nihilism 
to mean “[t]hat the highest values devaluate th e m s e lv e s and that, moreover, in 
Europe the overall “aim is lacking” and the question ‘Why?’ no longer finds an 
answer.”75 The deeper and more sophisticated meaning of the advent of European 
nihilism entails not only the disenchantment of European culture at the hands of 
modem science, but it also means that even modem science itself faces immense 
difficulties in legitimising its own ground following the ‘death of God.’ For, with the
74 Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 5, p. 10.
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advent of European nihilism, it is not only of the foundations of Christianity and 
modem science which collapse, but the fundamental way of thinking that underlies 
them both, namely that of the will-to-truth. What, for Nietzsche, has become 
contested in modem times, in effect, is the credibility of an entire pattern of thinking 
that has predominated in Europe for over two millennia. In this sense, the advent of 
European nihilism implies not only that ‘God is dead,’ but, more importantly, also 
that “/ay// gods are dead’ as Nietzsche had Zarathustra observe.76 Put differently, 
with the advent of European nihilism and the self-questioning of the will-to-truth, any 
attempt to posit a deeper or ‘true’ meaning underlying European existence, i.e. any 
attempt to reactivate the will-to-truth and to posit a ‘true’ world, is no longer credible. 
As Martin Heidegger noted in his study of Nietzsche’s discussion of European 
nihilism, the ‘death of God’ means that the “suprasensory world is [now] without 
effective power. It bestows no life. Metaphysics, i.e., for Nietzsche Western 
philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an end.”77 This, then, is the much deeper 
implication of the advent of European nihilism.
In a section from The Twilight o f the Idols entitled “How the ‘True World’ at 
- last Became a Myth” Nietzsche himself summarised this process genealogically in six 
brief steps, noting how, after more than two thousand years, the will-to-truth had 
finally begun to prey on itself in modem Europe, thereby giving rise to the experience 
of meaninglessness. Nietzsche commences his brief history of the ‘will-to-truth’ with 
Plato. In Nietzsche’s view, Plato was amongst the first to posit the “true world, 
attainable to the wise, the pious, [and] the virtuous man.’ The ‘true’ world, for Plato,
T O
consisted of the non-empirical and eternal Forms. Plato, in Nietzsche’s account, thus 
stands at the beginning of a Western tradition which tended to denigrate the sensuous 
world for some higher and more true world. Indeed, according to Nietzsche, Plato’s is 
the “[o]ldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing” and in 
Nietzsche’s view, Plato himself thought that he was tmth. What Nietzsche is 
essentially drawing attention to here, as David Toole explains, is that “[s]ince Plato 
there has been a tendency in the West to give meaning to this world -  the world of our
75 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 1.2., p. 9.
76 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, Part I, “O f the Bestowing Virtue,” 3, p. 104.
77 Martin Heidegger. “Nietzsche’s Word God is dead” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 61.
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daily lives, filled as they are with violence, suffering, injustice, deception, and so on -  
by invoking another world, a true world, on the basis of which was can determine the 
aim, unity, and truth of this world.”79 The ‘true’ world, in this sense in which 
Nietzsche uses it here, stands for any attempt to abstract from the diversity and 
ambiguity of existence a fixed or ‘true’ meaning of existence.
This, moreover, is an insight of considerable importance for understanding the 
quest to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era. For, in 
contrast to those thinkers who do not engage directly with the question of what the 
meaning of ‘meaningful’ is, Nietzsche can be seen as offering a genealogical account 
of what the meaning of the term ‘meaningful’ was implicitly taken to be in Europe in 
the past. Indeed, what Nietzsche is illustrating in this passage on Plato, is the 
beginning of the process by which European existence had traditionally been 
endowed with a greater sense of meaning. In Nietzsche’s account, this process 
entailed invoking a metaphysical distinction between a merely apparent and 
meaningless realm of existence characterised by flux and uncertainty, and the 
postulation of a ‘true’ world, where the more eternal and ‘true’ meaning of existence 
was located. It is this distinction which traditionally ensured the possibility of 
obtaining a more meaningful idea of European existence.
Nietzsche continues his account of how the ‘true’ world gradually became a 
myth by noting that during the second stage of its history, the ‘true’ world became 
“unattainable for the moment, but [was nevertheless] promised to the wise, the pious, 
the virtuous man (to the sinner who repents).” The idea of the ‘true’ world becomes 
“more refined, more enticing, more incomprehensible, -  it becomes female, it 
becomes Christian.” Within the Christian faith, Nietzsche argued, the ‘true’ world was 
no longer as easily accessible as Plato had postulated; rather, it began to reside as a 
promise of an afterlife. Nevertheless, and as Bruce Detwiler notes in relation to this 
history, like Platonism “Christianity asserts that there is a universal and timeless ‘true 
world,’ independent of the apparent world, that is synonymous with the ‘good as 
such’ and also that there is such a thing as an omniscient ‘pure spirit’ that is
78 Toole, Waiting fo r  Godot in Sarajevo, p. 32.
79 Toole, Waiting fo r  Godot in Sarajevo, p. 32.
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independent of and superior to corporeal existence.” It is this similarity which led 
Nietzsche to claim, as was already noted, that Christianity is a form of Platonism ‘for 
the people’ and which allowed him to speak of Europe’s ‘Christian-Platonic’ heritage 
centred around the will-to-truth.
During the third stage of Nietzsche’s account of the development of the 
Western ‘will-to-truth,’ in turn, the ‘true’ world ultimately became “unattainable, 
undemonstrable, cannot be promised,” but it was still thought of as “a consolation, a 
duty, an imperative.” What is more, Nietzsche argued, “the idea has become elusive, 
pale, nordic, Konigsbergian.” The later is a reference to Kant’s philosophy which, in 
the Critique o f Pure Reason, demonstrated the limits of reason, and the impossibility 
of knowing the ‘true’ world in itself. In this way, the status of reason is limited to the 
apparent world, thereby saving the place of faith, the sphere of which cannot be 
penetrated by reason.
The last three stages of Nietzsche’s account, in turn, pertain to stages in 
Nietzsche’s own thought.81 Thus, by the fourth stage in the history of the will-to-truth 
it was finally recognised, Nietzsche argued, that irrespective of its hypothetical 
attainability, the ‘true’ world remained unattained to earthly inhabitants, “[a]nd if 
unattained also unknown. Consequently, also no consolation, no redemption, no duty: 
how could we have a duty to something unknown?” This stage is marked, Nietzsche 
argued, by the “first yawns of reason and the cockcrow of positivism.” If one cannot 
know the ‘true’ world, one can at least resolve to know the sensuous world, and 
ignore the ‘true’ world. Overtly metaphysical explanations, at this stage, are slowly 
replaced in Europe by more empirical and scientific ways of understanding existence. 
Yet, by the fifth and penultimate stage in the history of the idea of a ‘true’ world, even 
“[t]he ‘true’ world -  [is] an idea no longer of any use, not even a duty any longer ... 
an idea grown useless, superfluous, consequently a refuted idea: let us abolish it” -  
Plato blushes for shame, Nietzsche notes metaphorically, and the ‘free spirits’ (as well 
as the ‘good Europeans’ as will subsequently become clear) begin to emerge. Here, in 
other words, the will-to-truth begins, as we have seen, to put itself into question itself
80 Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Aristocratic Radicalism, p. 74.
81 Maudemarie Clark. Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990, p. 112.
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and to realise that even modem science still retains the metaphysical belief in a ‘true’ 
world. This insight, in turn, finally gives rise to the sixth and last stage in the history 
of the will-to-truth in which, Nietzsche argued, “[w]e have abolished the true world: 
what world is left? The apparent world perhaps? ... But no! with the true world we 
have also abolished the apparent world! (Mid-day; moment of shortest shadow; end 
of the longest error; zenith of mankind, incipit Zarathustra. ” The implications of this 
final realisation are, as Connolly explains, certainly profound, for, “the world of 
appearances has always been defined through contrast to the tme world, to the world 
as it is knowable in itself. If the later disappears, the world defined by its contrast to it 
must too. They come and go together.”82 After more than two thousand years of 
seeking to invoke a ‘tme’ world in order to give European existence a deeper sense of 
meaning, it is precisely this mechanism which has, in modem times, collapsed and 
thus also given rise to the experience of meaninglessness in Europe.
What emerges from Nietzsche’s discussion, then, is that with the advent of 
modem European nihilism it is no longer intellectually persuasive to endow European 
existence with a greater sense of meaning by invoking a metaphysical or ‘tme’ world 
that would mark the ‘tme’ or ‘deeper’ meaning of European existence. This in, turn, 
signals a profound rupture for European culture, for it entails not only the collapse of 
one ideal or another, but of a fundamental way of thinking that has predominated in 
Europe for over two thousand years. Indeed, as Bmce Detwiler has noted more 
recently, the ‘death of God’ ultimately refers to the collapse of “not only all 
theological faiths but also the various metaphysical faiths that have served as God 
surrogates since antiquity, and it would appear that this includes faith in science as a 
source of ultimate answers.”83 The contemporary philosopher Simon Critchley 
provides a similar assessment of the advent of European nihilism, pointing out that the 
‘death of God’ “does not only entail the death of God of the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
but also the death of all those ideals, norms, principles, mles, ends and values that are 
set above humanity in order to provide human beings with a meaning to life. Such is 
the twilight of the idols.”84 Indeed, Critchley adds, the advent of European nihilism
82 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, pp. 143-144.
83 Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Aristocratic Radicalism , p. 69.
84 Simon Critchley. Very Little ... Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature. London: Routledge, 
1997, p. 2.
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refers to the complete “breakdown of the order of meaning, where all that was posited 
as a transcendent source of value becomes null and void, where there are no skyhooks 
upon which to hang a meaning for life.”85 What began, therefore, as an observation 
about the increasing untenability of the Christian faith ends up revealing a much 
profounder and more pervasive problem, namely the putting into question not only of 
Christianity itself, but also of the very structures of European thinking as well as the 
mechanisms for rendering European existence meaningful which have prevailed 
throughout the majority of Europe’s entire Christian-Platonic heritage.
Indeed, if the advent of European nihilism entails that the question of meaning 
remains unanswered in modem times, then, metaphorically speaking, Europe would 
truly become unchained from its sun. “What has happened at bottom?” Nietzsche 
asked, and replied that:
[t]he feeling o f valuelessness was reached with the realisation that the 
overall character o f existence may not be interpreted by means o f the 
concept o f ‘aim,’ the concept o f ‘unity,’ or the concept o f ‘truth.’ Existence 
has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in the plurality o f events is 
lacking: the character of existence is not ‘true,’ is false. One simply lacks 
any reason for convincing oneself that there is a true world.87
With the advent of European nihilism, the will-to-truth can no longer serve as a guide 
for rendering existence more meaningful; it has become intellectually incredible and 
these, in turn, are the full and deeper implications of the advent of European nihilism 
in Nietzsche’s account. It is here, moreover, that the second, and more profound, 
phase of Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism completes itself. This second 
and deeper phase of Nietzsche’s genealogy of European nihilism, entails the first 
phase, i.e. the challenge of Christianity through modem science, but it also extends 
further in the sense that it also recognises the problematic nature of modem science 
itself following the ‘death of God.’ Modem science, in Nietzsche’s account, is still 
continuous with the ‘will-to-truth’ around which Europe’s two-thousand year 
Christian-Platonic heritage is centred, and it is precisely this will-to-truth which has,
85 Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, p. 7.
86 See also Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem, p. 132.
87 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 12 A, p 13.
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in modem times, begun to put itself into question. In this sense, then, the ‘crisis’ of 
European nihilism runs very deep indeed, for it means that the fundamental 
mechanism with which Europeans have endowed their existence with a greater sense 
of meaning for over two thousand years has become untenable, with the result that all 
ideals now seem incommensurate.
6. European Nihilism and the European Debate
This discussion of European nihilism, moreover, bears directly on the question 
raised in the introduction of this thesis, namely why it is proving so difficult to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era. For, Nietzsche 
can, in this account, be seen as illuminating to the contemporary scholar of European 
affairs the tme depth and magnitude of the crisis which still afflicts contemporary 
Europeans. This crisis consists of the process by which ‘Europe,’ understood 
historically by Nietzsche as the ‘will-to-truth,’ has begun to put itself into question. In 
this sense, Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism can be seen as providing its 
contemporary readers with an understanding of what Europe was in the past, how 
Europe traditionally rendered its existence meaningful, namely by means of the will- 
to-truth, and why, in turn, this avenue can no longer be persuasively pursued within 
the cultural configuration of European modernity, thereby giving rise to the European 
experience of meaninglessness. In the first instance, therefore, Nietzsche’s account 
serves to demonstrate that the current problem is actually part of a much longer and 
deeper problem that emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century, if not earlier.
What is more, however, Nietzsche’s account can also assist contemporary 
scholars in understanding why Europeans would actually continue to desire the 
articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe in the aftermath of the ‘death of 
God,’ and why they would find the absence of such an idea both disconcerting and 
indicative of a lacking ‘spiritual vitality.’ In Nietzsche’s view, it was precisely 
because of the formative impact of Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage that it would 
require some time before Europeans would be able to renounce the necessity for 
positing a deeper or ‘tme’ meaning underlying European existence. As Nietzsche
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insisted, “it is in one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral one, that nihilism is
o o
rooted.” Much in this vein, Nietzsche himself had anticipated how the impact of the 
advent of European nihilism would frequently be uncomfortable and disorienting. In 
one passage, for example, Nietzsche hypothesised that Europeans might even ‘bleed 
to death’ from this realisation. “The tragic thing,” he noted in this regard:
is that we can longer believe those dogmas o f  religion and metaphysics, 
once we have the rigorous method of truth in our hearts and heads, and yet 
on the other hand, the development o f mankind has made us so delicate, 
sensitive and ailing that we need the most potent kinds o f cures and 
comforts -  hence arises the need that man might bleed to death from the 
truth he has recognised.89
It is also for this reason that Nietzsche defined a nihilist as “a man who judges, of the 
world as it is, that it ought not to be, and of the world as it ought to be, that it does not 
exist.” On the one hand, modem Europeans would feel uncomfortable with a world 
that appeared to be meaningless. “[T]he pathos of the ‘in vain,”’ Nietzsche noted, “is 
the nihilist’s pathos.”90 At the same time, however, Europeans could no longer easily 
convince themselves of any greater meaning to existence once the will-to-truth began 
to put itself into question. It is precisely this “antagonism -  not to esteem what we 
know, not to be allowed any longer to esteem the lies we should like to tell ourselves 
-  [that] results in a process of dissolution.”91 In this regard, moreover, Nietzsche’s 
analysis can also help, in the second instance, to illuminate why many Europeans 
would, on the one hand, still desire a more meaningful representation of their future, 
and why the absence of such a representation, in turn, would frequently lead to 
pessimistic accounts of European culture.
Finally, by exposing the true depth and magnitude of the ‘crisis of meaning,’ 
Nietzsche’s account can also help the contemporary scholar understand why it 
continues to prove so difficult to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe. After 
having sought a ‘meaning’ in all events, and after having come to believe that some
88 Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 1, p. 7.
89 Friedrich Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human. Trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann. London: 
Penguin, 1984, III, 109, p. 78.
90 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 585 A, p. 318.
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goal is to be achieved through the process, modem Europeans are likely, in 
Nietzsche’s view, to lose faith in the existence of such meaning and to suspect that 
becoming “aims at nothing and achieves nothing”92 Indeed, this, for Nietzsche, is 
precisely the ‘question mark’ of modem European nihilism:
Have we not exposed ourselves to the suspicion o f an opposition -  an 
opposition between the world in which we are at home up to now with our 
reverences that perhaps made it possible for us to endure life, and another 
world that consists o f  us -  an inexorable, fundamental, and deepest 
suspicion about ourselves that is more and more gaining worse and worse 
control o f us Europeans and that could easily confront coming generations 
with a terrifying Either/Or; ‘Either abolish your reverences or -  
yourselves/” The latter would be nihilism; but would not the former also be 
- nihilism? - This is our question mark.93
The deeper implication of the advent of European nihilism is that now any attempt to 
posit a ‘tme’ meaning underlying European existence becomes intellectually 
unconvincing. Once the will-to-truth begins to put itself into question, Europeans can 
simply no longer convince themselves that there is a greater or ‘tme’ meaning 
underlying human existence. Indeed, Nietzsche concluded, in modem Europe one 
“forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities -  
but cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny i t ”94 This condition of 
not being able to experience a meaningful existence, Nietzsche referred to as 
European nihilism and understood it as “the really tragic problem of our modem 
world....”95 As Nietzsche concluded, in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’ modem 
European existence appears to be “a hiatus between two nothingnesses,”96 i.e. an 
existence caught between myths that now seemed unacceptable on the one hand, and a 
pervasive feeling of meaninglessness on the other. By illustrating the tme depth and 
magnitude of this experience, moreover, Nietzsche’s account also helps to explain, in 
the third instance, why it remains so difficult, even in the contemporary context, to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe.
91 Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 5, p. 10.
92 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 12 A, p. 12.
93 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 346, p. 287.
94 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 12 A, p. 13.
95 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, 7[8], p. 291.
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Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, then, it might be said that Nietzsche is to modernity 
much as the madman is to the marketplace.97 Indeed, it is now clear that Nietzsche’s 
reference to the ‘death of God’ and the advent of European nihilism constitutes more 
than just an observation about the collapse of Christianity. Rather, it provides a 
complex account of a much deeper and more profound problem which arose in 
modem Europe and with which scholars are still engaging today. In this sense, 
Nietzsche’s genealogy of the modem European experience of meaninglessness can 
also be conceptualised as proceeding in two important phases. In the first instance, the 
European experience of meaninglessness derives from the disenchantment of 
European existence at the hands of modem science. In this phase, however, the will- 
to-truth still remains operational within the context of modem science. In the second, 
and more profound, phase, the will-to-truth begins to put itself into question. With this 
second realisation, moreover, it becomes clear that although European existence had 
traditionally been endowed with a greater sense of meaning by invoking a 
metaphysical distinction between a merely ‘apparent’ world on the one hand, and a 
‘true’ world which lurked behind or above earthly existence on the other, it is 
precisely this mechanism which, with the advent of European nihilism, has become 
incredible and lost its ability to endow European existence with a greater sense of 
meaning. By virtue of illuminating this process, moreover, Nietzsche’s discussion of 
European nihilism can be seen as marking the formative genealogical milestone in 
comprehending the contemporary European inability to find a more meaningful 
representation of its future.
In fact, Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism has helped to illuminate 
several features of the contemporary impasse in the debate on the idea of Europe. In 
the first instance, Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism illustrates how 
Europeans had traditionally endowed existence with a greater sense of meaning and 
how, in turn, this mechanism became increasingly untenable with the context of
96 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente J885-1887, 10[34], p. 473.
97 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 12.
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European modernity. Europe, understood by Nietzsche as the will-to-truth, began, 
with the advent of European nihilism, to put itself into question. Nietzsche thus not 
only provides his readers with an understanding of what ‘Europe’ is, but also how it 
has traditionally rendered its existence meaningful. In this sense, the contemporary 
problem is also part of a much longer problem that can be traced back at least to the 
end of the nineteenth century, if not earlier. Secondly, Nietzsche’s analysis of the 
advent of European nihilism assists in understanding \#hy Europeans, even after the 
advent of European nihilism, would, in light of Europe’s formative Christian-Platonic 
heritage, continue to habitually desire the balm of a more meaningful idea of Europe 
even after the ‘death of God,’ and why the inability to articulate such an idea often 
leads to pessimism. Finally, by exposing the actual depth and magnitude of the 
European experience of meaninglessness, i.e. the self-questioning of the will-to-truth,’ 
Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism also illuminates the profound difficulties 
which still afflict any contemporary attempt to articulate a more meaningful idea of 
Europe. Indeed, with the advent of European nihilism it became increasingly 
impossible for Europeans to convince themselves intellectually of the existence of a 
‘true’ world. Nietzsche’s account of European nihilism can, therefore, still be seen to 
be profoundly relevant to the question of why it is proving so difficult to articulate a 
more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era. What is more, it was also 
precisely in response to this very predicament that Nietzsche advanced his idea of the 
‘good Europeans.’
Before returning, however, to the contemporary debate on the idea of Europe 
and Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good Europeans,’ it is necessary to further corroborate 
this close relationship between Nietzsche’s analysis of European nihilism and the 
contemporary discussion of the European idea by tracing the persistence of European 
nihilism throughout the course of the twentieth century. Already as early as 1799, the 
German philosopher Friedrich Jacobi had employed the term ‘nihilism’ in his “Letter
Q O
to Fichte,” insisting that human beings have only a single choice alluded to in the 
title of this chapter: “Nothingness or a God. ... There is no third.”99 In Nietzsche’s
98 See Critchley, Very Little ... Almost Nothing, p. 3.
99 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. “Brief an Fichte.” Appelation an das Publikum. Dokumente zum 
Atheismusstreit Jena 1798/99. Leipzig: Reclam, 1987, p. 168. Quoted in Critchley, Very Little ... 
Almost Nothing, p. 4.
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view, however, the challenge confronting Europeans in the course of the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries would be to investigate whether Jacobi would, in this sense, 
not only have the first word on nihilism, but also the last, or, whether, alternatively, it 
would be possible to articulate a meaningful idea of Europe without recourse to the 
traditional metaphysical hypotheses. To Nietzsche, in other words, the question of 
how to live with the ‘death of God’ would constitute one of the greatest challenges for 
Europeans in the course of the twentieth century. Indeed, he had asked both 
ominously and metaphorically, “[h]ow shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of 
all murderers? What holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled 
to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood of us? What water is there for us 
to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to 
invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us?”100 It is in this vein, then, 
that the next chapter turns towards a consideration of the legacy of the problem of 
European nihilism in the twentieth century, focusing, in particular, on its relationship 
to the European crisis which initially prompted the emergence of the institutional 
project of Europe.
100 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 125, p. 181.
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CHAPTER 3
EUROPEAN NIHILISM AND ANNIHILATION IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
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EUROPEAN NIHILISM  AND ANNIHILATION IN 
THE TW ENTIETH CENTURY
In order to further corroborate the argument that the contemporary debate on 
how to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe is still, at bottom, Nietzsche’s 
question of how to confront the advent of European nihilism, this chapter illustrates 
how the problem delineated by Nietzsche persisted in Europe throughout the course of 
the twentieth century. In particular, this chapter considers some prominent, twentieth- 
century examples which testify to the actual advent of the first phase of European 
nihilism as anticipated by Nietzsche, namely the increasing disenchantment of 
European existence which resulted from the ‘death of God’ and the ascendancy of 
modem science.1 What emerges from such an analysis, however, is not only that the 
experience of meaninglessness did indeed persist throughout the course of the 
twentieth century, but also that this experience actually manifested itself most 
explicitly within the context of the violent conflicts that divided Europe during the 
twentieth century and against the background of which the institutional project of 
Europe was initiated. Often it was precisely the urge to transcend and escape the 
disorienting experience of nihilism and to reconstitute some greater form of meaning 
which served to fuel the two world wars and the Cold War that followed. These 
violent conflicts are thus also very real examples of the violent potential inherent in 
strategies which seek to reactivate the will-to-truth under modem conditions by trying 
to create a ‘tme’ world based on more earthly notions such as nation, class or race. 
Tracing the persistence of the experience of European nihilism through the course of 
the twentieth century thus not only serves to corroborate the argument that the 
contemporary impasse in the European debate is still, at bottom, Nietzsche’s question 
of how to confront the advent of European nihilism, but it also shows that his analysis 
still bears decisively on the question of how to delineate, as Europeanists wish to do, a 
viable response the divisive and violent nature of European history in the twentieth 
century.
1 For a review o f the most prominent literature see Charles Irving Glicksberg. The Literature o f  
Nihilism. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1975.
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1. Nietzsche, Nihilism and Annihilation
Nietzsche himself thought that the advent of European nihilism might lead to 
catastrophe in the course of the twentieth century. It will be recalled from the previous 
chapter that, in his account, the advent of European nihilism referred to a profound 
cultural crisis, the magnitude of which could hardly be overestimated. Indeed, 
Nietzsche argued, the advent of European nihilism was likely to result in the 
experience of an uncomfortable tension between Europe’s cultural heritage which had 
emphasised the existence of a greater meaning and purpose underlying European 
existence, on the one hand, and the inability, following the ‘death of God,’ to 
articulate a compelling substitute, on the other. Thus, in Nietzsche’s view, the crucial 
question confronting Europeans in the twentieth century (as well as the twenty-first) 
was how they would respond to this rupture. In theory, one option for Europeans 
would be to simply side-step the crisis by relinquishing the desire to have their 
existence endowed with a greater sense of meaning or purpose. In light of Europe’s 
lengthy and formative Christian-Platonic heritage, however, Nietzsche thought that it 
was very unlikely that the majority of Europeans would, in fact, pursue this course in 
the short term. If anything, he argued, the absence of meaning in their lives would 
produce only the opposite; it would lead Europeans to demand such meaning with 
even greater intensity than before.2 Europeans would thus be left, Nietzsche thought, 
in the peculiar circumstance where the ‘religious’ instinct for meaning was growing 
powerfully at exactly the same time that theistic satisfaction was being increasingly 
refused with deep suspicion.3
How, though, might Europeans seek to comfort themselves, how might they 
determine a new ‘Why?’, i.e. a non-Christian method of rendering existence 
meaningful in the twentieth century? In Nietzsche’s account, a likely outcome was 
that many Europeans would resort, either intentionally or unconsciously, to a form of 
what he metaphorically called ‘intoxication’ or ‘narcotization.’ As Nietzsche 
formulated it in a posthumously published fragment:
2 See, for example, his comment on Thomas Carlyle. Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight o f  the Idols. Trans. 
R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1990, ‘Expeditions o f an Untimely Man,’ 12, p. 85.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans, by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 
1989, 53, p. 66.
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The ways o f  self-narcotization. -  Deep down: not knowing whither.
Emptiness. Attempt to get over it only by intoxication: intoxication as 
music; intoxication as cruelty in the tragic enjoyment o f the destruction o f  
the noblest; intoxication as blind enthusiasm for single human beings or 
ages (as hatred, etc.) -  Attempt to work blindly as an instrument of  
science: ....4
Nietzsche, in other words, posited that in the attempt to fend off and overcome the 
disorienting experience of meaninglessness in the twentieth century, Europeans might 
turn to questionable, and perhaps even violent, ways of overcoming this experience. 
Indeed, he noted, in the aftermath of the ‘death of God* Europeans would be seeking a 
“temporary redemption from pessimism,” and in this quest would, in his view, turn, 
amongst other things, to ‘great wars,’ ‘strong military organisations,’ and 
‘nationalism.’5 The first way, then, in which Nietzsche hypothesised that the advent of 
European nihilism would become significant for Europeans in the course of the 
twentieth century, is that this disorienting experience of meaninglessness would 
spawn great and potentially violent attempts aimed at overcoming it.
There was, however, also a second and closely related way in which Nietzsche 
thought the advent of European nihilism would affect Europeans in the course of the 
twentieth century. This second relationship derives from the scope that any such 
attempts to reconstitute European existence with meaning were likely to take. Despite 
his own intellectual efforts to the contrary, Nietzsche thought that it would be very 
unlikely that the ideas advanced in order to fill the spiritual vacuum left behind by the 
‘death of God’ would be European in scope. Rather, the collapse of the Christian idea 
of Europe would herald, he thought, a violent period of European history in which 
statesmen would seek to forfeit a European solution in favour of narrower ambitions.6 
In Nietzsche’s metaphorical language, the Christian ‘ice’ was beginning to thaw, 
leaving behind only large icebergs, i.e. modem European states, destructively 
colliding into one another other. “[W]e are still caught,” he maintained, “in the ice-
4 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1968, 29, p. 20.
5 Friedrich Nietzsche. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, KSA 12, 
9 [126], p. 410.
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filled river of the Middle Ages.” Yet, “it has thawed and begun to rush relentlessly 
and destructively. The great sheets of ice collide and all shores are flooded and 
endangered.” If, as Keith Ansell-Pearson suggests, it was the Christian framework 
which had traditionally provided not only European existence with meaning, but, 
through cultivating popular sentiment and a common identity, had also served as a 
mechanism towards internal peace,8 then the ‘death of God* might pose a formidable 
obstacle to the preservation of both a meaningful and peaceful European existence in 
the twentieth century. In the absence of an overarching idea of Europe “almost 
everything on earth,” Nietzsche thought, would be “determined by the most common 
and evil forces, by the egoism of acquisitors and military despots.” What is more, 
“[i]n the hands of the latter, the state attempts, as does the egoism of the acquisitors, 
to organise everything anew from out of itself and to be the bond and the pressure for 
all those hostile forces; that is to say, the state wants human beings to idolise it in the 
same way that they previously idolised the Church. With what success? We will have 
to witness this.”9 Following the death of God, in other words, attempts to reendow 
European existence with meaning would, Nietzsche anticipated, no longer be 
constituted along European lines. Rather, Europeans would choose instead to devote 
themselves to “narrower values (like the ‘nation’).”10 Indeed, in his view one of the 
greatest dangers confronting Europeans in the course of the twentieth century was the 
loss of a European voice.11 The two principal ways, then, in which Nietzsche thought 
the European experience of meaninglessness would effect Europe in the twentieth 
century, is that, firstly, this experience would spawn attempts to reendow existence 
with a sense of purpose of meaning and, secondly, that the purposes likely to be 
advocated in this quest would be national, rather than European, in scope.
With this analysis in mind, it comes as less of a surprise that Nietzsche also 
referred to the advent of European nihilism as “a pathological, transitional stage in the
6 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 7[8], p. 292.
7 Friedrich Nietzsche. Untimely Meditations. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator,’ 4, p. 148.
8 Keith Ansell-Pearson. An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 86.
9 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator, ’ 4, p. 150.
10 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente J885-1887, 7[8], p. 292.
11 “Nietzsche sagt sehr deutlich, die grosste Gefahr fur Europa sei, ‘die Stimme fur die Seele Europas 
zu verlieren....’” Josef Nolte. Wir guten Europaer: Historisch-politische Versuche iiber uns selbst. 
Tubingen: Narr, 1991, p. 207.
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history of Europe” and as the “danger of all dangers.”12 Indeed, it helps to explain 
why Nietzsche’s predictions for Europe in the twentieth century were often 
apocalyptic and catastrophic in nature, anticipating great upheavals. There are several 
passages of his which posit this relationship between the advent of European nihilism 
and the violent dissolution of Europe in the twentieth century quite clearly. In the first 
passage, Nietzsche wrote that:
What I relate [in 1888] is the history o f the next two centuries. I describe 
what is coming, what can no longer come differently: the advent o f  
nihilism. This history can be related even now; for necessity itself is here at 
work. This future speaks even now in a hundred signs, this destiny 
announces itself everywhere.... For some time, our whole European culture 
has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is 
growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river 
that wants to end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect.13
In a second passage Nietzsche also referred to the impending dissolution of Europe by 
insisting that “[disintegration characterises this time, and thus uncertainty: nothing 
stands firmly on its feet or on hard faith in itself; one lives for tomorrow, as the day 
after tomorrow is dubious.” Furthermore, “[ejverything on our way is slippery and 
dangerous, and the ice that still supports us has become thin: all of us feel the warm, 
uncanny breath of the thawing wind, where we still walk, soon no one will be able to 
walk.”14 In yet a third passage, Nietzsche even alludes to the possibility of 
unprecedented wars in the course of the twentieth century:
When truth enters into a fight with the lies o f  millennia, we shall have 
upheavals, a convulsion o f earthquakes, a moving o f valleys and 
mountains, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of  
politics will have entirely been merged with war of and for minds; all 
power structures o f the old society will have been exploded -  all o f them 
are based on lies: there will be wars, the like o f which have never been yet 
on earth.15
12 Nietzsche, Will to Power, p. 45. See also Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 
2[100], p. 109.
13 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Preface, 2, p. 3.
14 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 57, p. 40.
15 Friedrich Nietzsche. Ecce Homo Trans. Walter Kaufrnann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random 
House, 1967, “Why I am a destiny,” 1, p. 327.
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Indeed, Nietzsche added, “[a]s the will to truth thus gains self-consciousness -  there 
can be no doubt of that -  morality will gradually perish now: this is the great 
spectacle in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe....”16 
Finally, Nietzsche even referred explicitly to the coming of “a few warlike centuries 
that have no parallel in history; in short, we have entered the classical age o f  war, of 
scientific and at the same time popular war on the largest scale (in weapons, talents,
1 n
and discipline).” These passages, moreover, also demonstrate that it is not fortuitous 
that Nietzsche should have reflected on the possible future implications entailed by 
the advent of European nihilism for Europeans in the twentieth century. Rather, 
interrogating modem times from the perspective of imaginary points in the future
1 ftformed an integral part of Nietzsche’s intellectual strategy. Indeed, Nietzsche 
himself had Zarathustra proclaim that “I walk among men as fragments of the 
future”19 and had him warn his readers that “I flew too far into the future: a horror
90assailed me.” In this sense, then, relating Nietzsche’s discussion of European 
nihilism to the catastrophic course of European history in the twentieth century is not 
so much to apply his work out of context as it is achieving the opposite.21 The 
remainder of this chapter, therefore, turns towards surveying some of the references, 
both scholarly and those based on lived experience, which testify to the respective 
role played by the experience of meaninglessness in the two world wars, as well as the 
Cold War.
16 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Genealogy o f  Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New  
York: Random House, 1967, III, 27, p. 161.
17 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974, 
362, p. 318.
18 William E. Connolly. Political Theory and Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, p. 6.
19 Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1961, Part 
Two, ‘O f Redemption,’ p. 161.
20 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘ Of the Land o f Culture’, p. 142. See also Nietzsche, Nachgelassene 
Fragmente 1887-1889, KSA 13, p. 18, where he asks ‘where are the barbarians o f the twentieth 
century?’
21 Indeed, Elisabeth Kuhn points out that Nietzsche’s analysis o f European nihilism does not at all 
restrict itself to the past, nor even the present, but also to seeks to anticipate the future, because 
Nietzsche wanted to describe what for future generations will already have been the past. Friedrich 
Nietzsches Philosophie des europaischen Nihilismus. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1992, p. 200.
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2. European Nihilism and the First World War
Beginning with World War I, it was the German philosopher Karl Lowith who 
was amongst the first to explicitly consider the relationship between the advent of 
European nihilism and the occurrence of the First World War. The thesis he advanced 
was that “[n]ihilism as the disavowal of existing civilisation was the only real belief 
of all truly educated people at the beginning of the twentieth century” and, 
consequently, that “[n]ihilism is not a result of the Great War but, on the contrary, its
77cause.” It was, moreover, a thesis which he would later explore further in his essay 
“European Nihilism: Reflections on the Spiritual and Historical Background of the
7^
European War.” To what extent philosophical concepts and categories can be 
legitimately applied to the analysis of complex social phenomena like war is, of 
course, one of the enduring academic debates of the twentieth century.24 Moreover, 
the causes of the outbreak of World War I, both immediate and long-term, are 
undoubtedly multiple and complex. Nevertheless, Lowith has gathered considerable 
historical evidence to suggest that the widespread experience of meaninglessness 
evident prior to the outbreak of war played an important role that, at least initially, 
served to fuel the strong emotions which informed the outbreak of the First World 
War. What is more, historians of the First World War have themselves repeatedly 
argued that the general mood in Europe prior to the outbreak of war is of historical 
significance in accounting for the outbreak of the war. Thus, Marc Ferro, for example, 
reminds his readers that the “elation is a factor in the origins of the war and of its 
after-taste, and deserves as much stress as the more strictly economic or political
7 ^causes.” Another historian, James Joll, similarly points out in his study of the 
origins of- the—First. World War that “[i]t is these attitudes which made the war
22 Karl Lowith “The Historical Background o f European Nihilism” in Nature, History, and 
Existentialism: an Other Critical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History. Edited by Arnold Levison. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 10. His view has been supported more recently by 
Roland Stromberg’s study Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914. Lawrence: Regents Press 
ofKansas, 1982.
23 Karl Lowith. Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995, pp. 173-234.
24 Theodor Adorno, for example, was very critical o f writers such as Spengler, Jiinger and Heidegger 
for what he saw as their anti-Marxist approach o f applying metaphysical concepts directly to social 
analysis. This is not to say that Adomo refused to acknowledge the problem o f nihilism, but rather that 
he sought to distil its origins not so much in philosophy as by means of a Weberian social analysis. See 
Simon Critchley. Very Little ... Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature. London and New  
York: Routledge, 1997, p. 20.
25 Marc Ferro. The Great War: 1914-1918. Trans. Nicole Stone. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1973, p. xi. Moreover, for Friedrich Meinecke this very elation constituted his most cherished memory
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of the First World War that “[i]t is these attitudes which made the war possible; and it 
is still in an investigation of the mentalities of the rulers of Europe and their subjects 
that the explanation of the causes of the war will ultimately lie.”26 When accounting 
for the outbreak of war, then, it is necessary not only to consider the immediate 
political and economic causes, but also to take into account the predominant mood of 
Europeans at the time.
Importantly, however, and as Joll further points out, the task of establishing 
the overall mood in Europe at the time of the First World War is confounded by 
methodological difficulties, especially in light of the subtle variations between 
countries, classes, social groups, etc.27 In this sense, the ‘mood of 1914’ can only be 
approached impressionistically at best. Nevertheless, there is agreement that this is an 
important task, and it is, moreover, also a task which Karl Lowith was engaged in. 
What Lowith wished to draw particular attention to, was the fact that the mood 
evident amongst many Europeans prior to 1914 was precisely one characterised by the 
experience of meaninglessness, by an inability to identify meaningfully with the 
modes of existence that prevailed in Europe at the time. In this vein, Lowith cited, for 
example, from the preface of the third annual Yearbook fo r  the Spiritual Movement 
(1912) which was influential amongst the literary circle around Stefan George. In the 
preface, written two years before the outbreak of war, one could read that “[e]ven the 
dim eye does not fail to observe the general cheerlessness spreading despite all 
improvements, alleviations and amusements, provoking the comparison with the late 
Roman Empire. From the Emperor to the humblest worker everyone feels that it 
cannot go on in this way.” What is more, “[njobody believes any longer in the 
foundations of the present state of the world. These pessimistic presentiments and 
divinations represent the truest feelings of the time and all hopes to build something
9 oon nothing have, therefore, the look of despair.” In this sense, both the war itself, as
of the war: “The exaltation of spirit experienced during the August days o f  1914, in spite o f its 
ephemeral character, is one of the most precious, unforgettable memories o f the highest sort.... One 
perceived in all camps that it was not a matter merely o f the unity o f a gain-seeking partnership -  but 
that an inner renovation o f our whole state and culture was needed. We generally believed, indeed, that 
this had already commenced and that it would progress further in the common experience o f war.” 
Cited in Eric J Leed. No M an’s Land: Combat & Identity in World War I. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 48-49.
26 James Joll. The Origins o f  the First World War. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 1992, p. 229.
27 See Joll, The Origins o f  the First World War, p. 199.
28 Lowith, “The Historical Background o f European Nihilism,” p. 10.
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well as the nationalist sentiments which propelled it, might be seen, at least in part, as 
attempts to escape or overcome the experience of meaninglessness prevalent towards 
the beginning of the twentieth century, as ‘intoxicating’ ways of reinstating a sense of 
meaning or purpose to European existence.29
Over the course of the past decades, this important aspect of the First World 
War has also gained increasing attention and endorsement by historians studying the 
origins of the war. Indeed, the important role that organised violence can have in 
rendering existence meaningful has recently been re-emphasised by Anne Norton, 
who reminds her readers that “[t]he common characterisation of violence as 
‘meaningless’ is ... foolish and misleading. Violence is seen not only as invested with 
meaning but also as a means -  perhaps the most important means -  of inscribing that 
meaning upon the world.”30 Similarly, the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka pertinently 
noted in relation to traditional attempts aimed at understanding the First World War, 
that “the idea that war ... has itself the power of bestowing meaning, is an idea 
foreign to all philosophies of history and so also to all the explanations of the world 
war we know.”31 In 1914, in particular, there were many young men in Germany, 
France and England who, despite often having enjoyed a materially saturated 
existence, understood themselves to be living in a decadent world without a greater or 
underlying sense of meaning or purpose. There were a significant number of young 
men who, as one historian points out, had been “[r]eared in safe, cosy and 
comfortable surroundings” and “trained by their families to aim for ever-increasing 
material achievements.” Nevertheless, they “greeted the war with an intensity that 
transcended national traditions.” “Everywhere,” the historian Gordon Martel adds, 
“they spoke in idealistic terms of the great unifying spiritual crusade that they were 
undertaking -  a crusade that was the more estimable because it so clearly eschewed 
petty considerations of material self-interest.”33 Moreover, when war came, many of 
them longed of “merging into the whole” and of bringing about a new unity in
29 The relationship between the advent of European nihilism and the rise o f  modem nationalism is 
considered in greater detail in Chapter 5.
30 Anne Norton. Reflections on Political Identity. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1988, p. 6.
31 Jan Patocka. “Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War” in Heretical Essays 
in the Philosophy o f  History. Trans. Erazim Kohak. Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 120.
32 Gordon Martel. “Generals Die in Bed: Modem Warfare and the Origins o f Modernist Culture.” 
Journal o f  Canadian Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3 and 4, Autumn-Winter 1981, pp. 2-3.
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fighting for a common purpose.34 “There comes again and again,” Nietzsche himself 
had once noted, “the hour when the masses are ready to stake their life, their goods, 
their conscience, their virtue so as to acquire that higher enjoyment, and as a 
victorious, capriciously tyrannical nation to rule over other nations.. ..”35
Often, then, the First World War was seen as presenting the opportunity to 
leave behind them what was perceived as a largely meaningless existence and to 
search for meaning in the experience of war itself. In this sense, the initial experience 
of war was clearly not H. G. Well’s unequivocal “war to end all wars.”36 Rather, as 
the historian Eric J. Leed reminds his readers, “[t]he war experience [was] an ultimate 
confirmation of the power of men to ascribe meaning and pattern to a world, even 
when that world seems to resist all patterning.” What is more, Leed notes, “[t]he war 
mobilised all the cultural resources of meaning available to Europeans in the first 
decades of the twentieth century. It allows us to see what those resources were, not as 
an abstract system of thought, but as something which rendered experience coherent 
and meaningful.” Indeed, Patocka further argued with specific reference to the 
experience of the front warfare during the First World War that, “[i]t is not the 
fascination of the abyss and the romance of adventure; it is no perversion of natural 
sentiments. The person on the front line is gradually overcome by an overwhelming 
sense of meaningfulness which would be hard to put into words. It is a feeling capable
-jo u
of persisting for many years.” Not everyone, of course, experienced the front this 
way. Mostly, there was an initial and persisting revulsion at the experience of war. In 
this case, as Patocka notes further, the experience is one of utter meaninglessness, one 
of despair at the horror and the world that produced it. It is the kind of experience 
immortalised by Babusse. Yet, even this experience of utter despair and 
meaninglessness would often quickly turn into something ‘eschatological,’ i.e. an 
overriding quest to end war, the war against and war and the fight for peace. In this 
sense, the experience of war often brought about the struggle to secure the conditions
33 Martel, “Generals Die in Bed,” pp. 2-3.
34 Martel, “Generals Die in Bed,” p. 3.
35 Nietzsche, Daybreak, 189, p. 110.
36 Martel, “Generals Die in Bed,” p. 9.
37 Leed, No M an's Land, p. x.
38 Patocka, “Wars o f the Twentieth Century,” p. 126.
39 Henri Barbusse. Light. Trans. Fitzwater Wray. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1919.
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that will make such an event impossible in future.40 These aspects of the First World 
War documented by historians, moreover, not only serve to support Lowith’s initial 
claim that the inability to experience a meaningful, European existence prior to 1914 
formed an important historical context of the First World War, but also serve to 
corroborate Nietzsche’s initial suspicion that the attempts to circumvent this 
disorienting experience of meaninglessness might only serve to usher in catastrophe 
for Europe in the course of the twentieth century 41
Nor, moreover, were these attempts to reconstitute a sense of meaning and 
purpose European in scope. The second way, it will be recalled, in which Nietzsche 
had thought that the advent of European nihilism would affect Europe in the twentieth 
century, was that new forms of meaning that would be advocated would be unlikely to 
be European in scope. Nietzsche, in other words, anticipated that the advent of 
European nihilism would lead to a situation where:
[t]he waters o f  religion recede and leave behind swamps and ponds; the 
nations again draw apart in the most hostile manner. ... The sciences 
disintegrate and dissolve all that was firmly believed. ... Everything serves 
to promote the coming barbarism.... Surely forces are present, immense 
forces, but they are wild, primitive and wholly merciless.... Now  
everything on earth is determined only by the coarsest and most evil
40 Patocka, “Wars o f the Twentieth Century,” p. 127.
41 This is, o f course, not to deny that there were also other, more tangible, material and equally 
important reasons for the outbreak of war in 1914. Importantly, however, it is very difficult to reduce 
the experience o f meaninglessness to material factors alone. Theodor Barth illuminates this point very 
well when he argues in relation to the work of Pierre Bourdieu that there is no a priori reason ‘why the 
moral “obligation to be happy” or the “duty o f happiness” ... in the “affluent society” -  e.g. the 
prevalence o f therapeutic ethics -  should not result in the same syndrome o f laborious indifference and 
consumerist idiosyncrasy as economic deprivation. ... Consequently, not even economics may provide 
the standard factor by which all human orders may be appraised and given a critical and realistic 
perspective -  be it in the last instance -  since we may argue that both affluence and deprivation 
similarly result in symbolic collapse, disintegration or accelerated erosion.’ Theodor Barth, ‘Memories 
o f the Gaon: Ethnographic Documents, Social Organisation and Regions o f Humanity’ in J. Peter 
Burgess (ed.), Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern Europe. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1997, p. 69. Indeed, it was also for this reason that Wemer Sombart abandoned his formerly Marxist 
analysis o f the First World War, arguing instead that, in the final analysis, the First World War could 
only be made intelligible by seeing it as a Glaubenskrieg, i.e. as an ideological or religious war. The 
material gains in the name o f which the war was waged, he argued, had to be seen as mere 
epiphenomena o f deeper forces emerging from the ‘soul.’ See Roland Stromberg, Redemption by War: 
The Intellectuals and 1914. Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1982, p. 137.
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forces, by the egoism o f those engaged in acquisitive pursuits and by the 
military despots.42
The advent of nihilism, in this account, would lead to the loss of a European voice; 
nations would ‘draw apart’ under the leadership of politicians and ‘military despots’ 
seeking to exploit the spiritual vacuum left behind by the ‘death of God’ in pursuit of 
their own, narrower ambitions, even at the expense of pitting Europeans against one 
another.
As early as 1915, the German phenomenologist Max Scheler argued that the 
First World War was itself testament to, and indeed a reflection of, the immense 
impact the experience of European nihilism had had on the international relations of 
Europe. The war, he argued, had demonstrated that in Europe there was no longer a 
shared meaning to bind the various nations of Europe together. According to Scheler, 
at no time in the history of Western Europe subsequent to the decline of the medieval 
papacy, had it become so clear as during the Great War what it meant for Europe no 
longer to possess any commonly recognised authority.43 What is more, the war made 
apparent that “science’s claim to take the place of the kind of spiritual European 
authority which contributes moral weight and its sanctified tradition, has become so 
ephemeral, so unreliable and empty” with the result that at the time of the war there 
was “no man, no place, and no authority which possessed the inner worth and moral 
weight to place it above the danger of partisanship....”44 Thus, Scheler concluded, 
“[t]his is the outlook of our time: every aspect has become dubious, in connection 
with each there prevails an unlimited number of conflicting opinions -  and it is only 
the masses and power that confer some meaning.”45 In doing so, moreover, Scheler 
demonstrated very eloquently the continuities between the implications of the 
experience of European nihilism as Nietzsche understood them towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, and the dissolution of a common European ground evident in the 
First World War. When viewed in historical perspective, the First World War can thus 
be partially seen as a reflection of the immense impact that the advent of European
42 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator,’ 4, p. 150.
43 See Lowith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, p. 176.
44 Max Scheler. Der Genius des Krieges und der deutsche Krieg. Leipzig: Verlag der weissen Bucher, 
1915, pp. 322-323. Quoted in Lowith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, p. 176-7.
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nihilism had had on the international relations of Europe and that a commonly shared 
idea of Europe had succumbed to attempts to reconstitute meaning along more 
national parameters.
Indeed, contemporary historians of the First World War, too, still take the war 
to be testament to the prevalence, amongst Europeans, of attachments to national 
sentiments and purposes, rather than European ones. The purposes, in other words, for 
which the war was waged and which propelled men to fight were not European in 
scope and outlook, but much rather national and particular. For Nietzsche, the spread 
of modem nationalism which he already detected amongst his contemporaries was, as 
will be explained in greater detail in Chapter 5, nothing but “the metamorphosis of the 
cross,”46 i.e. a modem attempt to re-endow European existence with a greater sense of 
meaning following the ‘death of God.’ At the outbreak of war, in turn, strong 
nationalist sentiments were evident in Germany, Austria, Russia, France and England 
and, indeed, most studies of the origins of the First World War emphasise the 
“militant nationalism which without exception inflamed all European states” in 
August of 1914.47 Indeed, according to Norman Angell, on the eve of the First World 
War, nationalism seemed “the most important thing in the world” to Europeans.48 
Most specialists on the origins of the First World War thus accord nationalist 
sentiments a major status. Indeed, the First world War is generally seen to have been a 
“supremely nationalistic war”49 and as part of an era in which “mass armies [were] 
supported by the fanatical nationalism of the civil population.”50 This identification 
with the nation, and an overarching national purpose is seen, at a minimum, to 
constitute a pre-eminent cause of World War I, and at a maximum, as perhaps the 
“key factor.”51
45 Scheler, Der Genius des Krieges, pp. 322-323. Cited in Lowith, Martin Heidegger and European 
Nihilism, pp. 176-7.
46 See Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 7[26], p. 305.
47 For a detailed list of historians advocating this view, see. see L. L. Farrar, jr. “Villain o f the Peace: 
Nationalism and the Causes o f World War I.” Canadian Review o f  Studies in Nationalism, XXII, 1-2 
(1995), p. 55, fn. 102.
48 Cited in Louis L. Snyder. The Roots o f  German Nationalism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1978, p. vii.
49 C. J. Hayes. Nationalism: A Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1960, p. 122.
50 Michael Howard. War in European History. London: Oxford University Press, 1976, p. 134.
51 See Farrar, jr. “Villain o f the Peace,” p. 56, fns. 137, 138.
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In the end, however, the First World War was not able to overcome the 
European experience of nihilism. It is in this crucial recognition that Georg Simmel 
can be said to have been more prescient than Scheler. Simmel, too, had seen in the 
War an attempt at a temporary reconstitution of meaning, but was much more 
sceptical as to whether the war experience itself could actually produce a new 
certainty. It was, in his view, much more likely to produce only catastrophe, and with 
it, an ever more acute sense of meaninglessness. Far from solving the problem of 
European nihilism, the First World War actually intensified its experience through the 
vast amount of human carnage and suffering it provoked, giving Nietzsche’s 
discussion of European nihilism a real sense of urgency and meaning.53 Indeed, 
Michael Gillespie points out, the effect of World War I was that it “dispirited the 
liberalism that understood history as a process of rational technical and political 
development and turned man’s aspirations toward ideologies that offered radical 
solutions through revolutionary action.”54 The Great War, in this sense, can be seen 
both as a testament to, and an exacerbation of, the European experience of nihilism 
delineated by Nietzsche towards the end of the nineteenth century. It is precisely this 
realisation, moreover, which led Karl Lowith to conclude that what the First World 
War finally unveiled for the world to see, had been anticipated by “those 
knowledgeable among the Europeans” for some time.55 In Lowith’s view, Nietzsche 
constituted precisely such a figure and, in this regard moreover, it is also possible to 
see some of the key aspects of the First World War as being compatible with the 
consequences of the advent of European nihilism that Nietzsche anticipated for 
Europeans in the course of the twentieth century.
3, European Nihilism and the Second World War
The desire to endow existence with a greater sense of meaning and purpose 
also played an important role in the Second World War, especially through facilitating
52 Christopher Coker. “Post-modemity and the end o f the Cold War: has war been disinvented?” 
Review o f International Studies. Vol. 18, 1992, pp. 189-198, p. 194.
53 Michael Allen Gillespie. Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground o f  History. Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1984, 122.
54 Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground o f  History, p. 19.
55 Lowith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, p. 192.
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the rise of the National Socialist party in Germany during the inter-war years. The 
association between Nietzsche’s writings and the Nazi movement is, of course, not 
novel. “In spite of all that has been written about Nietzsche since the Second World 
War,” one prominent Nietzsche scholar has recently observed, “it remains the case 
that anyone who approaches [Nietzsche’s] work for the first time ... does so with 
these Nazi connotations.”56 This also means, however, that there exists a significant 
discrepancy between the popular perception of Nietzsche, on the one hand, and the 
reception of his corpus by Nietzsche scholars themselves, on the other. Amongst the 
latter, there is widespread agreement that it would be erroneous to see Nietzsche’s 
corpus as being compatible with the ideology of National Socialism. As Tracy Strong 
has recently noted in this regard, “perhaps no opinion in Nietzsche scholarship is now 
more widely accepted than that the Nazis were wrong and/or ignorant in their 
appropriation of Nietzsche.” Yet, despite the fact that many Nietzsche scholars 
have, following Walter Kaufmann’s initial lead, sought to dispel the myth that 
Nietzsche was a proto-fascist, Nietzsche’s corpus is still frequently assumed to have 
underpinned the ideology of National Socialism. Importantly, however, the attempt to 
see Nietzsche’s philosophical corpus as being complicit in the Nazi project not only 
fails to recognise the overwhelming incompatibilities between the two, but also 
ignores the extent to which Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism might 
actually serve to illuminate some of the important dynamics which underpinned the 
initial success of the Nazi movement.58 Rather, in other words, than seeking to 
implicate Nietzsche in the ideology of National Socialism, it might be more useful to 
employ his analysis of the advent of European nihilism and its likely consequences in 
the attempt to better understand the initial success of this movement.59
56 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 28.
57 Tracy B. Strong. “Nietzsche’s Political Misappropriation” in Bemd Magnus and Kathleen M. 
Higgins (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 131.
58 Indeed, these consistencies were even evident to some o f the Nazi ideologues themselves. Consider, 
for example, Ernst Krieck, Professor o f Pedagogy at the University o f Heidelberg, who caustically 
remarked that apart from the fact that Nietzsche was not a socialist, not a nationalist and opposed to 
racial thinking, he could have been a leading National Socialist thinker. See Steven E. Aschheim. The 
Nietzsche Legacy in Germany, 1890-1990. Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1992, p. 253.
59 See, for example, Stefan Elbe. “O f Seismographs and Earthquakes: Nietzsche, Nihilism and 
Genocide” in James Kaye and Bo Strath (eds.) Enlightenment and Genocide, Contradictions o f  
Modernity. Oxford: P.I.E. - Peter Lang, 2000.
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Amongst the first to investigate the relationship between the advent of 
European nihilism and such totalitarian movements as the National Socialist one was 
the French scholar Aron Gurwitsch. Writing in April of 1945, Gurwitsch insisted that 
there was an intricate relationship between the European experience of nihilism and 
the emergence of these totalitarian movements, arguing that the totalitarian movement 
is “the culmination of nihilism: all its elements and all the tendencies originating 
therein may be found again in the totalitarian ideology.”60 In Gurwitsch’s view, 
therefore, “totalitarianism must be seen as the most representative phenomenon of 
nihilism which has found here its full expansion and the realisation of all its 
potentialities.”61 Nowhere, perhaps, was this tendency more evident than in inter-war 
Germany. “There can be no doubt,” Eric Voegelin observed in this regard, “that the 
Western crisis [of nihilism] has reached particularly grave forms in Germany....” 
Indeed, it would fall upon the German philosopher Martin Heidegger to clearly 
identify the direct relationship between the onset of European nihilism and the rise of 
the Nazi party by urging his readers and listeners to see in Hitler and the Nazi party a 
laudable counter-movement to the disconcerting experience of European nihilism. 
While no longer seen as so laudable, this relationship between the two is nevertheless 
still seen to exist.64
The importance of the relationship between the popular desire for a greater 
sense of meaning and purpose and the popularity of the Nazi movement has been 
emphasised by several historians as well. Thus, Fritz Stem, for example, argues that 
Hitler was the cataclysmic event of our time and that “we need seismographers of the 
spirit to understand the faults that made possible the earthquake in comparison to 
preceding, lesser ones.” On more than one occasion, Stem himself turned to Nietzsche
60 Aaron Gurwitsch. “On Contemporary Nihilism.” The Review o f  Politics. Vol. 7, No. 2. April 1945, p. 
187.
61 Gurwitsch, “On Contemporary Nihilism,” p. 187.
62 Eric Voegelin. “Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War.” The Journal o f  Politics. Vol. 6, No. 2 May, 1944, 
p. 183.
63 Steven E. Aschheim. “Nietzsche, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust” in Jacob Golomb (ed.) Nietzsche 
and Jewish Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 1997, pp. 16-17, fn. 3. “These two men,” 
Heidegger argued in his lectures on Schelling from the year 1936, “who each in their own way, have 
introduced a counter-movement to nihilism -  Mussolini and Hitler -  have learned from Nietzsche, each 
in an essentially different way. But even with that, Nietzsche’s authentic metaphysical domain has not 
yet come into its own.”
64 Simon Critchley, for example, sees both the Marxist and Fascist revolutions as responses to the 
underlying experience o f nihilism. Very Little ... Almost Nothing, p. 11.
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as precisely such a seismographer. Writing about the phenomenon of National 
Socialism, he remarks that “the zeal of the millions who joined the [Nazi] movement 
even before 1933 calls to mind Nietzsche’s dictum: ‘Weariness that wants to reach the 
ultimate with one leap, with one fatal leap, a poor, ignorant weariness that does not 
want to want anymore: This created all gods and other worlds.” ’65 Nietzsche himself, 
moreover, had already observed about his own times that, “[wjhoever has preserved, 
and bred in himself, a strong will, together with an ample spirit, has more favourable 
opportunities than ever. ... Whoever can command finds those who must obey: I am 
thinking, e.g., of Napoleon and Bismarck.”66 From today’s perspective, however, it is 
not difficult to see that Napoleon and Bismarck were not the last to find those who 
‘must’ obey. In this vein, Stem goes on to note how Hitler was able to offer Germans 
a secular promise of salvation, i.e. a non-Christian yet quasi-religious ideology.67 In 
particular, Stem points out:
Hitler’s rhetoric was religious; he dissolved politics in a religious aura, and 
all the theological terms which had been previously secularised were now 
the great standard themes o f his appeals. He promised deliverance and 
redemption, rebirth and salvation, even as he reviled the Reich’s enemies 
as godless and satanic; he did all this in the name o f Providence, for he 
believed that Providence had selected him to deliver the German people.68
Hitler, in other words, was able to cast a spell over large sections of the German 
population with the promise of endowing their lives with a greater sense of meaning 
and purpose in a world otherwise characterised by hardship and meaninglessness, in a 
world where, in Nietzsche’s words, the “redeeming class and human being” were 
otherwise lacking.69 It will be recalled, moreover, that one of the ways in which 
Nietzsche had hypothesised that Europeans might seek to circumvent the experience 
of nihilism, was precisely through the “blind enthusiasm for single human beings.” 
In the twentieth century, and after the ‘death of God’ many Europeans would,
65 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘Of the Afterworldsmen,’ p. 59. Cited in Fritz Stem. Dreams and Delusions: 
National Socialism in the Drama o f  the German Past. New York: Vintage Books, 1987, p. 149.
66 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 128, p. 79.
67 See also John E. Smith. Quasi-Religions: Humanism, Marxism and Nationalism. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1994.
68 Stem, Dreams and Delusions, pp. 144-145.
69 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Book I, 1, p. 8. “Es fehlt der erldsende Stand und M ensch....” KSA 12, 
2[127], p. 127.
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Nietzsche thought, choose to worship human gods, even “the very serpents that dwell 
amongst His [God’s] ruins.”71
What is true for the worship of ‘great’ personalities, was similarly true for the 
success of their movements at large. In this vein, Stem also cites Theodor Heuss (later 
to become the first president of West Germany) who, as early as 1931, had already 
been aware of the relationship between the spiritual disappointment entailed in the 
advent of European nihilism and the Nazis’ ability to draw on this reservoir of 
meaninglessness in order to legitimate their bellicose political project. Lecturing in 
Tubingen, Heuss inquired “Is National Socialism Germany’s Salvation?” thereby 
drawing attention to the fact that salvation was precisely the promise that Hitler and 
the Nazi movement held out for Germany; the Nazis would deliver salvation and the 
‘Ftihrer’ was to be their saviour.72 Heuss concluded, of course, that National 
Socialism was not Germany’s salvation and his books would subsequently be burned 
by the Nazis for their ‘un-Germanness.’ Heuss, however, was not alone in drawing 
this connection. Two years after Heuss’ lecture, in April of 1933, Thomas Mann 
would similarly draw the connection between the ‘death of God’ and the advent of 
Hitler, concluding that Hitler “this ludicrous tin god ... has become a religion for 
millions.” Indeed, the attractive power that Hitler’s vision held out is exemplified 
very well by Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker’s admission in 1982 that he, too, had 
considered joining the Nazi movement irrespective of its ideational content. As he 
explains:
It is true that I could not develop any interest in the Nazis’ ideology either 
before or after their assumption o f power. Nonetheless, I was very much 
tempted after 1933 to join the movement in some way or another. But that 
had nothing to do with the ideas these people had but solely with an 
elemental reaction to what Wilhelm Kuetemeyer has called a pseudo­
outpouring o f the Holy Spirit in 1933.74
70 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 29, p. 20.
71 Coker, War and the Twentieth Century, p. 41.
72 Quoted in Stem, Dreams and Delusions, p. 147.
73 Quoted in Stem, Dreams and Delusions, p. 174. See also Gary Lease “The Origins o f National 
Socialism: Some Fruits on Religion and Nationalism” in Peter Merkl and Ninian Smart (eds.) Religion 
and Politics in the Modern World. New York: New York University Press, 1983.
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In the end, of course, National Socialism was not Germany’s salvation, but its 
destruction. Nevertheless, Stem rightly insists that there was a strong religious- 
mythical element in Nazism which many found appealing. In this sense, moreover, 
there is considerable historical evidence that the spiritual disappointment entailed in 
the experience of nihilism, alongside the many traditional factors (political, economic 
and historical) already documented by historians, can illuminate our understanding of 
the origins of this appeal. The point, however, is not to insist that the advent of 
European nihilism was the only, or even the primary, source of suffering for Germans 
at the time. Rather, it is to insist that what is equally important in understanding the 
rise of this movement, is the way in which this suffering is addressed and responded 
to. To the extent that the advent of European nihilism entails the demise of 
Christianity, it can assist in explaining why people might turn to secular leaders for 
redemption from their suffering rather than mediating their hardship within the 
traditional Christian framework. The quest for meaning in their lives, one scholar 
observes in this vein, “led them to submit to politicians who gave them a sheet anchor 
on which to hold at the cost later of acquiescence in their own destruction.”
More recently, in turn, Henry Staten has made the explicit case in favour of 
drawing on Nietzsche’s corpus in order to better understand the historical background 
to the rise of the Nazi movement. In his critical engagement with recent theorists 
advocating the ‘radical evil’ thesis, Staten argues quite unequivocally in relation to 
Nazi Germany that “Nietzsche’s analysis of the advent of nihilism is still the best 
account we have of this situation, and in my view gives us a more accurate sense of 
the state of European society at the birth of Nazism than does the account of the 
radical evil theorists.”76 Moreover, Staten argues, according to Nietzsche’s analysis, 
“European civilisation by the nineteenth century had put all its eggs in the basket of 
transcendence, but the same instinct for truth that had created the system of 
transcendence had now called into question, and with the collapse of this system the 
spectre of meaninglessness loomed.”77 Thus, Staten concludes, “[i]f Nazism is indeed 
to be understood as a subreption of the transcendent, which is plausible, the
74 Quoted in Stem, Dreams and Delusions, p. 174.
75 Coker, “Post-modemity and the end o f the Cold War,” p. 194.
76 Henry Staten. “Radical Evil’ Revived: Hitler, Kant, Luther, neo-Lacanianism.” Radical Philosophy. 
No. 98. 1999, p. 13.
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historicizing Nietzschean would see this as one case more of the old habit of 
mendacity -  a problem not of too little transcendence but of still not enough 
immanence. Germany in the first part of the twentieth century was still under the 
influence of a Christian or Christian-derived ideology of transcendence.”78 In doing 
so, Staten serves to further corroborate Nietzsche’s hypothesis that the collapse of any 
way of endowing European existence with meaning following the death of God, 
would spurn quasi-transcendent movements who would promise to overcome this 
experience. In this account, the National Socialist movement can be seen, at least in 
part, as an example of precisely such a violent attempt to endow existence, including 
its suffering and disappointments, with a greater sense of meaning or purpose 
following the ‘death of God.’
Importantly, however, the fascist challenge to the European order is also an 
example of the second way in which Nietzsche thought that advent of European 
nihilism would affect Europe in the course of the twentieth century; it is an example 
of how such quasi-transcendent movements did not advocate destinies that were 
European in scope, but rather emphasised particular and national ideas.79 Thus, the 
Second World War, too, was itself testament to the absence of a common European 
voice. Writing in 1944 against the background of the ongoing war, the German 
philosopher in exile Eric Voegelin urged his readers to interpret Nietzsche’s 
predictions of the coming barbarism and unprecedented wars on the level of empirical 
description. According to Voegelin, the wars predicted by Nietzsche were immense 
because the framework of political ordinates which determine the purpose, and with 
the purpose the limits of war, was breaking down. In Voegelin’s interpretation, 
therefore, the “impending wars,” including the Second World War, were “much more 
the expression of a pneumatic-pathological situation marked by the struggle of
OA
instincts between the extirpation of an old and the birth of a new spiritual order.”
77 Staten, ‘“Radical Evil’ Revived,” p. 13.
78 Staten, “‘Radical Evil’ Revived,” p. 14.
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What is more, much like Max Scheler had observed in relation to the First 
World War, World War II similarly demonstrated the inability of science to serve as 
the basis for a peaceful and meaningful European identity. Even worse, science could 
now be used as a divisive force. What was already dangerously foreshadowed by the 
gas warfare of the First World War, rose to novel heights during the Second World 
War. Thus, accusations against the European Jews, for example, were no longer 
articulated primarily along the lines of religious differences but much more on the 
basis of ‘scientific’ or ‘medico-biological’ differences.81 In Hannah Arendt’s 
memorable phrase, Judaism was replaced with Jewishness: “Jews had been able to 
escape from Judaism into conversion; from Jewishness there was no escape.’ Yet, 
science was not only invoked to discriminate against the Jews, but was also 
instrumentalised in order to divide Europe itself -  a fact which was quite evident to 
the Polish jurist, Raphael Lemkin, who first coined the term ‘genocide’ in 1944. As 
Lemkin pointed out:
Hitler’s conception o f genocide is based not upon cultural but only 
biological patterns.... Some groups -  such as the Jews -  are to be 
destroyed completely. A distinction is made between peoples considered to 
be related by blood to the German people (such as Dutchmen, Norwegians,
Flemings, Luxembourgers), and peoples not thus related by blood (such as 
the Poles, Slovenes, Serbs.) The populations o f the first groups are deemed 
worthy o f being Germanized. With respect to the Poles particularly, Hitler 
expressed the view that it is their soil alone which can and should be 
profitably Germanized.83
In the hands of the Nazi ideologists, modem science could thus serve to divide 
Europe, rather than constituting the source for a broadly shared identity. Following 
the First World War, Albert Einstein had already recognised the ambiguous
81 That the Jews would be designated as the ‘Other’ might not even have come as such a surprise to 
Nietzsche. He himself had already remarked quite ominously that “[a]mong the spectacles to which the 
coming [twentieth] century invites us is the decision as to the destiny of the Jews o f Europe. That their 
die is cast, that they have crossed their Rubicon, is now palpably obvious: all that is left for them is 
either to become the masters o f Europe or to lose Europe.” Nietzsche, Daybreak, 205, pp. 124-25. Yet 
Nietzsche himself was opposed to anti-Semitism.
82 Quoted in Zygmunt Bauman. Modernity and the Holocaust, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989, p. 59.
83 Raphael Lemkin. Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1944, pp. 81-82. Quoted in Helen Fein. Genocide: A Sociological Perspective. 
London: Sage, 1993, p. 9.
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achievement of science when he lamented the uses to which it was being put: “In the 
hands of our generation these hard-won instruments are like a razor wielded by a child 
of three. The possession of marvellous means of production has brought misery and 
hunger instead of freedom.”84 These words would ring even truer following the 
discovery of the extermination camps. Nietzsche himself, however, had already 
warned his readers how culture could become ‘barbarised’ by “the modem traffic with 
science.”85
Central aspects, then, of the Second World War can similarly be seen to be 
compatible with the anticipated ramifications of the advent of European nihilism, 
exemplifying both the collapse of the traditional moral hierarchy of Europe as well as 
the attempts to reconstitute a greater sense of meaning which emphasised nationalist 
purposes rather than ones which are European in scope. Much in this vein, and in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, the German Professor Heinrich Fries argued that 
after the Great War it was already evident that Nietzsche’s thoughts on nihilism were 
no longer the distant voice of a past pessimist, but, alas, bitter reality. The Second 
World War confirmed Nietzsche’s vision yet again, and Fries, at the time of his 
writing, was unwilling to speculate as to whether it would be the last manifestation of 
European nihilism.86 One cannot, in this view, easily divorce the two world wars 
which descended upon Europe in the course of the twentieth century from the 
problems which Nietzsche had already addressed towards the end of the nineteenth 
century in his discussion of European nihilism.
What is more, much like the First World War before it, the Second World 
War, too, was not capable of successfully overcoming the experience of 
meaninglessness. It, too, left Europe divided and without a strategy for rendering 
European existence more meaningful. As Gillespie concludes in this regard, “far from 
shaking the trust that these movements placed in history, the War only strengthened
84 Cited in Ronnie S. Landau. Studying the Holocaust: Issues, Readings, and Documents. London: 
Routledge, 1998, p. 7.
85 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘The Untimely Ones,’ 1, p. 276.
86 Heinrich Fries. Nihilismus. Die Gefahr unserer Zeit. 1949, pp. 17, 19. Quoted in Albert Kopf. Der 
Weg des Nihilismus von Friedrich Nietzsche bis zur Atombombe. Munich: Minerva Publikation, 1988, 
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their convictions and intensified their missionary zeal.”87 Moreover, for the next four 
and a half decades following World War II, Europeans would not have the chance to 
become the creators of their own meaning, as this task was no longer to be determined 
by Europeans themselves. Europe’s opportunity to regain composure would 
effectively be postponed until the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989. 
Yet, as will become clear in the next section, this does not mean that the quest to 
impose upon existence a greater sense of meaning or purpose actually disappeared 
following the Second World War.
4. European Nihilism and the Cold War
What Gillespie already alluded to in the previous quotation, is that even the 
ideological component of the Cold War rivalry which divided Europe in the second 
half of the twentieth century cannot be easily divorced from the underlying question 
of how existence would be endowed with a greater sense of meaning or purpose in the 
twentieth century.88 Much like the Great War before it, the Second World War, with 
its recourse to concentration camps and nuclear weapons, had not resolved the 
experience of meaninglessness. If anything, for many it only seemed to make the 
experience more acute. Thus, as Gillespie further argues, rather than leading to a more 
reflective stance on the human condition in modem times, the even greater carnage 
and scope of World War II “evoked a tremendous anxiety that prevented man from 
coming to terms with the horror and drove him instead into the future as the secure
O Q  • •  •harbour of his hopes and the bastion against his fears.” In this vein, the ideologies 
which gained in prominence in the aftermath of the Second World War might, at least 
in part, also be seen as attempts to reendow existence with a greater sense of meaning 
or purpose following the ‘death of God.’ Michael Novak for example, has observed 
that “[l]acking faith, our age did not want for warring ideologies.”90 Indeed, he 
suggests that modem ideologies should be seen as a secular substitute for faith, 
thereby implicitly drawing attention to the continuities between the ‘death of God’
87 Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground o f  History, p. 22.
88 For a recent treatment see Mark Kramer. “Ideology and the Cold War.” Review o f  International 
Studies. Vol. 25. No. 4. October 1999, pp. 539-576.
89 Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground o f  History, p. 21.
90 Michael Novak. The Experience o f  Nothingness. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1998, p. 130.
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and the ideological cleavage which divided Europe in the second half of the twentieth 
century. It was, moreover, a conclusion which had been reached earlier by the 
political philosopher Eric Voegelin. Following his extensive study of modem 
ideologies, Voegelin had concluded that modem political ideologies are essentially 
closed systems of human knowledge which, as Ted McAllister explains, serve as 
means for achieving human felicity on earth; they attempt to re-divinisize the world 
and seek to replace the uncertainty of faith with the certainty of ideology.91 This 
ability to provide certainty and meaning constitutes an important factor in accounting 
for their success in an age which, at bottom, still had not confronted directly the 
problem of European nihilism.92
During his own times, Nietzsche had expressed reservations about the fact 
that, following the increasing incredulity of the Christian explanation of existence, too 
many would not embrace the unique opportunity that this presented, in his view, to 
revalue the traditional values, but would rather revert to this old Christian habit of 
trying to locate the meaning of the world in something external to mankind. In this 
vein, Nietzsche noted that:
The nihilistic question 'for whatV is rooted in the old habit o f supposing 
that the goal must be put up, given, demanded from outside -  by some 
superhuman authority. Having unlearned faith in that, one still follows the 
old habit and seeks another authority that can speak unconditionally and 
command goals and tasks. The authority of conscience now steps up front 
... Or the authority o f reason. Or the social instinct (the herd). Or history 
with an immanent spirit and a goal within, so one can entrust oneself to 
i t 93
Of all the potential antidotes to meaninglessness that men might seek, Nietzsche was 
particularly critical of attempts to endow ‘world history’ with meaning. Indeed, it was 
a development that Nietzsche was amongst the first to criticise. Thus, already in the
91 Ted V. McAllister. Revolt against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and the Search fo r  a 
Postliberal Order. Lawrence, Kansas: University o f Kansas Press, 1996, pp. 17, 22.
92 Indeed, Hannah Arendt came very close to articulating this thesis when she concluded at the end o f  
her study on Totalitarianism, that “[ljoneliness is the common ground for terror, the essence of 
totalitarian government, and for ideology ....” The Origins o f  Totalitarianism. London: Harcourt Brace 
& Company, 1973, p. 476.
93 Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 20, p. 17.
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second of his Untimely Meditations on The Use and Abuse o f  History fo r  Life, for 
example, Nietzsche had expressed his disapproval of the fact that amongst many of 
his contemporaries the belief in the meaning of History had almost attained the status 
previously accorded to Christianity. “What, there are no longer any living 
mythologies? What, the religions are dying out? Just behold the religion of the power 
o f history, regard the priests of the mythology of the idea and their battered knees! Is 
it too much to say that all the virtues now attend on this new faith?”94 In the course of 
the twentieth century modem men would indeed increasingly turn to a belief in the 
meaning of history.
In fact, the ideologies which gained in influence in the course of the twentieth 
century have been understood by scholars to be exactly such interpretations of 
History, as attempts to render existence meaningful in the face of modem science’s 
inability to do so. In this vein, Gillespie has argued that:
[t]here are two great intellectual forces in the modern world, science and 
history, and while they seem mutually antagonistic they are in fact 
fundamentally complementary. Modem science determines the causal laws 
that govern the motions o f matter but, in contradistinction to ancient 
science, eschews teleology and thus any determination o f human ends.
While it may thus present humanity with supreme knowledge o f the 
mechanisms o f nature and open up the possibility for the technological 
conquest o f the natural world and indeed of human nature itself, it does not 
and in principle cannot tell us what we ought to do or how we ought to 
live. It is this question that history answers.95
History, in other words, becomes the context in which modem men would 
increasingly look for a greater purpose to human existence and for moral guidance. 
“We shall conquer,” Goebbels proclaimed “because it lies in the logic of history, 
because a higher destiny wills it, ... because without our victory history would have 
lost its meaning; and history is not meaningless.”96 In this sense, moreover, modem 
man’s reaction to the alienation and uncertainty brought about by the onset of
94 Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse o f  History fo r  Life, VIII, p. 105.
95 Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground o f  History, p. ix.
96 Cited in Richard Ashley. “The geopolitics o f geopolitical space: toward a critical social theory of 
international politics.” Alternatives. Vol. 12. No. 4. 1987, p. 413.
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European nihilism was to attempt to circumvent this predicament by means of a 
teleological interpretation of History. Leading up to the Second World War, but most 
importantly during the Cold War, this belief in the meaning of History, as ideology, 
held out, for modem man, the promise of a meaningful existence sometime in the 
future.
In retrospect, this belief in the meaning of history is, perhaps, understandable. 
After all, if meaning was no longer to be credibly located in an other-worldly religion, 
such meaning would have to derive from temporal, earthly existence. “What greater 
abdication of God than time?” Simone Weil once remarked. “We are,” she noted in
• Q7this vein, “abandoned in time, God is not in time.” In the quest to experience a 
meaningful existence, modem Europeans, following Hegel, sought to identify and 
decode the essential message and meaning of temporal, earthly existence, i.e. of 
History.98 In this sense, the modem age also found it impossible, as the German 
philosopher Hans Blumenberg suggested “to decline to answer questions about the 
totality of history. To that extent the philosophy of history is an attempt to answer a 
medieval question with the means available to a post-medieval age.”99 In the 
twentieth century, it was often the belief in the deeper meaning of History which held 
out the possibility for modem Europeans of overcoming their experience of 
nihilism.100
This belief in History as a way of addressing the experience of nihilism is, 
moreover, of crucial importance in understanding the ideological component of the 
Cold War rivalry that divided Europe in the second half of the twentieth century. For, 
as Michael Allen Gillespie reminds his readers, nowhere:
97 Simone Weil. La Connaissance surnaturelle. Quoted in Anthony Kemp. The Estrangement o f  the 
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is the importance and depth o f the question about the nature and ground o f  
history more evident than in the debate about its answer. Unfortunately, 
this debate is not merely the concern of learned men and societies, nor is it 
contested only with words: the debate about the nature and ground of 
history has become ideological and revolutionary; it has become bellicose 
and cataclysmic. The greatest event o f our times, the Second World War, 
in whose unperceived shadow we stand, was in principle an internecine 
struggle about the nature of history. The cold war is no less the result o f
the conviction and fervour o f  some and the perplexity and paralysis o f
others about the answer to this question, [emphasis added]101
This is particularly true for those versions of Marxism which posited the future
redemption of humanity through the creation of classless society and the emergence
of a new man. Often it was precisely the strength and certainty of the vision of the 
future posited by Marxism which exerted a strong appeal on many of its adherents. As 
John Smith has noted in his study of ‘quasi-religions,’ “[t]he hope engendered in the 
disinherited by this cosmic vision of redemption has proved to be one of the main
107motives behind the spread of Marxism throughout the world.”
Historical support corroborating Smith’s assessment has been collected in the 
book The God that Failed which documented this relationship between some of the 
movement’s most important participants and the cause towards which they laboured. 
Thus, Arthur Koestler, for example, argued that “the revolutionary’s Utopia, which in 
appearance represents a complete break with the past, is always modelled on some 
image of the lost Paradise, of a legendary Golden Age.”103 Ignazio Silone would also 
recall, in relation to his conversion to Communism, that “[f]or me to join the Party of 
the Proletarian Revolution was not just a simple matters of signing up with a political 
organisation; it meant a conversion, a complete dedication.”104 Andre Gide, in turn, 
similarly noted in his Journal, that “[m]y conversion is like a faith. My whole being is 
bent towards one singe goal, all my thoughts -  even involuntary -  lead me back to it. 
In the deplorable state of distress of the modem world, the plan of the Soviet Union
101 Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground o f  History, pp. x-xi.
102 John E. Smith. Quasi-Religions: Humanism, Marxism and Nationalism. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
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103 Richard Crossman and Arthur Koestler (eds.) The God that Failed. London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1950, p. 25.
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seems to me to point to salvation.”105 There is, then, much to support Malraux’s view 
that often Marxism is not so much a philosophy as it is a destiny.106
Importantly, however, it was not only the Soviet Union which saw itself as the 
decoder and agent of History. Rather, both the Soviet Union and the United States 
“saw themselves not as actors, but historical agents with the power as well as the will
1 07to give history a push.” Indeed, Hegel’s historical thinking would later come to 
greatly influence not only the communist party in the Soviet Union, but, ironically,
• 1 ORalso the post-war American right. In this vein, Eric Voegelin, for example, once 
noted that the self-understanding of constitutional democracies, especially in Anglo- 
Saxon countries, still rests on “the eschatological tension left over from the Puritan 
Revolution which endows the constitutional form with a character of ‘finality’ as the 
successful experiment in organising a society with a classical and Christian 
tradition.”109 One way, therefore, of understanding the second half of the twentieth 
century, is to see it as consisting of a violent and aggressive rivalry between 
competing interpretations of History against the background of an otherwise 
debilitating nihilism. What is more “these apparently liberatory and critical 
ideologies,” Julia Kristeva argues, “become de facto religious ideologies, in the sense 
that they are based on the affective, not critical, adherence of the subjects who 
subscribe to them.”110
All too often, however, modem ideologies did not content themselves with 
endowing History with meaning. For, in identifying the key agents of history, they 
similarly cultivated hatred of those who, in their interpretation of History, stood in
105 Crossman, The God that Failed, p. 176.
106 The Human Condition. “What has twentieth-century culture opposed to, or how has twentieth- 
century culture answered, the advent o f nihilism? At a philosophical level, some examples seem  
particularly emblematic: Marxism, in its various theoretical forms....” Gianni Vattimo. The End o f  
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way of the creation o f this meaningful and redemptive future.111 It was in this vein, 
moreover, that Paul Valery was once moved to observe that:
History is the most dangerous product that the chemistry o f the intellect 
has invented. ... It engenders dreams, it intoxicates the people, ... leads 
them to delusions o f grandeur or o f persecution, and makes nations bitter, 
arrogant, insufferable and vain. History can justify anything. It can teach 
nothing with restraint, for it contains everything and gives examples o f  
everything. ... In the present state o f the world, the danger o f allowing one 
self to be seduced by history is greater than ever it was.112
From the mid century onwards, then, modem man did not, by and large, engage with 
the problem of nihilism in the way Nietzsche had hoped. The advent of European 
meaninglessness had not prompted careful reflection on the “fundamental character 
and really tragic problem of the modem age.” Rather, much as he feared, the 
experience of nihilism led to a growing attachment to ideological interpretations of 
the meaning of history.
As ideology, moreover, History also led to conflict. For, to quote Gillespie 
once more, “[t]he exclusive and ever more fanatical claim of every ideology 
necessary [brought] it into conflict with every other ideology.” Consequently, the 
result of attempting to overcome the problem of European nihilism through a belief in 
History results, ultimately, in a “propaganda war” or a “struggle of world views” to 
determine in Nietzsche’s words “who shall be master of the earth,” i.e. which 
ideological interpretation will direct the conquest and exploitation of man and
1 I *5 #
nature.” This struggle, moreover, unfolds itself in world war and intense 
ideological rivalry which barred the creation of a meaningful Europe from the late 
inter-war years up until the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989. 
Throughout the twentieth century it was possible for those who had an interest in 
doing so, to portray themselves as missionaries of a more meaningful future, and to
111 As the semiotician and psychoanalyst Julia Kristeva explains, in the absence o f traditional 
structures, men may engage in defensive reactions consisting o f “community bonding whose only 
identity comes from efforts to sustain hatred fo r the other." Julia Kristeva. “Comment on the Hutchison 
Paper: Which Individual for the Twenty-First Century?” In Kokusai Koryu Kikin and Nichi-Bei Senta 
(eds.) The End o f  the Century: The Future in the Past. Tokyo, New York and London: Kodansha 
International, 1995, p. 268.
112 Paul Valery. “Extraneous Remarks” (1927). Paul Valery: Selected Writings. New Directions 
Publishing Corp, 1950, p. 136.
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themselves as missionaries of a more meaningful future, and to gain significant 
popular support in this quest. It is in this sense, moreover, that Nietzsche’s discussion 
of European nihilism can be seen to pertain not only to the two world wars which 
shattered Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, but also to an understanding 
of the ideological component of the Cold War which, until recently, ensured that 
Europe remained divided. It is this very nexus which allowed Andre Malraux to 
conclude that “Nietzsche understood far better than anyone else that the twentieth 
century would be the century of great ideological wars.”114
Conclusion
What the plethora of writers cited in this chapter have sought to draw attention 
to, is the fact that many of the violent political events of the twentieth century which 
ensured Europe’s division in the course of the twentieth century would not have been 
thinkable without the prior collapse of the spiritual and ethical ground of Europe.115 
What these writers testify to, moreover, is the fact that the experience of European 
nihilism never actually disappeared from European culture since the end of the 
nineteenth century. Rather, the problem of nihilism has accompanied European life 
through to the present day, manifesting itself most starkly in those violent conflicts 
throughout the course of the 20th century against the background of which the 
institutional project of Europe was initiated. The ability to actually trace the 
persistence of the experience of European nihilism throughout the course of the 
twentieth century, moreover, serves to further corroborate the assessment that the 
contemporary question of how to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the 
post-Cold War era is still, at bottom, Nietzsche’s question of how to confront the 
advent of European nihilism.
What is more, these conflicts also demonstrate how the attempt to simply 
transcend and escape the experience of nihilism without a deeper engagement with the 
advent of European nihilism can become dangerous and bellicose. Indeed, one
114 Tracy B. Strong. Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Transfiguration. Berkeley: University o f
California Press, 1975, p. 189.
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important common feature of these three conflicts is that they each, in their own way, 
constitute an attempt to escape the experience of meaninglessness in the aftermath of 
the ‘death of God’ through a reactivation of the will-to-truth, i.e. by identifying a 
‘true’ race, nation, class or agent of history as embodying the ‘true’ meaning of 
existence. Such a strategy is dangerous if only because in the absence of any external 
criteria, it is difficult to establish their ‘truth’ without recourse to the use of force and 
violence. It thus also seems difficult, in retrospect, to disagree with Nietzsche when he 
had Zarathustra proclaim that, “blood is the worst witness of truth.”116 Not only, 
however, is the reactivation of the will-to-truth in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’ 
dangerous, but, by virtue of the suffering that such an attempt usually brings about, it 
also runs the risk, in the end, of simply making the problem of nihilism more acute. 
Nietzsche himself, although he had not witnessed the violent course of European 
history in the twentieth century, had thought for his own reasons that “[ajttempts to 
escape nihilism without revaluing our values so far: they produce the opposite, make 
the problem more acute”117 and that “[t]he fight against [nihilism] strengthens it.”118 
Not only, then, did the experience of European nihilism persist in the course of the 
twentieth century during which, as Jacques Darras has noted, “the fate of Europe was 
at stake,”119 but it also bears decisively on our understanding of the violent conflicts 
against the background of which the institutional project of Europe was initiated. 
With these points in mind, it is possible to return to the contemporary debate on the 
idea of Europe and to begin unfolding the various stages in Nietzsche’s own response 
to the advent of European nihilism that will eventually culminate in his idea of the 
‘good Europeans.’
1,5 Hermann Rauschning. Masken und Metamorphosen des Nihilismus: Der Nihilismus des XX. 
Jahrhunderts. Frankfurt am Main: Humboldt-Verlag, 1954, p. 24.
116 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘O f the Priests,’ p. 116.
1.7 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 28, p. 19.
1.8 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 5[57], p. 206.
1.9 Jacques Darras. Beyond the Tunnel o f  History. London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 56.
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THE EUROPEAN DEBATE REVISITED
The previous chapter demonstrated that the problem described by Nietzsche 
under the heading of European nihilism persisted throughout the course of the 
twentieth century, manifesting itself most starkly within the context of its ‘deep 
addiction to war’ and its conflicting ideological constructs.1 The fact, moreover, that 
these difficulties entailed by the ‘death of God’ did not vanish in the course of the 
previous century serves to further corroborate the argument that Nietzsche’s European 
thought in general, and his analysis of European nihilism in particular, is still relevant 
to the contemporary debate on the European idea, despite being written over a century 
ago. This chapter, in turn, wishes to finally complete the historical link between 
Nietzsche’s earlier discussion and the present debate on the European idea. It does so 
by showing how Nietzsche’s European thought has become particularly pertinent in 
the post-Cold War era given that that many Europeans have begun, over the course of 
the past decades, to display an increasing incredulity towards the Cold War ideologies 
described in the last section of the previous chapter. This development in European 
culture means that much like Nietzsche found himself caught in the intellectual 
climate of an age in which the great speculative philosophies had spent themselves, 
leaving the question of Europe’s meaning unresolved, so too do contemporary 
Europeans once again confront the question of how to endow European existence with 
a greater sense of meaning and purpose as the traditional ideologies of the Cold War 
era gradually decompose. By subsequently drawing attention to the revealing 
similarities between the contemporary predicament described by scholars of European 
affairs in the introduction to this thesis, on the one hand, and Nietzsche’s earlier 
discussion of European nihilism on the other, the deeper relevance of Nietzsche’s 
European thought for the contemporary impasse is established. Having established 
this symmetry, moreover, the chapter subsequently turns towards a consideration of 
the first step in Nietzsche’s own and subtle response to the advent of European 
nihilism that will eventually culminate in his idea of the ‘good Europeans.’
1 Jan Patocka. “Wars o f the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War” in Heretical Essays 
in the Philosophy o f  History. Trans. Erazim Kohak. Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 120.
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1. The ‘End o f  Ideology’
That contemporary Europeans should once again be concerned with the 
question of delineating a greater sense of meaning or purpose for the European idea 
derives, at least in part, from the increasing incredulity many Europeans now display 
towards the Cold War ideologies discussed in the previous chapter. European elites, 
as well as European societies at large, have, as Stanley Hoffmann points out, begun to 
display an increasing disbelief in relation to these ideologies. Indeed, one of the 
enduring features of European affairs since the 1960s which Hoffmann identifies, is 
the absence of any new set of values underlying the project of European integration. 
In his view, Europeans simply lack the ‘solid bed of beliefs’ which, for example, is 
provided by liberalism in the United States. Nor, Hoffmann argues, did the events of 
1968 do much to alter this circumstance. Rather, in his view, the “bizarre ‘events’ of 
1968 had many aspects: one was a protest against the vacuum of beliefs, or, with 
regard to communism, against the ossification and sterilisation of the creed. But the
•y
attempt to spread new values failed: it was a revolt, not a revolution.” It is for this 
reason, moreover, that Hoffmann concludes by pointing out that “[i]n 1964 I wrote 
that the European consensus was negative; I do not think that there is one today.” In 
Hoffmann’s account, then, this ‘end of ideology’ phenomenon goes some way 
towards explaining the contemporary inability to articulate a more meaningful idea of 
Europe. Indeed, he singles this factor out as constituting one of the three most 
important political characteristics of contemporary Europe which are interfering with 
the articulation of a more compelling vision of Europe in the post-Cold War era.4 
From the perspective of those who desire the articulation of a more meaningful idea 
of Europe, therefore, this ‘end of ideology’ phenomenon is also seen as an ambiguous 
achievement at best, especially in light of the fact that Europeans have, in the mean 
time, not been able to readily fill what Hoffmann refers to as the resultant ‘vacuum of 
beliefs.’
Hoffmann, of course, is not the first scholar to draw attention to the ‘end of 
ideology’ phenomenon in contemporary European culture. The thesis had already
2 Stanley Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” Daedalus Vol. 123. No. 2 1994, p. 13.
3 Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” p. 13.
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been famously formulated by the sociologist Daniel Bell in the 1960s. In his book, 
itself entitled The End o f Ideology, Bell had concluded quite unequivocally that 
“ideology, which was once a road to action, has come to be a dead end.”5 Since that 
time, the debate about the ‘end of ideology’ has occupied a prominent position in the 
Western academy. Importantly, the thesis would also find nourishing ground within 
the context of a Europe which had experienced two world wars and was subsequently 
confronted by the threat of nuclear destruction at the hands of the two rivalling 
ideological systems. Within this international constellation it had become increasingly 
difficult for Europeans to view History as a progressive, rational, meaningful and 
cumulative enterprise -  a luxury which, as Walter Benjamin once pointed out in his 
theses on the philosophy of history, was only granted to the ‘victorious ones.’6 Within 
the context of the Cold War, European scholars consequently began to engage in a 
‘postmodern’ critique of modem ideology.
Thus, according to Jacques Derrida, for example, actively critiquing the 
assumptions of modem ideologies was, and continues to be, a normative endeavour 
required in light of the violent and oppressive nature of much of the twentieth century. 
Indeed, Derrida has consistently warned his readers against employing any ‘totalistic’ 
or ‘final’ vocabulary in relation to such concepts as ‘history’ and ‘meaning,’ or indeed 
any such combination as in, for example, the ‘meaning of history.’ His notion of 
‘deconstruction,’ moreover, is concerned, at least in part, with demonstrating the 
untenability of what he takes to be one of the major axioms of the ‘Western’ 
philosophical tradition, namely the view that the meanings of words are fixed, stable 
and readily accessible to our understanding.7 This ‘logocentric’ bias, as David Hall 
explains, “motivates thinkers to attempt to present the tmth, being, essence, or logical
Q
structure of that about which they think and discourse.” Much like Nietzsche before 
him, then, Derrida argues that any such attempt at articulating a transcendental ground 
of things, or one which posits a telos working itself through world history, is
4 Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” p. 16.
5 Daniel Bell. The End o f  Ideology: On the Exhaustion o f  Political Ideas in the Fifties. New York: Free 
Press, 1962, p. 393.
6 Walter Benjamin. “Theses on the Philosophy o f History” in Illuminations. Ed. Hanah Arendt. 
Glasgow: Fontana/Collins, 1973, p. 258.
7 Stuart Sim. Derrida and the End o f  History. Cambridge: Icon Books, 1999, pp. 70-71.
8 David Hall. “Modem China and the Postmodern West” in Lawrence Cahoone (ed.) From Modernism 
to Postmodernism: An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p. 698.
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ultimately a fiction and is no longer intellectually credible following the ‘death of 
God’ and the advent of European nihilism.9 Derrida, moreover, also detects a strong 
relationship between the logocentric bias of European thinking and its violent history, 
especially in relation to the twentieth century. Indeed, he urges his readers to 
acknowledge that the meaning of words, in particular, and the meaning of existence in 
general, cannot be fixed or policed, not only because such an attempt is bound to 
attempt the impossible, but also because it is profoundly dangerous. Any attempt to 
do so would be, in his view, ‘totalitarian’ and Derrida is content to openly draw upon 
the authoritarian connotations which accompany this term, especially in light of such 
twentieth-century figures as Stalin or Mao.10 There is, to quote Benjamin once more, 
“no document of civilisation which is not at the same time also a document for 
barbarism.”11 While Derrida is, of course, a particularly prominent scholar, he is not 
the only one to drive forward the debate questioning the prevalent ideologies of 
modernity.
Another French scholar, Jean-Francois Lyotard, has similarly taken this 
“incredulity towards metanarratives” to be the defining characteristic of the 
postmodern outlook in his book The Postmodern Condition}2 Metanarratives, as 
Lyotard employs the term, are precisely those ‘universal’ and ‘total’ accounts of 
existence which had been advanced by the speculative philosophers of History -  
Hegel and Marx, but also includes such intellectual systems as liberalism and 
positivism.13 What is so characteristic of the ‘postmodern’ condition, in Lyotard’s 
view, is that “[w]e no longer have recourse to the grand narratives -  we can resort 
neither to the dialectic of Spirit nor even to the emancipation of humanity as a 
validation for postmodern scientific discourse.”14 As is the case with Derrida, 
however, much of Lyotard’s quest is also normative. For, Lyotard, too, is critical of
9 See, for example, Madan Sarup. An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism. 2nd 
Ed. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 37
10 Sim, Derrida and the End o f  History, pp. 50-51.
11 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy o f History,” p. 258.
12 Jean-Francois Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge {La condition 
postmoderne). Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1984, p. xxiv. The report was presented to the Conseil des Universites o f the government of 
Quebec at the request o f its president, (p. xxv).
13 See, for example, Steven Best and Douglas Keller. Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations. New  
York: The Guilford Press, 1991, p. 165.
14 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 60.
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the ‘totalising’ and ‘homogenising’ tendencies of such metanarratives.15 Indeed, he 
argues that “[t]he nineteenth and twentieth centuries have given us as much horror as 
we can take. We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the 
one.. ..”16 The answer to this predicament, he subsequently argued, is to “[l]et us wage
1 *7a war on totality....” In no small measure, then, the contemporary scepticism that 
European scholars display towards the traditional European ideologies, is normatively 
motivated.
The ‘end of ideology’ phenomenon may, however, not be entirely self­
induced. In this vein it is important to also draw attention to Jurgen Habermas’s 
contribution to the debate on the nature and demise and of modem ideologies. In his 
Theory o f Communicative Action, Habermas differentiates between first and second 
generation ideologies. Amongst the former, he includes those ideologies, like 
liberalism and nationalism, which emerged around the time of the French Revolution. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, however, these were followed by a second 
generation of ideologies which emerged in reaction to the first one. These ‘second 
generation* ideologies expressed, Habermas argues, “society’s paradoxical 
rationalisation: the destruction of traditional forms of life and the partial realisation of 
modernity which necessitated the reinvention of tradition.”18 What is more, they 
sought the political transformation of society without overt recourse to metaphysical 
or religious world views.19 Despite these differences, however, Habermas goes on to 
argue that both generations of ideologies shared a totalising conception of society, 
usually addressed to mass society by elites who were struggling to gain control of the 
state.20 What, according to Habermas, is particularly important to note in the 
contemporary context, however, is that these ideologies have lost their ability to 
function properly as an extension of elite rule in Europe. Their manipulative 
operation, he argues, is inhibited by the increasing social fragmentation evident in 
most European societies. Indeed, he deems existence in modem European societies to
15 See Best and Keller, Postmodern Theory, p. 166.
16 Lyotard, Economie Libidinale. Cited in Seyla Benhabib. “Epistemologies o f Postmodernism: A 
Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard,” New German Critique, 33, 1984, p. 121.
17 Lyotard, Economie Libidinale. Cited in Benhabib, “Epistemologies of Postmodernism,” p. 121.
18 For a treatment o f Habermas’s theory of ideology, see Gerard Delanty. “Redefining Political Culture 
in Europe Today: From Ideology to the Politics o f Identity and Beyond” in U lf Hedetofh (ed.) Political 
Symbols, Symbolic Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, pp. 26-27.
19 Delanty, “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today,” p. 27.
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have reached such a level of complexity and specialisation that existence in such an 
environment evades the possibility of being understood with reference to a single 
ideology. In his view, therefore, society as a whole is no longer likely to be grasped 
by Europeans pursuing their individualised and rationalised existences. In his own 
formulation, “[e]veryday consciousness is robbed of its power to synthesise; it
91becomes fragmented.” Importantly, then, in Habermas’s account the end of ideology 
is not so much voluntary, as a result of underlying sociological and historical 
developments.
Irrespective, however, of whether scholars understand the increasing 
incredulity towards ‘grand narratives’ to be the result of a normative critique or of the 
underlying sociological processes, or even a combination of the two, it remains the 
case that increasing numbers of Europeans are demonstrating a growing incredulity 
towards such totalising ideologies. Interestingly, Nietzsche himself had already noted, 
somewhat prematurely, in the Genealogy o f Morals that:
[t]o view nature as if  it were a proof of the goodness and providence o f a 
God; to interpret history to the glory o f a divine reason, as the perpetual 
witness to a moral world order and moral intentions; to interpret one’s own 
experiences, as pious men long interpreted them, as if  everything were 
preordained, everything a sign, everything sent for the salvation o f the soul 
-  that belongs to the past?2
Today, however, Nietzsche’s assessment may be a more accurate description. Much 
in this vein, Goran Rosenberg, for example, has recently argued that the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 may have signalled the end “not of the 20th century, but of a 
very long 19th century, a double-century that began in 1789, with the French 
Revolution and the dream of a new, secular, rational, enlightened, evermore perfect, 
world-order. With the idea that history had a meaning, a given course of progress -  
and a final goal.”23
20 Delanty, “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today,” p. 27.
21 Delanty, “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today,” p. 27.
22 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Genealogy o f  Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New 
York: Random House, 1967, III, 27, pp. 160-1.
23 Goran Rosenberg. “The Heritage o f a Century” in James Kaye and Bo Strath (eds.) Enlightenment 
and Genocide, Contradictions o f  Modernity. Brussels: P.I.E. -  Peter Lang, 2000, p. 245.
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Importantly, however, if Europeans are becoming increasingly critical o f these 
ideologies, this also means that Europeans have become critical of one of the most 
influential ways in which the twentieth century had sought to avert the advent of 
European nihilism. It will be recalled from the previous chapter that it was precisely 
by providing ideological interpretations of History, that European existence could be 
rendered meaningful and the deeper implications of European nihilism could be 
avoided. The question that subsequently arises in the absence of these ideologies, is 
what, if  anything, will provide European existence with a greater sense of meaning in 
the post-Cold War era. It is here, moreover, and as was already noted in Chapter 1, 
that many contemporary scholars and policy-makers of European affairs detect an 
uncomfortable silence. In contemporary Europe, it does indeed seem as if the overall 
aim is once again lacking, and the question ‘Why?’ no longer finds a ready answer. 
With this very realisation, however, contemporary Europeans can also be seen as 
entering a renewed phase of what Nietzsche already referred to as European nihilism 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, with the result that the historical link 
between Nietzsche’s earlier discussion and the contemporary predicament is also 
finally completed. Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism, then, is particularly 
relevant for the contemporary debate on the idea of Europe because Europeans, 
despite their growing incredulity towards many of the ideological accounts of 
twentieth century, have nevertheless not yet been able to successfully address the 
deeper and underlying ramifications of the ‘death of God’ already detected by 
Nietzsche towards the end of the nineteenth century. As the doubts about the 
traditional ideologies of the Cold War increasingly emerge, therefore, so too does the 
underlying problem of European nihilism which these ideologies partially sought to 
address.
2. Contemporary European Nihilism
If it is indeed the case that many contemporary Europeans have once again 
returned to Nietzsche’s earlier problem, and have begun to enter a renewed phase of 
European nihilism, then one would expect there to be a general convergence between 
the descriptive analysis of European culture provided by contemporary scholars of
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European affairs, on the one hand, and the analysis of European nihilism already 
provided by Nietzsche towards the end of the nineteenth century, on the other. In 
order to ascertain whether such a convergence does, in fact, exist, it is useful to recall 
in greater detail the way in which Nietzsche actually described the experience of 
European nihilism. Nietzsche wrote, for example, that:
[t]he feeling of valuelessness was reached with the realisation that the 
overall character o f existence may not be interpreted by means o f the 
concept of ‘aim,’ the concept o f ‘unity,’ or the concept o f ‘truth.’ ...
Briefly: the categories ‘aim,’ ‘unity,’ ‘being’ which we used to project 
some value into the world -  we pull out again; so the world looks 
*" - valueless.24
Nihilism, in other words, is the experience likely to result when the concepts of ‘aim’ 
and ‘unity,’ which were traditionally employed to establish the meaning of European 
existence, became unconvincing. As was already noted in Chapter 2, the advent of 
European nihilism reaches its highest point when the will-to-truth of Europe’s 
Christian-Platonic heritage begins to undermine these very concepts and, as a 
consequence, modem European existence increasingly takes on the appearance of 
actually being meaningless.
Nietzsche described the onset of European nihilism more specifically through 
the means of a three-step realisation.25 “Nihilism,” he argued, would be reached first 
“when we have sought a ‘meaning’ in all events that is not there. ... Nihilism, in this
sense, is the recognition of the of the long waste of strength, the agony of the ‘in
vain....’” One had sought to achieve something and “now one realises that becoming 
aims at nothing and achieves nothing.” Once, in other words, world history, for 
example, is seen to move in a specific direction and towards a specific goal, it is 
deemed to be meaningful as a whole. To the extent that Europeans took part in such 
processes, their existence, too, could come to be seen as being meaningful. When, 
however, it increasingly emerged that no such meaning exists in world history, 
existence, too, might take on the appearance of being meaningless. In this sense, the
24 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1968, 12 A, pp. 12-13.
25 For the following citations, see Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 12 A, pp. 12-13.
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experience of nihilism begins, in the first instance, with the suspicion that a specific 
meaning which had been previously posited as underlying all events is no longer 
credible. The past subsequently takes on the appearance of a great waste of resources, 
of a misguided and futile effort.
Nihilism, moreover, is reached secondly, Nietzsche further explained, when 
one has posited “a totality, a systematization, indeed any organisation in all events, 
and underneath all events.... ‘The well-being of the universal demands the devotion 
of the individual’ -  but behold, there is no such universal!” The result o f this 
realisation, in Nietzsche’s view, is that “[a]t bottom, man has lost faith in his own 
value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him; i.e. he conceived such a 
whole in order to be able to believe in his own value.” Put differently, the experience 
of nihilism is intensified by the realisation that it is not only one particular 
interpretation of existence that is no longer credible, but that, in fact, no 
universalisable or transcendent meaning can be ascribed to existence at all, be it either 
of the Christian or of any other conceivable kind. This recognition that it is no longer 
possible to posit a meaning underlying all events, moreover, provokes the suspicion 
that there no longer is any universalisable meaning underlying human existence as 
well. Faith in an existing overall unity of European existence is lost.
Finally, in Nietzsche’s account, these two sources of European nihilism can 
give rise to the third and most pervasive stage of nihilism. When, he noted, “man 
finds out how that world is fabricated solely from psychological needs, and how he 
has absolutely no right to it, the last form of nihilism comes into being: it includes 
disbelief in any metaphysical world and forbids itself any belief in a true world.” 
Over time, in other words, the quest for an overall aim and meaning to existence may 
culminate in profound disillusionment. Indeed, Nietzsche noted further, “[hjaving 
reached this standpoint, one grants the reality of becoming as the only reality, forbids 
oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and false divinities -  but 
cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny i t ” It is, moreover, 
against the backdrop of this analysis that Nietzsche concluded over a century ago that 
“[w]e Europeans confront a world of tremendous ruins. A few things are still 
towering, much looks decayed and uncanny, while most things already lie on the 
ground. It is all very picturesque -  where has one ever seen more beautiful ruins? -
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and overgrown by large and small weeds.”26 European existence, in Nietzsche’s 
account, is likely to be understood as being meaningless unless scholars find a 
compelling way of circumventing this experience.
Do, then, Nietzsche’s observations in regard to the advent of European 
nihilism, now over a century old, still resonate in contemporary Europe? One answer 
to this question has already been provided by Keith Ansell-Pearson who has argued 
that “[o]ne of the ways of understanding Nietzsche’s characterisation of the 
experience of nihilism as a psychological experience of weariness, distrust, apathy, 
and hopelessness, is by reflecting on some recent events in our own time, such as the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and its existential impact on committed 
socialists and Marxists.”27 In relation to those contemporary Europeans confronting 
the collapse of Communism, Ansell-Pearson points out that in Nietzsche’s account 
nihilism is:
the recognition o f the long waste o f strength, the agony o f the ‘in vain’, 
insecurity, the lack o f any opportunity to recover and regain composure — 
being ashamed in front o f oneself, as if  one had deceived oneself all too 
long. -  This meaning could have been: the ‘fulfilment’ o f some highest 
ethical canon in all events, the moral world order; or the growth o f  love 
and harmony in the intercourse o f beings; or the gradual approximation o f  
a state o f universal happiness; or even the development toward a state o f  
universal annihilation -  any goal at least constitutes some meaning. What 
all these notions have in common is that something is to be achieved 
through the process and now one realises that becoming aims at nothing 
and achieves nothing.28
After several decades of Communist rule, many of those who had come to believe in 
the socialist cause, Ansell-Pearson argues, experienced sentiments not at all that 
foreign from the ones Nietzsche had earlier associated with the experience of 
European nihilism. This time, however, the experience was triggered not by the 
collapse of the ‘God-hypothesis’ but by one of the ideologies which, as discussed in
26 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974, 
358, p. 310.
27 Keith Ansell-Pearson, Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 38.
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the previous chapter, served, at least in part, as an attempt to re-endow existence with 
meaning following the ‘death of God.’
Yet, it is also possible to pursue this analogy even further. Indeed, it can be 
suggested that it was not only ‘eastern’ Europe which would be revisited by the 
experience of nihilism following the tremendous events of 1989. Thus, one of the 
unexpected results of the collapse of the Cold War, perhaps, is that this experience of 
meaninglessness and disorientation was not confined to eastern Europe but has also 
become manifest in ‘western’ Europe as well. As the ‘postmodern’ critique made its 
impact on European culture, and as the Cold War rivalry receded, the ‘universal’ 
ideologies of the past decades were no longer readily seen to provide comfort to 
Europeans. As a consequence, European and world affairs could also no longer be 
assessed, interpreted and appropriated within the encompassing framework of the 
Cold War rivalry, aspects of which had previously permeated virtually all of 
international politics and reached into the four comers of the planet.29 If, as Zaki Lai'di 
has recently argued in his book A World without Meaning: The Crisis o f Meaning in 
International Politics, we understand ‘meaning’ to consist of three inter-related 
notions -  a foundation, a sense of unity and a final goal -  then international relations 
in general, and European relations in particular, can properly be described as 
‘meaningless’ in the post-Cold War era.30 If, in other words, in the post-Cold War era, 
ideological forms of thinking can no longer readily provide European existence with 
meaning, if their credibility has become challenged far enough so as to no longer 
provide for such a possibility, then Europe is left, once again, in want of a meaningful 
identity; it has once again to confront the problem of European nihilism. In this sense, 
then, the crisis of meaning, or the experience of meaninglessness, is not at all 
confined to ‘eastern’ Europe and the formerly Communist or socialist countries. 
Rather, as Lai'di notes, “[t]he loss of reference points and the dispossession of a 
‘principal meaning’ affect far more than just the former communist societies, or just 
the continent of Europe.”31 It is, moreover, in precisely this sense that it can also be
28 Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 12 A, p. 12.
29 See Zaki Lai’di. A World Without Meaning: The Crisis o f  Meaning in International Politics. Trans.
June Burnham and Jenny Coulon. London and Routledge, 1998.
30 Lai'di, A World Without Meaning, p. 1.
31 Lai’di, A World Without Meaning, p. 2. Indeed, for Lai’di this loss of meaning following the end o f the
Cold War was even ‘planet-wide’ and ‘universal.’
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said that Nietzsche’s account of European nihilism still resonates over a century after 
he first penned it. Indeed, Keith Ansell-Pearson has noted, “[tjoday it remains as 
necessary as ever to think through the problem of nihilism....”32 For, he argues 
further, “[i]f God is dead, and if we have lost the traditional metaphysical-moral 
structure which enabled us to make sense of existence, to give it a meaning and a 
purpose, how is it possible for us now to interpret the world and to give meaning to 
our lives?”33
The analogy between Europe’s contemporary predicament and Nietzsche’s 
discussion of European nihilism emerges even more clearly when one recalls, from 
Chapter 1, some of the ways in which contemporary Europe has been characterised by 
those scholars engaged in the debate over the European idea. According to a plethora 
of scholars of European culture, contemporary Europeans are deemed unlikely to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe which could serve to legitimise the 
institutional project of Europe. There is, in other words, a growing feeling that, much 
as Nietzsche anticipated, Europeans have lost the voice with which to cultivate the 
European idea. One could even cite one of Nietzsche’s own descriptions of Europe 
and it would not seem out of place in the company of these previous descriptions. 
Thus, Nietzsche himself, for example, wrote that “[t]he whole of the West no longer 
possesses the instincts out of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: 
perhaps nothing antagonises its ‘modem spirit’ so much. One lives for the day, onfc 
lives very fast, one lives very irresponsibly: precisely this is called ‘freedom.’”34 
Indeed, he added elsewhere, “this is how things are: the diminution and levelling of 
European man constitutes our greatest danger, for the sight of him makes us weary.... 
The sight of man now makes us weary -  what is nihilism if it is not that? -  We are 
weary of m any35 Contemporary Europeans simply seem unable to in determine a new 
‘Why?’ and it is this inability to identify an overall aim which is precisely the 
definition of nihilism that Nietzsche provided. It is in this sense, then, that there is
32 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 8.
33 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, pp. 7-8. For similar assessments see: Gianni Vattimo. 
The End o f  Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Post-modern Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1988, p. 19; David Owen. Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity: A Critique o f  Liberal Reason. London: 
Sage, 1995, p. ix; William E. Connolly. Political Theory and Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, p. 
12 .
34 Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight o f  the Idols. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1990, 
‘Expeditions o f an Untimely Man,’ 39, p. 105.
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also a very close symmetry between Nietzsche’s discussion o f European nihilism and
the contemporary debate on the meaning of the European idea.
What is more, this inability to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe is 
not widely met with enthusiasm and acceptance but is rather deemed to be 
problematic. It does not seem, in other words, that Europeans are today content to 
simply substitute the prospect of a more meaningful existence in favour of the 
attainment of physical security and material satisfaction. This may have seemed a like 
a desirable and reasonable prospect in the aftermath of two world wars and within the 
context of Europe’s resultant and fragile position between the two ‘superpower’ 
rivals. In the post-Cold War era, however, there are many Europeans who express the 
demand for an existence which is more meaningful than the one described by 
Nietzsche towards the end of the nineteenth century under the heading of the ‘last 
man’:
Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow o f his 
longing beyond man, and the string o f his bow will have forgotten how to 
whir....
Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer 
able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man. “What is love?
What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?” thus asks the last man, 
and he blinks....
“We have invented happiness,” say the last men, and they blink. They have 
left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still 
loves one’s neighbour and rubs against him, for one needs warmth....
One still works, for work is a form o f entertainment. But one is careful lest 
the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: 
both require too much exertion.
No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the 
same: whoever feels differently goes voluntarily into a madhouse.36
Nietzsche considered the ‘last man’ to be the most nauseating type because he is 
incapable of setting the kinds of goals that would enable him to overcome himself.
35 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, I, 12, p. 44.
36 Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1961, I, 
“Zarathustra’s Prologue,” 5, p. 46.
107
He is, in the words of Francis Fukuyama, the kind of man who “gave up prideful 
belief in his or her own superior worth in favour of comfortable self-preservation.”38 
Much in this vein, Nietzsche also warned his readers in The Genealogy o f  Morals, that 
“the diminution and leveling of European man constitutes our greatest danger”; man 
is becoming ‘thinner ... more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent.” What 
Nietzsche worried about in relation to modem Europe, in other words, is the 
increasing mediocritisation and despiritualisation of Europeans. Indeed, he pointed 
out that “[t]he glorification of ‘work’, that hard industriousness from early till late,” 
had become “the best policeman [which] keeps everyone in bound and can mightily 
hinder the development of reason.”40 What is more, it makes people “ashamed of 
resting, and prolonged reflection almost gives people a bad conscience. One thinks 
with a watch in one’s hand, even as one eats one’s midday meal while reading the 
latest news of the stock market.”41
Similarly, it seems that there are, today, many who share these kinds of 
apprehensions about a Europe reminiscent of this ‘last man.’ Francis Fukuyama, for 
example, has argued in his influential book The End o f History and the Last Man that:
[w]hen Nietzsche’s Zarathustra told the crowd about the last man, a clamor 
arose. “Give us this last man, O Zarathustra!” “Turn us into these last 
men!” they shouted. The life of the last man is one o f physical security and 
material plenty, precisely what Western politicians are fond o f promising 
their electorates. Is this really what the human story has been “all about” 
these past few millennia? Should we fear that we will be both happy and 
satisfied with our situation, no longer human beings but animals o f genus 
homo sapiens? Or is the danger that we will be happy on one level, but still 
cfw-satisfied with ourselves on another, and hence ready to drag the world 
back into history with all its wars, unjustice, and revolution.42
37 Bruce Detwiler. Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Aristocratic Radicalism. Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1990, p. 73.
38 Francis Fukuyama. The End o f  History and the Last Man. London: Penguin, 1992, p. 301.
39 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, 1 ,12, p. 44.
40 Friedrich Nietzsche. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices o f  Morality. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 173, p. 105.
41 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 329, p. 259.
42 Fukuyama, The End o f  History and the Last Man, p. 312.
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By way of analogy, there is no guarantee that contemporary Europeans will, in the 
post-Cold War era, content themselves with the parameters of existence described by 
Nietzsche under the heading of the ‘last man.’ If anything, there is evidence to suggest 
that there has been, over the course of the past decade, a growing demand for 
significant change in this regard. Stanley Hoffmann, for example, points out that some 
Europeans now “wonder what the higher purpose of West European integration is if 
their societies do not have anything specific to protect and promote.”43 Zaki Lai'di, 
moreover, has recently noted that European societies are currently experiencing what 
he calls the paradox o f  meaning:
Though European societies demonstrate an extreme reservation and 
resistance towards any wholesale, voluntarist reformulation, they persist in 
expressing a strong but complex demand for meaning. Though they expect 
a collective project to have a practical effect on their daily lives, they 
cannot persuade themselves to construct a ‘horizon o f meaning’ founded 
solely on instrumental rationality.44
As emerged particularly clearly in relation to the Maastricht Treaty, the goals of 
material gratification and physical security no longer exhaust the demands of a 
growing percentage of Europeans. This is a trend, moreover, backed by contemporary 
sociologists who detect a consistent rise in the percentage of the populations of 
European societies frequently reflecting about the meaning or purpose of their 
existence.45 There are, perhaps, as Walter Kaufmann once pointed out, increasing 
numbers of people who realise “that their pleasure does not add up to happiness and 
that their ends do not give their lives any lasting meaning” and who consequently 
wish to keep the question of Europe’s meaning alive.46 In this sense, then, the advent 
of European nihilism described by Nietzsche does indeed continue to be a problem 
confronting contemporary Europeans, and the historical link between Nietzsche’s 
earlier discussion and the contemporary debate is finally completed.
43 Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” p. 15.
44 Lai’di, A World Without Meaning, p. 76.
45 Ronald Inglehart. Modernisation and Postmodernisation: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change 
in 43 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 286.
46 Walter Kaufmann. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. 4th Edition. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974, Preface to the First Edition (1950), p. xvi.
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3. *Incomplete ’ Nihilism and the European Debate
Having drawn attention to the relevance of Nietzsche’s European thought for 
understanding the current impasse in the European debate, it is now possible to turn 
towards unravelling Nietzsche’s own subtle response to the advent of European 
nihilism that will culminate in his idea of the ‘good Europeans.’ At this point, in other 
words, Nietzsche himself can be drawn into the contemporary debate on the idea of 
Europe. Nietzsche’s philosophy was, after all, very much addressed to the 
philosophers of the future. Moreover, contemplating the predicament of the lack of an 
overall aim or purpose to existence constituted one of the most important aspects of 
Nietzsche’s intellectual pursuit. Indeed, Nietzsche himself characterised his 
philosophical project much in these terms, as the following passage illustrates:
He that speaks here, conversely, has done nothing so far but reflect: a 
philosopher and solitary by instinct, who has found his advantage in 
standing aside and outside, in patience, in procrastination, in staying 
behind; as a spirit o f daring and experiment that has already lost its way 
once in every labyrinth o f the future; as a soothsayer-bird spirit who looks 
back when relating what will come; as the first perfect nihilist o f Europe 
who, however, has even now lived through the whole o f nihilism, to the 
end, leaving it behind, outside himself.47
Nietzsche sought to think through the crisis of European nihilism and to free 
European life from its moribund remnants. Most of his published works following 
Zarathustra, furthermore, constitute his responses to this advent of European
• i S  *nihilism. Nietzsche’s self-appointed task, in this sense, consisted, as Keiji Nishitani 
has pointed out, of experimenting:
with the future tendencies and issues o f history by making the self one’s 
laboratory. This activity discloses the end o f history lurking in its ground 
by tempting the self to venture into every labyrinth o f the future, which is 
to lure the ending out o f history and into the self. This is the meaning of
47 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Preface, 3, p. 3.
48 Alan D. Schrift. Nietzsche and the Question o f  Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction. New York and London: Routledge, 1990, p. 15.
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‘living nihilism through to its end’ and the standpoint o f ‘one who is a 
philosopher and a hermit by instinct.49
Nietzsche thus sought to contemplate the trajectory of European history and to 
experiment with this trajectory within himself. This also means, however, that, as one 
scholar has pointed out, “[njihilism is not the doctrine which he seeks to defend, as is 
popularly supposed, but rather the problem with which his philosophy begins.”50 It 
may well turn out that Nietzsche’s corpus in general, and his idea of the ‘good 
Europeans’ in particular, can indeed provide some fruitful insights into what might 
constitute an appropriate response to the contemporary inability to articulate a more 
meaningful idea of Europe.
How, though, would Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ seek to address the advent 
of European nihilism? The answer to this question, like Nietzsche’s analysis of 
European nihilism itself, is complex and will, in fact, take the remainder of the thesis 
to unfold.51 A sound starting point, however, is the recognition that Nietzsche set out 
his engagement with the experience of European nihilism by distinguishing, in the 
first instance, between two different forms of nihilism -  ‘incomplete’ and ‘complete’ 
nihilism. For the purposes of this chapter, it is the former which is of the most 
immediate interest, while it is left to the last chapter to consider the latter of the two 
strategies for responding to the advent of European nihilism. In Nietzsche’s view, a 
strategy of ‘incomplete’ nihilism consists of any “attempt to escape nihilism without 
reevaluating our values so far.”52 Incomplete nihilism is the attempt, in the aftermath 
of the ‘death of God,’ to replace the ‘old God’ with more secular ones. As the French 
Nietzsche scholar Michel Haar has argued in this vein, “[ijncomplete nihilism is but 
the decomposition of the ‘true world,’ the recurrent attempt to find replacement 
values to substitute for the Platonic and Christian ideals (Christianity only having 
‘popularised’ the concept of a ‘true world’ with its idea of a ‘world beyond’).”53
49 Keiji Nishitani, The Self-Overcoming o f  Nihilism. Trans. Graham Parkes with Setsuko Aihara. 
Albany: SUNY, 1990, p. 30.
50 R. C. Solomon. From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their Nineteenth- 
Century Backgrounds. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, p. 112.
51 See Henning Ottmann. Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987, p. 
342.
52 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 28, p. 19.
53 Michel Haar. “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language” in David Allison (ed.) The New Nietzsche. 
London: The MIT Press, 1997, p. 14.
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Underlying this strategy for confronting the ‘death of God’ was the desire to salvage 
the traditional structure of endowing European existence with a greater sense of 
meaning, not by erecting new, other-worldly deities, for this was now no longer 
credible in modem times, but rather by transposing this metaphysical distinction 
between a ‘true’ world and an ‘apparent’ world onto the ‘earthly’ realm.
Strategies of incomplete nihilism thus also operate quite explicitly under the 
assumption that the ‘dead God’ can be replaced in modem times by other, more 
earthly values. Martin Heidegger explained how according to Nietzsche the empty 
space left behind by the ‘death of God’ demands, in modem times:
to be occupied anew and to have the god now vanished from it replaced by 
something else. New ideals are set up. That happens according to 
Nietzsche’s conception ... through doctrines regarding world happiness, 
through socialism, and equally through Wagnerian music, i.e. everywhere 
where ‘dogmatic Christendom’ has ‘become bankrupt.’ Thus does 
‘incomplete nihilism’ come to prevail.54
Nietzsche’s notion of incomplete nihilism, then, refers to those strategies which, in 
their engagement with the experience of meaninglessness, seek to erect new ideals 
and idols in place of the ‘dead God,’ in which case the metaphysical structure of 
thinking is not so much abandoned as it is merely transposed from the otherworldly 
realm to the earthly one. The will-to-truth nevertheless continues to remain in 
operation.
It is, moreover, precisely this strategy of confronting the advent of European 
nihilism which seems to have prevailed throughout the course of the twentieth 
century. As was already noted in the previous chapter, the violent nature of the 
twentieth century was intimately connected with the attempts to erect and legislate 
new and secular idols and meanings which promised earthly forms of transcendence 
at some point in the future. These attempts, too, did not rest so much on an 
abandonment of the previous metaphysical distinction between a ‘true’ world and a
54 Martin Heidegger “Nietzsche’s Word God is dead” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt: New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 69.
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merely ‘apparent’ world, as they did on transposing this distinction onto the realm of 
human history, where the notion of a ‘true’ world was not abolished, but rather 
directed into the future. These strategies were often directed not to the god of the past, 
but to the one that is coming.55 Thus, while Nietzsche found that many of the 
doctrines advanced by Europeans following the ‘death of God’ had clearly done away 
with the overt doctrine of Christianity, many of them were nevertheless still 
ultimately derived from its conceptual and psychological foundations.
The German philosopher Karl Lowith further elaborated on this point by 
noting how “Christian trust in a future fulfilment has been abandoned by modem 
historical thinking, but the perspective toward the future as such has been maintained. 
It pervades all European thought and all our concern with and whence and whither of 
the historical process. Together with the horizon of the future, the quest for meaning 
as goal and purpose has persisted.”56 Thus, despite the frequent abandonment of overt 
Christian theology, there still remains much that is ‘Christian’ in modem European 
thought, and much which still retains, as Nietzsche and Lowith argued, the Judeo- 
Christian faith in a future redemption by positing a redeeming future and telos 
underlying world history. Politically, Lowith argued in a Nietzschean vein, this logic 
was present in the English, French, and Russian revolutions, all of which “would not 
have taken place without the faith in progress, and secular faith in progress would 
hardly have come into existence without the original faith in an ultimate goal of 
human existence.”57 In this sense, Lowith, like Nietzsche before him, sought to 
expose the residual teleological belief in progress, for example, which he detects in a 
variety of forms, such as:
progress toward the fulfilment o f conscious freedom (Hegel), toward 
scientific positivism (Comte), toward a classless society (Marx), towards 
conscious decline (Spengler), toward a universal religion as the creative 
escape from a declining civilisation (Toynbee). All are directed toward an
55 Jurgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1996, p. 87.
56 Karl Lowith. Nature, History, and Existentialism: and Other Critical Essays in the Philosophy o f  
History. Edited by Arnold Levison, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 23.
57 Lowith, Nature, History and Existentialism, p. 23.
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aim and are therefore progressive toward an aim and therefore progressive 
toward the fulfilment of a meaningful purpose.58
From Nietzsche’s perspective, all these strategies would similarly constitute examples 
of incomplete nihilism. Indeed, as David Toole notes with reference to Nietzsche’s 
discussion of European nihilism, the only difference between Christianity and 
strategies of incomplete nihilism, “is that this space is now occupied by a new god. 
[Yet, t]he same drive to escape meaninglessness, the same unwillingness to face the 
world as it is -  a drive that Nietzsche deems ‘the will to truth’ -  remains operative in 
this incomplete form of nihilism.”59 With strategies of incomplete nihilism the will- 
to-truth seeks to maintain or re-establish itself in the aftermath of the ‘death of God.’ 
As Nimrod Aloni notes in relation to Nietzsche’s understanding of incomplete 
nihilism, “God’s shadow lingers when thinkers retain a belief in a telos, a cosmic 
goal, a direction in nature, a purpose in existence, an end to history.”60
The likely response, then, that Nietzsche anticipated for the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries, was the erection of new ideals which would fill the space left 
behind by the ‘death of God.’ Indeed, Nietzsche understood that strategies of 
incomplete forms of nihilism would, in fact, be quite attractive to Europeans in the 
course of the twentieth century. For, although Christianity was indeed deemed to be 
dead by many Europeans, the adoption of incomplete forms of nihilism served to 
retain some of the metaphysical ‘balm’ which Europeans would, in Nietzsche’s view, 
still desire in light of the formative impact of Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage on 
modem European culture. This was particularly true with respect to the metaphysical 
distinction between a ‘true’ world and an ‘apparent’ world, which could be retained in 
terms of an artificial distinction between the present and the future. Rather than 
simply accepting the experience of meaninglessness in the aftermath of the ‘death of 
God,’ Nietzsche thought that many Europeans would seek instead to circumvent this 
experience by positing new and secular values and it is precisely this strategy which 
he referred to as incomplete nihilism. As Nietzsche himself put it, “God is dead; but
58 Lowith, Nature, History and Existentialism, p. 22.
59 David Toole. Waiting fo r  Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, Tragedy and 
Apocalypse. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998, p. 37.
60 Nimrod Aloni. Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche’s Healing and Edifying Philosophy. Lanham: University 
Press o f America, 1991, p. 91.
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given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his 
shadow will be shown.”61
Importantly, however, and despite being able to understand their appeal, 
Nietzsche himself found strategies of incomplete nihilism to be unconvincing 
responses to the advent of European nihilism for at least two reasons. Nietzsche 
objected to such strategies, firstly, because they still rested on precisely this 
metaphysical distinction that was, in his view, no longer intellectually tenable in the 
aftermath of the ‘death of God.’ The reason, in other words, why Nietzsche opposed 
strategies of incomplete nihilism was because, as Heidegger further noted, “that 
which must take the place of the suprasensory world will [still] be variations on the 
Christian-ecclesiastical and theological interpretation of the world, which took over 
its schema of the ordo of the hierarchy of beings from the Jewish-Hellenistic world, 
and whose fundamental structure was established and given its ground through Plato 
at the beginning of Western metaphysics.” Forms of incomplete nihilism, while 
indeed displacing the overtly Christian aspects of the past, still retain the same way of 
endowing existence with meaning by positing an essence or a telos, albeit one which 
resides in the earthly realm; they still rely on the underlying will-to-truth. Yet, as will 
be recalled from Chapter 2, in Nietzsche’s view the deeper implications of the advent 
of European nihilism entailed precisely that the will-to-truth put itself into question, 
with the result that any attempt to postulate a new ‘true’ world in the aftermath of the 
‘death of god’ was, strictly speaking, no longer credible. Strategies of incomplete 
nihilism may please old habits and thus also attain considerable success, but they are 
no longer, Nietzsche insisted, intellectually tenable following the ‘death of God.’
In addition to being intellectually untenable, Nietzsche was, however, also 
critical of strategies of incomplete nihilism for a second and equally important reason. 
For, according to Nietzsche, such strategies of incomplete nihilism are still nihilistic 
in the sense that, like Christianity beforehand, they affirm a non-existent ascetic ideal 
which reduces the rich complexity and ambiguity of earthly existence and which is 
indicative of a resentful attitude towards existence. In this vein, Nietzsche sought to
61 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 108, p. 167.
62 Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s Word God is dead,” p. 64.
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demonstrate, in the Genealogy o f Morals, how the origins of these metaphysical 
distinction are indeed human, all too human. In Nietzsche’s account, and as David 
Owen has noted in relation to Nietzsche’s genealogy, “the act of offering a historical 
(this-worldly) account of the emergence of values for which a transcendent (other- 
wordly) status is claimed, performs a critique of this status which renders it open to 
question....”63 Nietzsche, in other words, wished to draw attention to the questionable 
status of traditional dualistic assumptions of Europeans by demonstrating how the 
evolution of this distinction can, in fact, be explained in naturalistic terms.
Nietzsche thus set out to trace how man, originally nothing more than a 
sophisticated animal, came, over time, to be a creature which endowed, and needed to 
endow, existence with a greater sense of meaning. Nietzsche argued that the 
distinction between an ‘apparent’ and a ‘true’ world emerged historically during the 
process of state formation, when stronger men began to forcefully enslave weaker 
men. From the perspective of the powerful men, Nietzsche explained, the weaker men 
were seen to be bad examples of human beings. This, as Nimrod Aloni notes, “did not 
mean bad in the sense of evil or selfish. It would be rather like referring to ‘bad 
apples,’ that is, rotten apples, apples low on the scale of applehood. There is nothing 
immoral in being a bad apple, just as there is nothing evil in being a bad human in the 
eyes of the noble aristocrat.”64 This ability of the rulers to unreflectingly 
understanding themselves as being inherently good, Nietzsche referred to as ‘master’ 
morality, while he labelled the morality of those subsequently ruled as ‘slave 
morality.’
Nietzsche continued his account of the origins of such metaphysical 
distinctions by noting that for the weaker men the experience of enslavement is 
traumatic. Confined to the violent rule of the stronger men, the weaker men can no 
longer find a ready outlet for their natural instincts and physical drives. As a 
consequence, in Nietzsche’s account, they become increasingly repressed and evolve 
an inner life or soul within which to process the aggression and cruelty that they
63 Owen, Nietzsche, Politics, and Modernity, p. 71.
64 Aloni, Beyond Nihilism, p. 126.
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suffer at the hands of the ‘masters.’65 Indeed, Nietzsche argues, in order to come to 
terms with their suffering, these ‘slaves’ begin to deny earthly existence, marred as it 
is for them by suffering, in favour of another, ‘truer’ world where the moral hierarchy 
is precisely the opposite of the one there are experiencing, i.e. where the suffering 
men are redeemed and where the powerful masters are revealed as ‘evil’ and are 
consequently shamed and punished.66 Unable to resist physically to the masters the 
slaves resist spiritually. It is, therefore, also precisely amongst the weaker and 
enslaved men that, as David Allison points out, “the need arises for postulating every 
form of transcendence: an otherworldly religion, the metaphysical ideals of 
unchanging being, permanence, unity, soul, the moral ideals of ascetic virtue, absolute 
truth, and divine justice.”67
Importantly, however, this also means, according to Nietzsche, that the 
invention of the distinction between a ‘true’ and an ‘apparent’ world is, in effect, the 
creative act of ressentiment against earthly existence. As he argued in this regard in 
the Genealogy o f  Morals:
[t]he slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes 
creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment o f natures that are 
denied the true reaction, that o f deeds, and compensate with an imaginary 
revenge. While every noble morality develops from a triumphant 
affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is 
‘outside’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself;’ and this No is its creative 
deed. This inversion o f the value-positing eye -  this need to direct one’s 
view outward instead of back to oneself -  is o f the essence o f ressentiment: 
in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; 
it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all -  
its action is fundamentally reaction.68
Not only, then, is this metaphysical distinction between a ‘true’ world and an 
‘apparent’ world intellectually untenable, but, as Nietzsche hypothesised, it also has a 
decidedly earthly origin that can be traced back to the resentful attitude displayed
65 See Aaron Ridley. Nietzsche’s Conscience: Six Character Studies from the Genealogy. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1998, p. 8.
66 Owen, Nietzsche, Politics, and Modernity, p. 69.
67 David B. Allison “Introduction” in Allison (ed.), The New Nietzsche, p. 2.
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towards existence within the context of what Nietzsche referred to as ‘slave morality.’ 
In making this critique of ‘slave’ morality, however, Nietzsche is not arguing that 
slavery is inherently good. Rather, he is insisting that an ethics or worldview which 
derives from slavery is likely to be negative and destructive.69 It is precisely this 
logic, moreover, which, in Nietzsche’s account, was also retained within the various 
forms of incomplete nihilism that emerged in the twentieth century. By retaining this 
nihilistic tendency of denying earthly existing is favour of greater ascetic ideals, such 
strategies are, quite literally, still nihilistic and do not mark a decisive break with 
Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage. Bearing in mind, then, that Nietzsche found this 
distinction between a ‘true’ world and an ‘apparent’ world to be both intellectually 
unconvincing and ultimately grounded on a resentful attitude towards existence, it 
comes as less of a surprise that he opposed both Christian morality, as well as 
incomplete forms of nihilism which retained and perpetuated this logic in the 
aftermath of the ‘death of God.’ To this extent, Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would 
not choose to opt for a strategy of incomplete nihilism in response to the advent of 
European nihilism.
This assessment about the inadequacy of strategies of ‘incomplete’ nihilism, 
moreover, also puts Nietzsche and his idea of the ‘good Europeans’ at odds with the 
two principal ways in which scholars and policy-makers in the European debate have 
sought to address the experience of meaninglessness. For, as the sociologist Gerard 
Delanty has recently noted “[t]he great ideologies of European modernity have [now] 
decomposed in the new scenario of identity politics. In short, then, we are witnessing
• n(\ ,a very profound culture shift from ideology to identity.” In the post-Cold War era, m 
other words, many Europeans have turned away from the notion of ideology and 
towards the concept of identity in order to endow contemporary European existence 
with a greater sense of meaning or purpose. Mirroring this important shift, the 
question of whether political identities should be structured along nationally defined 
parameters, on the one hand, or more transnational and European lines on the other,
68 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, I, 10, pp. 36-37.
69 Connolly, Political Theory and Modernity, p. 152.
70 Delanty, “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today,” p. 25.
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has become one of the most divisive contemporary questions in Europe.71 The 
outpouring of literature on national and European identities to which scholars of 
International Relations have been witness in recent years can be understood against 
the background of the contemporary experience of meaninglessness described in the 
previous section.
What is more, despite the countless positions which have been articulated in 
relation to the future development of ‘Europe’ over the decades, it is possible, as Ulf 
Hedetoft has argued, to broadly distinguish in the contemporary debate between two 
different visions for Europe in the post-Cold War era. On the one hand, there are 
those to whom Hedetoft refers to as ‘Europeanisers’ and who generally emphasise the 
need and desirability of an over-arching European identity. In this vein, promoters of 
the European Union have, in recent years, sought to articulate a more meaningful idea 
of Europe around which a European identity may be formulated with the result that “a 
preoccupation with cultural definitions has returned to supplant purely economic and
7  7political concerns.” On the other hand, however, there is the group which Hedetoft 
calls the ‘nationalises.’ Writers in this group, in turn, insist, as the name already 
implies, that the future European order should be based predominantly on national 
identities. It is, however, also important to emphasise that members of this latter camp 
too, mostly consider themselves to be articulating a vision of Europe, albeit one
t • 77consisting of nation states. Hedetoft, moreover, is cautious not to overstate the 
division between the ‘Europeanisers’ and ‘nationalisers’ and notes that some 
important compromises have been made on both sides of the debate. Europeanisers, 
for one, have become increasingly convinced that any attempt to create or 
conceptualise a meaningful European identity has to bear in mind, in a serious 
fashion, the existence of national sentiments, whereas many nationalisers, have
71 Leszek Kolakowski. Modernity on Endless Trial. Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1990, p. 
19; Owen, Maturity and Modernity, p. 64; Charles Taylor cited in Lai'di, A World Without Meaning, p. 
51; John. D. Caputo (ed.) Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1997, p. 118.
72 Delanty, “Redefining Political Culture in Europe Today,” p. 32.
73 See, for example, William Hague’s speech in Budapest on May 13th 1999, entitled “In Europe, Not 
Run by Europe.” Reprinted in The European Journal. Vol. 6. No. 7. May/June 1999, p. 20. Tony Judt, 
in articulating a position more favourable to the continuing importance o f nation-states, also explicitly 
states that he nevertheless considers himself very much to be a European. See the introduction to his A 
Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996. See also U lf Hedetoft. “On 
Nationalisers and Europeanisers in Contemporary Europe -  an Introduction” in U lf Hedetoft (ed.) 
Political Symbols, Symbolic Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 3.
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learned to concede that their nationalising fervour has been provoked by ‘Europe’ and 
therefore: “cannot but accept that the world has been changed, that European 
integration is a fact of life, that Europe needs a political governance elevated above 
the nation-state (though the nature of this governance is disputed), and that Europe as 
a ‘civilisation’ might be able to rally some allegiance over and above the expedience 
of opportunism.”74 The two camps, then, are not as far apart as the discourse 
sometimes seems to suggest.
Yet, as Hedetoft further points out, this does not mean that there actually 
exists a viable middle ground where a meaningful European identity might mingle 
harmoniously with the gambit of national identities and cultures. In the final analysis, 
he concludes, “[s]ymbolic discourses of identity politics are still basically locked into 
an ‘either/or’ predicament, and integrative-syncretic thinking or theorising is hard to 
come by....”75 The closest that contemporary scholars can come to in terms of a 
consensus, is to pursue the possibility of articulating a European identity which would 
not supersede national identities, but would rather complement and supplement them. 
Yet, “how this could happen and what the different meanings of ‘identity’ might be in 
the two instances only very few have tackled in a serious way....” There is, then, 
still no clear and established middle ground on the question of what a meaningful idea 
of Europe may look like around which its various people could rally. Indeed, in the 
course of the 1990s the prospects for such an articulation have actually declined as the 
balance in the debate between the Europeanisers and the nationalisers has once again 
shifted to the later. Whereas in the 1980s Europeanisers had gained the most 
influence, in the course of the 1990s advocates of a Europe based on stronger national 
identities have once again attained the greater weight, not least by representing the
• . • 77advances towards European union as a threat to national cultures and identities. In 
this sense, it is not difficult to see how, in the post-Cold War era the “very aim of a 
more thorough European integration has fostered a political fight over collective and
70
political identities on the continent.” This development, Oliver Schmidtke further
74 Hedetoft. “On Nationalisers and Europeanisers in Contemporary Europe -  an Introduction,” p. 3.
75 Hedetoft, “On Nationalisers and Europeanisers,” p. 4.
76 Hedetoft, “On Nationalisers and Europeanisers,” p. 4.
77 Hedetoft, “On Nationalisers and Europeanisers,” pp. 2-3.
78 Oliver Schmidtke. “Obstacles and Prospects for a European Collective Identity” in Hedetoft, 
Political Symbols, p. 44.
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observes, is representative of a more general trend whereby the “more ambitious the 
goals become in terms of integrating the established nation-states into a wider 
political union, the more it becomes obvious how fragile the legitimating base of this
7Qtrans-national community is.” Contrary to much premature writing on the 
obsolescence of nations and nationalism, these entities and ideas remain potent forces 
in contemporary European politics. Indeed, as the twentieth century drew to a close, 
advocates of an over-arching European identity were once again in the minority. What 
remains to be seen, however, is to what extent any of these two prominent responses 
to the current experience of meaninglessness escape Nietzsche’s critique of 
incomplete nihilism.
Conclusion
By way of concluding this chapter, then, it has been argued that, as the 
traditional political ideologies of the Cold War era have receded, and as European 
culture has embarked upon what several commentators have referred to as its 
‘postmodern’ turn, contemporary Europe once again faces a predicament not at all 
dissimilar from the one described by Nietzsche in his genealogy of European nihilism. 
After having subsequently noted the similarities between Nietzsche’s discussion of 
European nihilism and the contemporary predicament, it was argued that Nietzsche’s 
own intellectual project of how to best engage and respond to the advent of European 
nihilism retains great contemporary pertinence because it is, at bottom, nothing other 
than a response to the question of how to articulate a more meaningful idea of 
European existence in modem times. In this vein, the chapter then turned toward a 
consideration of Nietzsche’s notion of ‘incomplete’ nihilism which he used for 
designating those strategies which retain the traditional metaphysical distinction 
between a ‘true’ world and an ‘apparent’ world in order to render European existence 
meaningful in the aftermath of the ‘death of God.’ What is more, in addition to 
finding, in Chapter 2, that such strategies are intellectually untenable in the aftermath 
of the ‘death of God’ because they still rely on the will-to-truth, this chapter added 
Nietzsche’s second critique of such strategies, namely that they are usually derived
79 Schmidtke, “Obstacles and Prospects for a European Collective Identity,” p. 44.
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from a resentful attitude towards existence. This analysis, moreover, now allows for a 
critical juxtaposition between Nietzsche’s critique of strategies of incomplete 
nihilism, on the one hand, and the current strategies of addressing the experience of 
meaninglessness by advocating national and European identities, on the other. It is to 
this task that Chapters 5 and 6 turn respectively.
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CHAPTER 5
‘LABYRINTHS OF THE FUTURE’ :
NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE OF A NATIONALIST 
RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN NIHILISM
‘LABYRINTHS OF THE FUTURE’ : NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE 
OF A NATIONALIST RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN NIHILISM
Does the advocacy of national ideas and identities constitute, in Nietzsche’s 
account, an appropriate response to the advent of European nihilism? In continuing 
with the critical dialogue initiated in the previous chapter between Nietzsche’s 
discussion of European nihilism and the contemporary debate on the idea of Europe, 
and in seeking to further unfold Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good Europeans,’ it is 
necessary to consider in greater detail his critique of modem nationalism. Such an 
analysis, moreover, is not without contemporary relevance. For, as one scholar has 
noted, “[n]o matter which shape they eventually come in, new European identities 
will have to either reconcile themselves with or combat nationalism and ethnicism.”1 
Indeed, the challenge of nationalist sentiments and loyalties has been one of the 
principle moral motives and goals informing the process of European integration 
since 1945. Yet, judging on the basis of the European debate in the 1990s, this 
benchmark is still far from being achieved. After much initial optimism and 
enthusiasm for a federal Europe leading up to Maastricht, there has been a progressive 
return, in the course of the 1990s, to the more modest consensus that for the 
foreseeable future the European order should remain based primarily on national 
identities and that these nations should provide the locus of meaning for societies in 
Europe. Contrary to much premature writing on the obsolescence of nations and 
nationalism, and despite several attempts to articulate the basis for a common 
European identity, these forces remain potent in contemporary European politics. 
Indeed, as Isaiah Berlin once noted in this regard, nationalism is not so much new or 
resurgent; rather, it has never died.2 An analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of modem 
nationalism, then, is important not only in order to understand more fully his notion of 
the ‘good Europeans,’ but also because it still bears on those who, within the context 
of the contemporary European debate, wish to emphasise the primacy of national 
identities.
1 Thomas Hylland Eriksen. “In Search of Brussels: Creolization, Insularity and Identity Dilemmas in 
Post-National Europe” in J. Peter Burgess (ed.) Cultural Politics and Political Culture in Postmodern 
Europe. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997, pp. 254-255.
2 Isaiah Berlin. “Two Concepts o f Nationalism.” The New York Review o f  Books. November 21, 1991. 
Cited in Tony Judt. “The New Old Nationalism.” New York Review o f  Books. May 26, 1994,44-51.
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Part of the very originality of Nietzsche’s treatment of modem nationalism 
derives from the fact that he sought to understand its rise against the backdrop of the 
wider cultural crisis of European nihilism. “What is the meaning of our nationalism?”
# o
Nietzsche asked and replied, “the metamorphosis of the cross.” Nietzsche, in other 
words, urged his readers to view nationalism as a modem response to the European 
experience of meaninglessness, as an attempt to re-endow existence with a greater 
sense of meaning or purpose in the aftermath of the ‘death of God.’4 By viewing 
modem European nationalism in this light, moreover, Nietzsche was able to gain 
original insights into the nature of modem nationalism, many of which have found an 
echo in the twentieth-century scholarship on nationalism. Importantly, however, this 
does not mean that Nietzsche actually considered modem nationalism to be either a 
viable or a desirable response to the advent of European nihilism. Rather, in his 
account, modem European nationalism still constituted a form of incomplete nihilism, 
i.e. a strategy which, while no longer advocating an ‘otherworldly’ purpose, as had 
previously been the case with Platonism and Christianity, nevertheless still rests on 
the same structure of meaning and the need for positing a higher purpose underlying 
human existence.5 In this sense, it also promises merely a transposition of the 
Christian-Platonic will-to-truth onto the earthly realm, rather than a transvaluation of 
it.6 Nietzsche argued, therefore, that nationalism is a highly artificial process of 
endowing modem existence with meaning which, like most forms of incomplete 
nihilism, is more likely to culminate only in a further institutionalisation of nihilism 
rather than in an honest confrontation and genuine engagement with it.
3 See Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, KSA 12, 
7[26], p. 305. See also KSA 12, 2, [127], p. 127.
4 See Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New  
York: Random House, 1968, I, 1, p. 8 and Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 
9[82], p. 377.
5 See also Elisabeth Kuhn. Friedrich Nietzsches Philosophie des europdischen Nihilismus. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1992, p. 244.
6 This will-to-truth, it will be recalled from Chapter 2, is a mode o f existence that denigrates the sensual 
world, broadly conceived, in favour o f some fixed and higher reality or ‘ascetic ideal’ which is 
subsequently used in order to judge the meaning of this world. It is, moreover, a mode o f approaching 
existence ingrained in European culture that seeks to abstract from the diverse aspects o f existence an 
underlying truth or reality and which seeks to impose upon the day-to-day existence o f Europeans a 
metaphysical structure that discriminates between a merely apparent and meaningless realm o f  
existence that is in constant flux, and the postulation o f a ‘true’ world where the real and deeper 
meaning o f existence is located.
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Correspondingly, he also sought to confront critically and quite unequivocally the rise 
of modem nationalism in Europe.7
1. Nietzsche, Nihilism and Nationalism
Nietzsche approached the rise of modem nationalism in Europe in a manner 
that would, perhaps, be deemed unconventional by contemporary standards. Rather 
than investigating it against the experience of two devastating world wars, to which 
nationalism is generally seen as having contributed in the first half of the twentieth 
century, Nietzsche approached the phenomenon against the background of the cultural 
crisis of European nihilism. Writing prior to the advent of the two world wars, 
Nietzsche, in other words, urged his readers to understand the rise of modem 
nationalism in Europe primarily as a response to the experience of European 
meaninglessness triggered by the ‘death of God.’8 This linking of the advent of the 
‘death of God’ with the rise of modem European nationalism is not fortuitous, but, as 
some brief biographical notes reveal, is partially derived from his own personal 
experience as a youth. Nietzsche, after all, had come of age politically during 
Bismarck’s rise to power and, like many other young men of his era, he affirmed the 
German nation-state as a student.9 Indeed, the young Nietzsche cultivated respect for 
established ‘historical heroes,’ for the classics, for his nation and for great 
leadership.10 Based, moreover, on the nationalist sentiments which he often expressed 
in his letters from the 1860s, it is clear that in his youth Nietzsche, while not uncritical 
of Germany, can nevertheless be said to have been a German patriot.11
7 Karl Jaspers once argued in relation to Nietzsche that scholars drawing on his work should not rest 
content until they have also found the exact opposite o f what he is claiming elsewhere in the corpus. In 
relation to the question of nationalism, however, this principle does not seem to hold.
8 Throughout this chapter, the term modem nationalism refers to what Otto Dann has classified as 
organised nationalism, i.e. that form of nationalism which arose in the last third o f  the nineteenth 
century. See Otto Dann. “Modernity and the Project o f the Modem Nation.” in Johannes Muller and Bo 
Strath (eds.) Nationalism and Modernity. EUI Working Paper HEC 99/1. San Domenico, Florence: 
1999, pp. 24-25.
9 Peter Bergmann. Nietzsche, The Last Anti-Political German, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1987, p. 30.
10 Keith Ansell-Pearson. An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect Nihilist. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 24.
11 Tarmo Kunnas. Die Politik als Prostitution des Geistes: Eine Studie tiber das Politische bei 
Nietzsche. Munich: Frido Flado, 1982, p. 130.
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The first test of Nietzsche’s political views, in turn, came with the war against 
Austria in 1866. Initially Nietzsche thought it “an audacity on Bismark’s [s/c] part to 
create a united Germany in this manner”12 and several of his friends even participated 
in anti-war demonstrations. Once the war proceeded, though, Nietzsche endorsed the
i  'y
Prussian deployments. What is more, by the time he took up his professorship at 
Basel, at the young age of 24 and without yet having completed his doctorate, 
Nietzsche’s patriotism had not yet receded as is evident, for example, from his 
voluntary service as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/71. It is 
important to recognise, however, that even in this early phase Nietzsche was not an 
unconditional supporter of nationalism. Rather, his nationalism is generally deemed to 
have been closer to the form articulated by Herder, i.e. a form which did not seek to 
preach an aggressive self-assertion and also included an important component of self- 
criticism.14 Nevertheless, Nietzsche clearly did endorse nationalist ideas as a young 
scholar and intellectual.
By the middle period of his writing career, however, and for reasons that will 
be treated in greater detail below, Nietzsche would come to abandon these sentiments 
and emerged as the fierce critic of nationalism which he remained until the end of his 
life.15 Nevertheless, these early years of Nietzsche’s career, during which he hoped 
that nationalist ideals might effect a cultural regeneration of Europe and would lead to 
the overcoming of the experience of European nihilism, would later also allow him to 
understand the profound appeal of nationalist sentiments in an age otherwise 
characterised by a perceived lack of a greater sense of meaning or purpose underlying 
European existence. Bearing in mind, from the previous chapter, Nietzsche’s attempt 
to experiment with European history within himself, Nietzsche even took his early 
flirtation with nationalist sentiments as a worrying indicator that, in future, much 
larger sections of European society might pursue a similar course, and that it might 
well take many decades before people would recognise, like he had done, that the 
nationalist alternative to nihilism was, metaphorically speaking, only a ‘labyrinth of
12 Bergmann, Nietzsche, p. 46.
13 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 25. See also Bergman, Nietzsche, Chapter 3, and 
Henning Ottmann. Philosophie undPolitik bei Nietzsche. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987, p. 15.
14 Kunnas, Die Politik als Prostitution des Geistes, p. 130. See also Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to 
Nietzsche, p. 24.
15 See, for example, Ottmann, Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche, p. 18.
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future,’ i.e. an initially appealing but ultimately not viable antidote to the experience 
of nihilism. Thus, one of the distinct features that defined the ‘good Europeans,’ 
which Nietzsche hoped would emerge in the future, was that they would arrive at this 
realisation much quicker than most of their contemporaries. As Nietzsche explained, 
partially in critical reflection on his own brief pondering of nationalist sentiments 
stimulated by his having just listened to Wagner’s music:
We ‘good Europeans’ -  we, too, know hours when we permit ourselves 
some heartly fatherlandishness, a plop and relapse into old loves and 
narrowness -  I have just given a sample o f that -  hours o f national 
agitations, patriotic palpitations, and various other sorts o f  archaizing 
sentimental inundations. More ponderous spirits than we are, [however,] 
may require more time to get over what with us takes only hours and in a 
few hours has run its course: some require half a year, others half a life, 
depending on the speed and power o f their digestion and metabolism.
Indeed, I could imagine dull and sluggish races who would require half a 
century even in our rapidly moving Europe to overcome such atavistic 
attacks o f fatherlandishness and soil addiction and to return to reason, 
meaning‘good Europeanism.’16
In Nietzsche’s view, the attraction of nationalist sentiments in an age deemed to lack a 
greater sense of meaning or purpose was so great that even, or perhaps especially, the 
intellectuals would not be immune to such persuasion. Nevertheless, Nietzsche 
thought that modem nationalism was only a ‘labyrinth of the future’ in which to get 
lost, rather than a genuine solution to the experience of meaninglessness, which is 
why he argued for a decidedly European perspective and became an advocate of
1 7‘good Europeanism.’ Indeed, already in Human, All to Human, Nietzsche had 
insisted that those who propagate nationalist ideas are perpetuating the “sickness of 
the century” and are “an enemy of the good Europeans, an enemy of the free 
spirits.”18 In this sense, then, Nietzsche’s critique of nationalism also forms an 
integral part of what it means to be, in his view, a ‘good European.’
16 Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f  the Future. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1966, 241, p. 174.
17 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 3, p. 3.
18 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, Part II, 87.
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Is there any historical evidence to support Nietzsche’s understanding of 
nationalism as an antidote to the experience of European nihilism? In the course of the 
twentieth century the phenomenon of nationalism has become a major field of 
academic inquiry in its own right and has spumed countless studies. Nor is there any 
indication that interest in the subject of nationalism is in the decline. The existence of 
a resultant wealth of scholarly literature on nationalism, moreover, allows for an 
investigation into whether Nietzsche’s claim that his experience as a young scholar, of 
being attracted to nationalism in order to find a greater sense of meaning in a Europe 
otherwise characterised by the ‘death of God,’ is plausible and perhaps even 
representative of larger sections of society. Indeed, a consideration of this literature 
reveals that there is, in fact, substantial support for Nietzsche’s hypothesis within the 
twentieth-century scholarship on nationalism. Thus, the thesis that nationalism 
functions as a surrogate religion, as a substitute for Christianity, is a view shared by a 
host of prominent nationalism scholars. “Is it not a demonstrable fact,” Charles Hayes 
already asked as one of the pioneering scholars of the field, “that nationalism has 
become to a vast number of persons a veritable religion, capable of arousing that deep 
and compelling emotion which is essentially religious?”19 Another early scholar of 
nationalism, Hans Kohn, similarly observed that nationalism replaced the divine right 
of kings with the divine right of nations. “Messianic dreams with the nation at their 
centre,” he noted, “put the nation into immediate and independent relations with the 
Absolute.”20 Kohn thus wrote of nationalism in the post-Revolutionary era as, quite 
explicitly, “taking the place of religion.”21 Despite these early efforts, however, it 
remains the case that this religious element has largely been ignored by subsequent
99generations of nationalism scholars.
Not ignoring this relationship, however, would lead to the recognition that 
there are, in fact, striking similarities between the emotive appeal of religion, and that 
of nationalist doctrines following the ‘death of God.’ Indeed, according to the
19 Carlton J. H. Hayes. Essays in Nationalism. New York: Macmillan, 1926, p. 95.
20 Hans Kohn. Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism. New York: 
Macmillan, 1946, p. 8.
21 Hans Kohn. The Idea o f  Nationalism. New York: Macmillan, 1948, p. 574. Cited in William 
Hutchison. “The Long Goodbye: Revision o f Traditional Identities in the ‘Christian West.’” in Kokusai 
Koryu Kikin and Nichi-Bei Senta (eds.) The End o f  the Century: The Future in the Past. London: 
Kodansha International, 1995, p. 250.
22 Hutchison, “The Long Goodbye,” p. 250.
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historian Arnold Toynbee, nationalism substituted the worship of God with that of 
collective power. Toynbee insisted that “spiritual nature, like physical nature, abhors a 
vacuum; and, since the eruption of the American and French Revolutions, the spiritual 
vacuum left in Western souls by the recession of Christianity has been filled by the 
resurgence of the older, and always latent, worship of the collective power of human 
communities.” What more, in Toynbee’s view, it was even possible to trace the 
dynamic whereby, in post-Christian societies, the religious zeal was transferred from 
religious worship to the nationalist doctrine. As he explained:
In our post-Christian age, the worship o f collective human power has been 
keyed up to a higher pitch by the infusion o f ex-Christian fanaticism into 
it. The post-Christian worship o f collective human power is the evil 
religion whose name is ‘nationalism.’ It is un-Christian, except in the point 
o f being Christianly fanatical. Unhappily, fanatical nationalism is today 
about 90 per cent o f the real religion o f about 90 per cent o f  the human 
race.24
While Toynbee clearly saw nationalism as something profoundly un-Christian, he 
nevertheless insisted that it did possess a strong religious quality and that its rise 
profited directly from the collapse of Christianity in European societies.
Are these earlier analyses of nationalism still tenable in light of subsequent 
scholarship which has emerged in the intervening decades? With regards to their 
analysis of the relationship between the decline of religion and the rise of nationalism, 
it seems that these studies have largely withstood the test of time. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note, in this regard, that some recent studies of modem European 
nationalism have begun, in line with the earlier studies of modem nationalism, to re­
emphasise the close relationship between the decline in the role of Christian faith in 
European societies and the rise of nationalist sentiments. Thus, the title, for example, 
of Joseph Llobera’s recently published study of the rise of modem nationalism in
• • 9 Swestern Europe, The God o f Modernity, evokes this relationship quite clearly. In the
23 Arnold Toynbee. “Death in War” in Toynbee (et. al.) M an’s Concern with Death. London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1968, p. 147.
24 Toynbee, “Death in War,” pp. 147-148.
25 Joseph Llobera. The God o f  Modernity. Oxford: Berg, 1994.
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book, Llobera explains that modem national identity appeared in western Europe at 
the same time that all the intermediary bonds of society were collapsing, and religion 
itself was losing its grip on the peoples. Religion was a ready-made model for 
nationalism and in many cases it was also a powerful ally, reinforcing emerging
Oftnationalism. This leads Llobera to argue quite explicitly that “nationalism has 
become the functional equivalent of religion; or, expressed in a more pungent way, 
nationalism has become a religion -  a secular religion where god is the nation.”27 
Indeed, in the twenty-first of his twenty-two concluding theses on the nature of 
modem nationalism, Llobera concludes, again quite unequivocally, that “[i]n the final 
resort, the success of nationalism in modernity has to be attributed largely to the 
sacred character that the nation has inherited from religion. In its essence the nation is 
the secularised god of our times.”28
Llobera, moreover, is not the only contemporary scholar of nationalism to 
stress the intricate relationship between the decline of religion and the rise of modem 
nationalism in Europe. Thus, a further example of contemporary scholarship on 
nationalism which endorses this relationship, is the recently published book by Mark 
Juergensmeyer, entitled The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the 
Secular State. Juergensmeyer similarly finds it no accident that nationalism was 
becoming increasingly religious in character at the same time as religious sentiments 
were declining in the West. In his view the structural similarities between religion and 
nationalism show themselves with particular clarity in their ability to draw allegiance
9 0and loyalty to the extent of sanctioning even martyrdom and violent conflict. He 
finds these similarities striking enough to even merit the coinage of a new term, 
‘ideologies of order,’ which he uses to encompass both religion and nationalism. 
Theses ideologies of order, Juergensmeyer maintains, “conceive of the world in 
coherent, manageable ways; they both suggest that there are levels of meaning 
beneath the day-to-day world that give coherence to things unseen; and they both 
provide the authority that gives the social and political order its reason for being.”
26 Llobera, The God o f Modernity, p. 144.
27 Llobera, The God o f  Modernity, p. 143.
28 Llobera, The God o f  Modernity, p. 221.
29 Mark Juergensmeyer. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 15.
30 Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, p. 31.
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Secular nationalism, as an ideology of order, locates an individual within the universe 
and ties him to a larger collectivity associated with a particular place and a particular 
history. Thus, organised religion and nationalism, in Juergensmeyer’s view, both 
“serve the ethical function of providing an overarching framework of moral order, a 
framework that commands ultimate loyalty from those who subscribe to it.”31 
Judging, then, from the scholarship on modem nationalism produced in the century 
since Nietzsche’s death, there is considerable evidence to suggest that his initial 
hypothesis about the relationship between the rise of nationalism, and the crisis of 
meaning induced by ‘the death of God’ is tenable. What remains to be seen in greater 
detail, however, is how this relationship unfolds in detail, especially with reference to 
both the appeal of nationalism on behalf of those who accept national identities, and 
in relation to the interests of those who actively advocate and propagate nationalist 
sentiments. For, such an analysis is not only interesting in its own right, but actually 
constitutes the background against which Nietzsche’s vehement critique of modem 
nationalism emerges.
2. Nihilism and the Appeal o f  Nationalism
In the first instance, Nietzsche’s analysis of the advent of European nihilism 
can assist in understanding the appeal of these nationalist sentiments in the aftermath 
of the ‘death of God.’ An understanding of the nature of this appeal is crucial to any 
account of nationalism and is something which structural accounts in general, and 
Marxist accounts in particular, generally face difficulty in accounting for. Thus, 
Benedict Anderson, for example, has argued in relation to Tom Naim’s theory of 
nationalism that while structural and Marxist accounts of nationalism can explain why 
nationalist ideas are advocated by certain segments of society, they encounter 
difficulties in explaining the attraction of these nationalist sentiments to those who 
accept them. Anderson thus grants that, up to a point, Naim’s argument that the “new 
middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and 
[that] the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood” is correct. 
Yet, Anderson continues, “it will be hard to see why the invitation came to seem so
31 Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?, p. 15.
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attractive ....”32 Structural and Marxist accounts, in other words, can explain the self- 
interest of certain segments of society in advocating nationalist sentiments, but, 
despite the complexities of their positions, they have greater difficulty in explaining 
why people actually believed the nationalist ideas.
This inability to adequately explain the attraction of nationalist ideas raises the 
suspicion that many of these structural accounts often rely implicitly on an underlying 
theory of meaning in human life without, however, making such assumptions explicit. 
In his recent article on psychological theories of nationalism, Alan Finlayson has thus 
sought to draw attention to some of these hidden assumptions. By way of example, 
Finlayson cites the celebrated scholar of nationalism, Ernest Gellner. In his book 
Nations and Nationalism Gellner points out to his readers that by emphasising the 
contrived and artificial nature of nationalism, he had not intended to “deny that some 
measure of such patriotism is indeed a perennial part of human life.”34 Yet, as 
Finlayson points out, this concession is actually of crucial importance to the viability 
of Gellner’s account of nationalism. While Finlayson agrees with Gellner that 
nationalism can be historicised and to some extent inserted into larger and over­
arching structural forces, this should, in his view, not be allowed to obscure the fact 
that at the basis of Gellner’s argument is “an untheorised, asserted claim about the 
innate features of human social need and an unexplained ‘l o y a l t y . T h i s  claim 
about a social need occupies a crucial place in Gellner’s account and yet remains 
largely unexplored. In Finlayson’s view, however, this under-theorisation needs to be 
addressed because the ‘agency’ involved in the spread of nationalism is of great 
enough importance not to be simply reduced to being either of marginal or of 
secondary importance. In doing so, moreover, Finlayson points to an important 
weakness of structural accounts of modem nationalism.
This is, however, not to insist that a psychological account of nationalism 
would be sufficient in and of itself. For, psychological accounts of the rise of modem 
European nationalism, in turn, run into the opposite problem; while they might be
32 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 77.
33 Alan Finlayson. “Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Theories o f Nationalism.” Nations and 
Nationalism. Vol. 4, No 2. 1998, pp. 145-162.
34 Ernest Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, p. 138.
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able to better explain the appeal of nationalism, they face difficulties in explaining 
why certain groups perpetuated nationalist ideas, and also why they did so particularly 
effectively in modem Europe. Thus, in his overview of the various theories of 
nationalism, John Breuilly, for example, remains sceptical of a theory of nationalism 
which grounds its explanation in psychological functions alone.36 As Breuilly argues, 
the problem with psychological accounts of nationalism in particular, and with 
functional accounts of nationalism in general, is that they also need to account for the
• • • 17particularly modern aspects of the nse of nationalism. In order to do so, Breuilly 
argues, such explanations invariably need to complement their account by taking into 
consideration some specifically modem development, such as religious decline or 
industrial economics. In doing so, however, such explanations also tend to move 
beyond the Emits of functional explanation alone. In short, then, and at the risk of 
slightly oversimplifying matters, the problem in accounting for the rise of modem 
nationalism in Europe, is that structural accounts of nationalism face difficulties in 
explaining the appeal of nationalism, while the resort to psychological theories of 
nationalism faces difficulties in accounting for the historical rise of nationalism in 
modem Europe. Against the background of this set of difficulties, it is interesting to 
return to Nietzsche’s own account of modem nationalism.
Nietzsche himself was very much interested in understanding the appeal of 
nationalism in modem Europe. Moreover, based on his own early experience as a 
youth, Nietzsche could understand very well the appeal of nationalism in European 
societies characterised by the ‘death of God.’ Thus, in Nietzsche’s account, the appeal 
of national ideas in modem Europe derived, at least in part, from the formative
35 Finlayson, “Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Theories o f Nationalism,” p. 146.
36 John Breuilly. “Approaches to Nationalism” in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed.) Mapping the Nation: 
London: Verso: 1996, p. 154.
37 Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism,” p. 155. To what extent nationalism is a truly modem 
phenomenon is, o f course, a matter o f debate amongst scholars o f nationalism. The two sides are, 
however, not as far apart as is sometimes suggested. In a recent article, for example, Armstrong notes 
that “to a considerable extent ... one may agree with ... [Hobsbawm and Anderson] ... that, like other 
human identities, national identity has been an invention. The principal remaining disagreement is over 
the antiquity o f  some inventions and the repertory o f pre-existing group characteristics that inventors 
were able to draw upon.” “Towards a Theory of Nationalism: Consensus and Dissensus” in S. Periwal 
(ed.) Notions o f  Nationalism (1995), p. 36. Cited in Shaw, “Citizenship o f  the Union,” p. 263. 
Similarly, Hutchinson notes that ethnicists “would accept that post-eighteenth-century nations differ 
significantly from earlier forms o f community in several respects, including their political conception 
of human identity, the democratic character o f their societies and the intensity o f social and economic 
interactions.” Modem Nationalism, p. 10. Cited in Shaw, “Citizenship o f the Union,” p. 263.
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influence of Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage. Following the ‘death of God, 
Europeans would be left, Nietzsche thought, in a situation where they still craved a 
greater purpose and meaning in their lives at precisely the time when Christianity was 
no longer perceived to be able to fill this desire. Following the ‘death of God,’ 
Europeans would be looking for a new why, a new purpose in their lives. It is within 
the context of this spiritual vacuum that nationalism could prosper. As Nietzsche 
explains, “[t]he nihilistic question ‘for what?’ is rooted in the old habit of supposing 
that the goal must be put up, given, demanded from outside -  by some superhuman 
authority.” The response to the ‘death of God’ that Nietzsche found most likely in 
modem Europe was that “[hjaving unlearned faith in that, one still follows the old 
habit and seeks another authority that can speak unconditionally and command goals 
and tasks.” As the hypothesis of ‘God’ lost its grip on the European imagination and 
ceased to constitute the unconditional goal, rather than accepting the meaninglessness 
of existence, the nation could step in to fulfil its place. Indeed, Nietzsche noted, in the 
aftermath of the ‘death of God,’ Europeans would be seeking a “temporary 
redemption from pessimism,” and in this quest would turn, amongst other things, to 
‘nationalism.’39 It is in this vein, moreover, that Nietzsche considered modem, 
European nationalism to be “the metamorphosis of the cross.”40 Nietzsche, in other 
words, thought that much like he himself had done in a qualified form in his early 
years, many Europeans would similarly prefer to turn towards the belief in the 
spiritual sanctity of the nation in order to render existence meaningful in the aftermath 
of the ‘death of God.’ In this sense, moreover, Nietzsche also did indeed link the rise 
of modem European nationalism to a particularly modem development, namely the 
process encapsulated under the heading of European nihilism. Indeed, for him the 
rising nationalism was itself already a sign of the ‘nihilistic catastrophe’ that had 
befallen Europe.41
Nietzsche’s voice, moreover, finds great contemporary resonance in what is 
one of the most influential contemporary writers on nationalism, Benedict Anderson. 
Being dissatisfied with traditional Marxist and liberal accounts of nationalism,
38 Nietzsche, Will to Power, I, 20, p. 17.
39 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 9 [126], p. 410.
40 See Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, KSA 12, 
7[26],p. 305.
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Anderson attempted a reorientation of perspective in “a Copemican spirit” by viewing 
nations and nationalism as cultural artefacts of a particular kind which need to be 
understood in the terms of which they have come into historical being, in what ways 
their meaning changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound 
emotional legitimacy.42 Against the background of Nietzsche’s aforementioned 
discussion of European nihilism, it is interesting that Anderson should commence his 
exposition of nationalism as a cultural artefact with a consideration of religion’s 
important role in endowing existence with a deeper meaning, including its suffering 
and death.43 Anderson begins his account with these observations because, in his 
view, it is crucial to understand that the dawn of nationalism in Western Europe 
during the eighteenth-century is linked to the dusk of religious modes of thought. In 
doing so, moreover, his account is clearly reminiscent of Nietzsche’s earlier 
discussion of the important role played by Christianity in European societies and its 
ability to give meaning even to suffering and death.
The problem entailed by the diminishing role of religious modes of existence, 
Anderson’s argument continues, was that their decline was not necessarily 
accompanied by a decline in suffering itself. While Christianity increasingly 
disappeared from European existence, the suffering which it had previously mediated 
did not. If anything, the experience of suffering may, in fact, have even been 
exacerbated by the striking absence of the promise of a redeeming afterlife. Indeed, 
Nietzsche himself had once noted in this similar vein that “[w]hat really arouses 
indignation against suffering is not suffering as such but the senselessness of 
suffering,” and it is this senselessness of suffering which the Christians were spared.44 
Correspondingly, in Anderson’s account, what was needed as religious modes of 
existence waned, was “a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, 
contingency into meaning,” and in Anderson’s view, “few things were [are] better 
suited to this end than an idea of nation.”45 With the decline in religion and the rise of 
the printed word, according to Anderson, it had become both possible and necessary 
to ‘imagine’ communities through which a sense of immortality can be projected, and
41 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 9[82], p. 377.
42 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 13.
43 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 19.
44 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, II, 7, p. 68.
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with which people in secular, capitalist societies can identify with, so as not to suffer 
from a pervasive sense of anonymity. In the modem age, these ‘imagined 
communities’ or nations are thus also able to provide important psychological 
functions. In doing so, moreover, Anderson explicitly recognises the relationship 
between nationalism and religion as cultural systems grappling with the problems of 
suffering and death. Nationalism, in his view too can be seen as addressing the 
‘metaphysical’ questions of human existence. For Anderson and Nietzsche alike, 
therefore, modem nationalism can be seen as fulfilling a desire formerly addressed by 
Christianity and left otherwise unfulfilled in modernity.46
Importantly, however, Nietzsche’s account also differs crucially from these 
above accounts in that Nietzsche actually sought to historicise this ‘need for 
meaning.’ Unlike psychological theories of nationalism, or, for that matter, 
structuralist accounts like that of Gellner, Nietzsche did not take this ‘need’ for 
meaning to be an innate feature of human existence. Rather, as is particularly evident 
in his genealogies and as was already explained in Chapter 2, Nietzsche traced the 
advent of modem European meaninglessness and the desire for a modem substitute 
back to the formative impact of the Christian-Platonic heritage of European culture. In 
Nietzsche’s view, it was precisely the centuries of Christian-Platonic thinking that had 
sensitised Europeans into requiring a greater sense of meaning or purpose, a need 
which, following the ‘death of God’ and the rise of modem science, remained largely 
unfulfilled. In this sense, moreover, Henry Staten’s recent assessment of one 
particularly vimlent form of modem nationalism, National Socialism, remains true for 
the rise of modem nationalism in general; it is, as Staten observes from a Nietzschean 
perspective, “one case more of the old habit of mendacity -  a problem not of too little 
transcendence but of still not enough immanence.”47 Nietzsche, in other words, did 
not necessarily take the human need for meaning to be an innate feature of human 
existence, but rather illustrated genealogically how, in Europe, this need was 
cultivated through centuries of Christian-Platonic interpretations of existence. Thus, 
Nietzsche does indeed realise that “[gjradually, man has become a fantastic animal
45 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 18.
46 See Daniel Pick. War Machine: The Rationalisation o f  Slaughter in the Modern Age. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 158-159.
137
that has to fulfil one more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to 
believe, to know, from time to time why he exists....”48 It is, furthermore, precisely 
with this ‘need for meaning’ that Nietzsche relates the rise of modem nationalism. At 
the same time, however, Nietzsche does not take this need to be an immutable, 
biological or psychological one, but rather as one which has been historically 
conditioned and one which must not necessarily be addressed in the way it has been 
done so in the past. In this way, moreover, Nietzsche’s move to view the phenomenon 
of nationalism against the backdrop of the larger cultural crisis triggered by the ‘death 
of God’ can also be said to go some way in avoiding the difficulties inherent in both 
functional and structural accounts of modem European nationalism. Contrary to 
stmcturalist accounts of modem nationalism, Nietzsche’s approach can account for 
the appeal of modem nationalism in Europe. At the same time, however, by 
historicising this need for meaning rather than seeing it as being innate, he also avoids 
the difficulties usually encountered by functional accounts of nationalism.
What is more, it is precisely the fact that the appeal of modem nationalism 
hinges on some kind of perceived ‘identity need’ or ‘need for meaning’ that also 
allows for Nietzsche’s criticism of it. Indeed, according to Nietzsche this is an 
assumption which informs strategies of incomplete nihilism more generally and which 
he wished to challenge. Thus, Nietzsche himself understood the conviction that such a 
need does exist to be the result of the formative influence of the Christian faith and 
post-Platonic philosophy on European culture. As Henry Staten further explains, 
“[w]hat motivates the immanentizing of transcendence could thus well be not a 
transhistorical or transcendent need for transcendence but a pre-existent ideology of 
transcendence or a need generated by such an ideology.”49 The reason, in other words, 
for the success of modem nationalism may not be some transcendental or biological 
need for meaning, but rather a need which is perceived as necessary on the basis of a 
preceding Christian-Platonic heritage, but one which is nevertheless not necessary 
immutable. It is this very insight which nationalist ideas refuse. Consequently, rather 
than combating the assumption of an innate need for meaning, advocates of nationalist
47 See Henry Staten ‘“Radical Evil’ Revived: Hitler, Kant, Luther, neo-Lacanianism” in Radical 
Philosophy'No. 98, 1999, p. 14.
48 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974, 
l , p .  75.
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ideas and identities actually encourage and indeed prosper on the basis of this 
assumption.
It is, moreover, for this reason that Nietzsche ultimately understood modem 
nationalism to be a form of incomplete nihilism. At bottom, Nietzsche insisted, 
modem nationalism still rests on the same objectionable foundation as Christianity, 
the same will-to-truth, and, in fact, perpetuates it further. Thus, in the Gay Science, for 
example, Nietzsche emphasised that:
The demand that one wants by all means that something should be firm 
(while on account o f the ardor o f this demand one is easier and more 
negligent about the demonstration o f this certainty) -  this, too, is still the 
demand for a support, a prop, in short, that instinct o f  weakness which, to 
be sure, does not create religious, metaphysical systems, and convictions o f  
all kinds but -  conserves them. ... Even the vehemence with which our 
most intelligent contemporaries lose themselves in wretched nooks and 
crannies, for example into nationalism [ Vaterlanderei] (I mean what the 
French call chauvinisme and the Germans ‘German’) ... always manifests 
itself above all the need for a faith, a support, backbone, something to fall 
back on.50
At the root of modem nationalism, in other words, is the desire not to confront the 
experience of meaninglessness and contingency in an honest manner, but rather the 
desire to simply escape it by replicating the transcendental within the earthly realm. 
Instead of provoking a genuine confrontation with the experience of European 
nihilism, modem nationalism seeks to further institutionalise it.
The first criticism, therefore, that emerges from Nietzsche’s analysis of the 
appeal of modem nationalism is that it still rests on the same psychological principles 
as Christianity had done previously and that, as a strategy of incomplete nihilism, it 
perpetuates the need for a greater sense of meaning, rather than undermining it and
subjecting it to critical scrutiny. Indeed, for Nietzsche, modem nationalism, like
49 Staten, ‘“Radical Evil’ Revived,” p. 14.
50 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 347, pp. 288-289.
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Christianity, is a form of ‘slave’ morality.51 It desires something greater and 
something higher in order to endow existence with a deeper sense of meaning and is 
based on a resentful attitude towards existence. Much like Christianity before it, 
modem nationalism is based on a resentful attitude towards existence which “from the 
outset says No to what is ‘outside’ what is ‘different,’ what is ‘not itself;’ and this No 
is its creative act.”52 Nietzsche’s own response, in contrast, was an attempt to wager 
on whether it was really necessary for a society and an individual to have some 
greater sense of meaning. For, to quote Staten once more, it is “far from proven that, 
whatever may be the case for given individuals, humanity in the mass has such a
Cl
need....” For this reason, then, Nietzsche also thought it important to interrogate 
with greater scrutiny why national ideas were actually being advocated in modem 
Europe.
3. Nihilism and the Advocates o f  Nationalism
So far it has been argued that Nietzsche’s analysis of the religious 
disappointment evident in the cultural configuration of modernity can help to explain 
the under-theorised appeal of national ideas that rests at the centre of many of the 
structural and Marxist accounts of modem nationalism, and that Nietzsche’s 
understanding of this appeal also constitutes the ground for his criticism of modem 
nationalism in particular, and of strategies of incomplete nihilism more generally. For, 
in Nietzsche’s account, strategies of incomplete nihilism are, as was noted in the 
previous chapter, premised on a resentful attitude towards existence. Importantly, 
however, this does not mean that Nietzsche failed to recognise, as structuralist 
theories of nationalism point out, that it is also in the self-interest of certain segments 
of a society to propagate national ideas. Indeed, there are several passages in 
Nietzsche’s corpus which indicate that it was his very awareness of these interests, 
rather than his ignorance of them, which triggered his suspicion that nationalism did 
not constitute a desirable and honest confrontation with the spiritual vacuum left 
behind after the ‘death of God.’ Already towards the end of the nineteenth century
51 Laurence Lampert. Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996, p. 170.
52 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, I, 10, p. 36.
53 Staten, ‘“Radical Evil’ Revived,” p. 13.
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Nietzsche urged his readers to detect the self-interest behind the perpetuation of 
nationalist ideas by politicians and businessmen. The recognition of this aspect of 
modem nationalism, moreover, meant that Nietzsche ultimately understood its rise as 
a regrettable symbiosis between European publics’ yearning for a greater sense of 
meaning or purpose following the ‘death of God,’ on the one hand, and self-interested 
segments of society wishing to profit from the production of meaning through 
nationalism on the other.
The primary promoter of modem nationalism, Nietzsche argued, was the 
modem state. In order to justify its existence and to legitimate the demands it made of 
the citizenry, the state employed nationalist ideas.54 As a result, in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra the modem, nationalistic state is labelled by Nietzsche as the “new idol” 
and the “coldest of all cold monsters” because it follows, and is in fact made possible, 
by the ‘death of God.’55 As Nietzsche lamented in this regard:
[t]oday almost everything on earth is determined by the most common and 
evil forces, by the egoism o f acquisitors and military despots. In the hands 
o f the latter, the state attempts, as does the egoism o f  the acquisitors, to 
organise everything anew from out o f itself and to be the bond and the 
pressure for all those hostile forces; that is to say, the state wants human 
beings to idolise it in the same way that they previously idolised the 
Church. With what success? We will have to witness this.56
In Nietzsche’s account, then, the modem state sought to profit from the ‘death of 
God’ by portraying itself as the new source of meaning in people’s lives. “The 
monster,” as he metaphorically called it, “divines you too, you conquerors of the old 
god.”57 What is more, he warned his readers, “[y]our weariness serves the new
co  t r #
idol.” The modem state, in other words, through its use of nationalist ideas, is able 
to thrive on the basis of those unwilling to welcome the experience of 
meaninglessness as harbouring the possibility of a cultural rejuvenation of Europe and
54 See, for example, Friedrich Nietzsche. Untimely Meditations. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator,’ 6, pp. 165-166.
55 Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1961, ‘Of 
the New Idol,’ p. 75.
56 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator, ’ 4, p. 150.
57 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘Of the New Idol,’ p. 76.
58 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘Of the New Idol,’ p. 76.
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harbouring the possibility of a cultural rejuvenation of Europe and who prefer instead 
a secular substitute for the ‘old Idol’ of Christianity.
In fact, Nietzsche argued, the modem state is not at all interested in a critical 
engagement with the advent of European nihilism. Rather, it is content with simply 
advocating a new and artificial form of meaning. “Coldly,” Nietzsche noted, “it lies, 
too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: ‘I, the state, am the people.’ It is a lie! It was 
creators who created peoples and hung a faith and a love over them: thus they served 
life.”59 Nietzsche maintained instead that it is precisely the destroyers “who set snares 
for many and call it the state: they hang a sword and a hundred desires over them.”60 
Indeed, it will be recalled from the previous chapter, that Nietzsche stipulated that it is 
precisely the state, broadly conceived, which facilitates the emergence of slave 
morality and generates the need for transcendence amongst its subjects. In Nietzsche’s 
account, the emergence of the state is generally due to “a conqueror and master race 
which, organised for war and with the ability to organise, unhesitatingly lays its claws 
upon a populace perhaps superior in numbers but still formless and nomad.”61 By 
hanging this sword over its subjects, and by virtue of the suffering it induces, the state 
thereby also creates the appetite for metaphysical meaning which will ultimately 
culminate in a way of interpreting existence which devalues existence in favour of a 
higher, life denying purpose. In this way, the state generates the very appetites which 
it claims to be addressing, and, in doing so, further institutionalises the advent of 
meaninglessness and the quest for some form of redemption.
In addition to serving the members of state bureaucracies, the advocacy of 
national ideals also served to benefit, Nietzsche further argued, those who stand 
outside of politics and in the service of international capital. Here, Nietzsche, like 
several scholars after him, sought to attack those ‘“ truly international homeless 
hermits’ who, due to their lack of state instinct, abuse politics as an apparatus for their
59 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘Of the New Idol,’ p. 75.
60 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘Of the New Idol,’ p. 75.
61 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Genealogy o f  Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New  
York: Random House, 1967, II, 17, p. 86.
62 See, for example, Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ 6, pp. 164-165.
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own enrichment.”63 It is in this vein, moreover, that Nietzsche also designated, “as the 
most dangerous characteristic of the political present, the application of revolutionary 
thought to the service of a selfish stateless gold-aristocracy....”64 Nietzsche, in other 
words, was also disturbed by the existence of men whose only loyalty was primarily 
to money and material wealth.65 Such men, he argued, would manipulate and 
propagate nationalist sentiments in the service of their own material interests. Thus, 
what united both European statesmen and businessmen alike, in Nietzsche’s account, 
was their joint lack of interest in confronting honestly the experience of 
meaninglessness. In addition, therefore, to resting on the same psychological 
foundations as Christianity, Nietzsche’s second reason for criticising modem 
nationalism as a means of engaging with the problem of European nihilism derives 
from his argument that it was being perpetuated by precisely those two types of actors 
in European affairs who had little interest in actually addressing the problem of 
nihilism, indeed who sought to exploit the ‘death of God’ in order to advance their 
own interests.
To Nietzsche, however, the fact that these ideas where deployed largely in 
order to meet the instrumental concerns of certain modem political and economic 
actors also meant that these ideas constituted a fairly artificial response to the advent 
of meaninglessness. In this vein, Nietzsche noted, for example, how national ideas 
require “cunning, lies, and force to remain respectable.”66 The continued existence of 
nationalist sentiments depends on the decisive efforts of the commercial and social
f i l  • • •classes in whose interest such a situation is maintained. It is in this vein, moreover, 
that Nietzsche insisted that “[w]hat is called a ‘nation’ in Europe today, and is really
rather a res facta than res nata (and occasionally can hardly be told from a res ficta et
• • • /:<? picta) is in any case something evolving, something young, and easily changed....”
Not only is nationalism a fairly artificial response to the advent of European nihilism,
but is also, Nietzsche argued, a very basic and unsophisticated one. Nationalism,
63 Tracy B. Strong. Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Transfiguration. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975, p. 209.
64 Nietzsche, The Greek State, III, 283-284. Cited in Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f  
Transfiguration, p. 209.
65 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Transfiguration, p. 209.
66 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, I, 475, p. 228.
67 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, I, 475, p. 228.
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when compared to the European scope of the advent of nihilism, is a very modest 
form of meaning ascribed to European existence.69 Nietzsche thus repeatedly refers to 
nationalism as ‘petty’ and small, and sees it in no way as being fit to deal with the 
problem of European nihilism whose nature is more profound and sophisticated. As 
Nietzsche himself complained, “[nationalism, this nevrose nationale with which 
Europe is sick, this perpetuation of European particularism (Kleinstaaterei), of petty 
politics [has] deprived Europe itself of its meaning, of its reason -  [has] driven it into 
a dead-end street. -  Does anyone besides me know the way out of this dead-end 
street? -  A task that is great enough to unite nations again?” This artificial and basic 
nature of national ideas, moreover, constitutes Nietzsche’s third critique of modem 
nationalism.
To Nietzsche, then, the rise of modem nationalism in Europe must ultimately 
be understood as a regrettable symbiosis between European publics’ yearning for a 
greater sense of meaning or purpose following the ‘death of God,’ on the one hand, 
and self-interested segments of society wishing to profit from the production of 
meaning through nationalism on the other. What is worse, the overall effect of this 
symbiosis, in Nietzsche’s view, is actually is to avoid a genuine and critical 
confrontation with the advent of European nihilism. As Tracy Strong points out in this 
regard, “[nationalism allows people to avoid coming to terms for a while with the 
gradual disintegration of meaning -  what Nietzsche formulated in the aphorism of the 
“death of God.”71 Indeed, Strong explains further, “[nationalism is .... essentially a 
resisting force. It does not want to return to something atavistic, but wants to stabilise 
the onrushing nihilism.”72 In this way, modem nationalism, like strategies of 
incomplete nihilism more generally, also obstmcts much more than it facilitates a 
critical confrontation with the problem of European nihilism.
Indeed, in Nietzsche’s view those who have understood the implications of the 
advent of European nihilism would find the advocacy of national ideas an
68 Something made; something bom; something fictitious and unreal. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
251, pp. 188.
69 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Transfiguration, p. 208
70 Friedrich Nietzsche. Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1967, ‘The Case of Wagner,’ 2, p. 321.
71 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Transfiguration, p. 205.
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unconvincing response to the advent of European nihilism. Thus, Nietzsche himself, 
for example, noted in a fragment entitled ‘ Critique o f  the worship o f fatherlands' that 
“whoever feels above himself values which he takes a hundred times higher than the 
wellbeing of the ‘fatherland,’ of society, of blood and race relatives, -  values that are 
beyond fatherlands and races, i.e. international values -  he would be a hypocrite to 
play the ‘patriot.’” For, Nietzsche insisted, “[i]t is a lowering o f man and spirit, which 
tolerates within itself national hate, or even admires and deifies it: the dynastic 
families exploit this type of man -  and, in turn, there are enough commercial and 
societal classes ... that profit from the national divisions are in power.”73 Indeed, 
Nietzsche added in the end, “[i]t is a bad symptom, that one pays so much tribute to 
the love of the fatherland and politics. It seems that there is nothing higher which one
„ 74can praise.
It is against the background of this pervasive critique of modem nationalism 
that one must also understand Nietzsche’s despising of the self-intoxication of the 
European nations,75 as well as his ardent pleas to overcome the petty nationalism of 
European nation-states. Thus, in one of his posthumously published notes, Nietzsche 
plead to “[l]et some fresh air in! This absurd state of affairs must not go on any longer 
in Europe! What sense is there in this bone-headed nationalism? Now that everything 
points to larger common interests, what is the purpose of encouraging this scurvy
7  f \egoism?” Indeed, he thought modem nationalism to be intellectually suffocating as 
well as barring human creativity. It is, he concluded, the anti-cultural sickness par
7 7excellence. Not only, then, are nationalist ideas are premised on a resentful attitude 
towards existence, in Nietzsche’s view, they are also intellectually untenable in the 
aftermath of the ‘death of God’ once the will-to-truth has put itself into question. 
Indeed, he argued, “to be national, in the way and degree in which it is now demanded 
by public opinion, would ... pose not only a case of bad taste among us more 
intellectual people, but also a deliberate numbing of our better knowledge and
72 Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Transfiguration, p. 208.
73 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 7[47], pp. 310-11.
74 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1875-1879, KSA 8, 17[52], p. 305.
75 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Anti-Christ. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1990, Foreword, p. 
125.
76 See Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887-1889, KSA 13, 11 [235], p. 92.
77 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘The Case o f Wager’, 2, p. 321.
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• 78conscience.” In nationalism, Nietzsche concluded provocatively “people want to 
work as little as possible ... with their heads.”79
All of Nietzsche’s above criticisms of the way in which modem nationalism 
seeks to deal with the advent of European nihilism are unleashed in his attack on 
German nationalism in particular. Indeed, Nietzsche looked upon the German 
character with ‘sorrowful despair”80 leaving the historian Golo Mann to later conclude
O 1
that “there has never been a shrewder critic at any time anywhere.” Nietzsche was, 
in fact, so critical of German nationalism that he once suggested that “to be a good 
German means to de-Germanicise oneself82 and even accused the Germans of denying 
Europe its last cultural harvest.83 By the time of the 1880s, Nietzsche was thus also no 
longer a friend of the German state. Rather, Nietzsche now loathed the philistinism of 
Bismarck’s Reich with its emphasis of racist, statist, nationalist and power politics. 
Already in the first of his Untimely Meditations Nietzsche had drawn a cmcial 
distinction between the German Geist, and the German Reich.95 For, in Nietzsche’s 
view, German public opinion had profoundly misunderstood the lessons of the 
Franco-Prussian War. It was not, as so many believed, German culture which had 
been victorious in the war with France. The things which led to the German victory, 
such as superior generalship and discipline must not, Nietzsche insisted, be confused 
with culture.86 Indeed, he lamented in this vein, “there no longer exists any clear
£7 •  • • •conception of what culture is” in Germany. This line of criticism, moreover, is 
continued in the Twilight o f  the Idols where he expressed the view that the cry 
“DeutschlandDeutschland iiber alles” had signalled the end of any serious thinking
78 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 2[199], pp. 164-65.
79 Friedrich Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human. Trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann. London: 
Penguin, 1984,1,480, p. 232.
80 Nietzsche, The Birth o f  Tragedy. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967, 23, p. 
136.
81 Golo Mann, in The History o f  Germany since 1789. Middlesex: Penguin, 1985, p. 396.
82 “Gut deutsch sein heisst sich entdeutschen.” Nietzsche, Menschliches, Allzumenschlisches II, 
‘Vermischte Meinungen und Spruche,’ KSA 2, 321, p. 511.
83 See also Nietzsche, Antichrist, 61, p. 196.
84 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 26.
85 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 27.
86 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 27.
87 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. ‘David Strauss, the Confessor and the 
Writer,’ l ,p .  5.
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• OQin German. In his autobiography of 1888, moreover, Nietzsche even attacked 
Treitschke, noting that “German has become an argument, Deutschland, Deutschland 
iiber alles a principle, the Teutons represent the ‘moral world-order’ in history ...” 
What is more, “[t]here is now a historiography that is reichsdeutsch; there is even, I 
fear, an antisemitic one -  there is a court historiography and Herr von Treitschke is
OQ
not ashamed. Nietzsche himself, however, insisted quite unequivocally that “[t]he 
nationality-insanity ... is without magic for me. ‘Deutschland, Deutschland iiber 
Alles ' rings painfully in my ears.”90
Nietzsche, moreover, also blamed the Germans for actually spreading modem 
nationalist sentiments and for turning their romanticism into an unreasonable political 
programme, which is why, in Beyond Good and Evil, he again portrayed them as a 
constraining force:
It must be taken into the bargain if  all sorts o f clouds and disturbances -  in 
brief, little attacks o f hebetation -  pass over the spirit o f  a people that is 
suffering, and wants to suffer, o f nationalistic nerve fever and political 
ambition. Examples among the Germans today include now the anti- 
French stupidity, now the anti-Jewish, now the anti-Polish, now the 
Christian-romantic, now the Wagnerian, now the Teutonic, now the 
Prussian (just look at the wretched historians, these Sybels and 
Treitschkes, and their thickly bandaged heads!) and whatever other names 
these little mystifications o f the German spirit and conscience may have.
Forgive me, for during a brief daring sojourn in very infected territory. I, 
too, did not altogether escape this disease and began like everyone else to 
develop notions about matters that are none o f my business: the first sign 
of the political infection.91
By the middle phase of his writing career, therefore, it seems that Nietzsche had 
clearly come to the conviction that German nationalism in particular, and modem 
nationalism in general, was neither a viable nor a desirable way of confronting the 
advent of European nihilism. Indeed, as Laurence Lampert notes in his study of
88 Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight o f  the Idols. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1990, ‘What 
the Germans Lack,” 1, p. 71.
89 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘The Case o f Wagner,’ 2, p. 319.
90 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 2[10], p. 70.
91 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 251, pp. 186-87.
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Nietzsche’s thought, “it was Nietzsche who warned good Europeans in the 1880s that 
there was nothing they should fear as much as they should fear nationalism; and in 
particular that they should fear German nationalism with its basis in German racial 
hatred; and more particularly still, they should fear German hatred o f Jews and take
* ,,92steps against it.
Nietzsche’s development from being an early, yet qualified, supporter of the 
German nationalist cause through to the ardent critic of nationalism is also mirrored in 
his relationship with Wagner, a relationship which preoccupied him until the very end 
of his sane life. “What did I never forgive Wagner?” Nietzsche asked and replied, 
“that he became reichsdeutsch.”93 Nietzsche realised that Bayreuth was increasingly 
becoming the new ‘cultural’ centre of the ‘German Reich,' the Holy City of anti- 
Semitic ‘Christian’ chauvinism.94 Indeed, he had grown sick of what he perceived as 
Wagner’s romanticism and egomania, as well as his anti-Semitism:95 “Thus I attacked 
Wagner -  more precisely, the falseness, the half-couth instincts of our “culture” which 
mistakes the subtle for the rich, and the late for the great.”96 Nietzsche would 
subsequently become, at least in his own view, the very antipode of Wagner,97 the 
antipode of the man who’s Parsifal, for Nietzsche, was proof that Wagner ultimately 
“knelt at the cross.”98
The factor, then, that perhaps differentiates Nietzsche from Wagner so 
crucially is not that Nietzsche himself did not also have a decadent side. After all, 
Nietzsche himself admitted quite openly that he was “no less than Wagner, a child of 
his age, that is a decadent: but,” Nietzsche wrote, “I comprehended this, I resisted 
it.”99 In contrast to Wagner, Nietzsche chose to vehemently fight his age, something 
Wagner had not done. Rather, in Nietzsche’s view, Wagner made his peace with his 
contemporaries and became the high priest of decadence. Towards the end of his sane
92 Lampert, Leo Strauss and Nietzsche, p. 9.
93 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Am So Clever,’ 5, p. 248.
94 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, I, 1. Cited in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 38.
95 Ansell-Pearson, An Introduction to Nietzsche, p. 27. “Die verfluchte Antisemiterei ... hat R[ichard] 
W[agner] und mich verfeindet, sie ist die Ursache eines radikalen Bruchs zwischen mir und meiner 
Schwester...” See Ottmann, Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche, p. 250.
96 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 135.
97 Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 66.
98 See A. J. Hoover. Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Thought. London: Praeger, 1994, p. 9.
99 Cited in Kaufmann, Nietzsche, p. 73.
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life, Nietzsche reflected once more on his early infatuation with Wagner’s music, 
concluding that “[a]ll things considered, I could not have endured my youth without 
Wagner’s music. For I was condemned to Germans.” Yet, Nietzsche further noted, 
“[i]f one wants to rid oneself of an unbearable pressure, one needs hashish. Well then, 
I needed Wagner. Wagner is the antitoxin against everything German par excellence -  
a toxin, a poison, that I don’t deny.”100 What, however, Nietzsche had still seen in his 
youth as an antidote to ‘everything’ German, had subsequently turned into a very 
different kind of intoxication, namely one that had made its peace with the Reich. It is 
also in this vein that one should understand his ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism’ which he 
later added to the preface of The Birth o f Tragedy. Nietzsche had now come to the 
realisation that his earlier quest to bring about the re-emergence of tragic culture was 
actually indicative of the very crisis he thought he had diagnosed.101 Indeed, as Daniel 
Conway points out, “[t]he guiding conviction that modernity stands in need of 
redemption, that its goals and accomplishments fall short of some shadowy trans- 
historical standard of cultural ‘health,’ is itself symptomatic of the facile moralising 
that he now associates with the crisis of modernity.”102 In Beyond Good and Evil, 
Nietzsche consequently came to the realisation that the most important task in an age 
characterised by the ‘death of God’ is “[n]ot to remain stuck to a person -  not even the 
most loved -  every person is a prison, also a nook. Not to remain stuck to a fatherland 
-  not even if it suffers most and needs help most -  it is less difficult to sever one’s 
heart from a victorious fatherland.”103
By way of concluding this section, then, Nietzsche saw both modem European 
statesmen and businessmen as working in opposition to the quest to achieve a more 
honest confrontation with the advent of European nihilism. Their willingness, 
moreover, to propagate national sentiments in order to serve their own interests, stood 
in opposition to Nietzsche’s search of a more honest and critical response to the onset 
of European nihilism. Rather than confronting the advent of European nihilism, such 
leaders preferred, in Nietzsche’s account, to keep the myth of a greater meaning alive, 
and to sustain the conviction that there has to be a greater meaning underlying
100 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Am So Clever, 6, p. 249.
101 Daniel Conway. “The Politics o f Decadence.” The Southern Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. XXXVII 
(Supplement). 1999: 19-34, p. 22.
102 Conway, “The Politics o f Decadence,” p. 22.
149
existence, even if this meant, in the end, pitting Europeans against one another. It is 
for this reason, moreover, that Nietzsche insisted that “this artificial nationalism is in 
any case as perilous as artificial Catholicism used to be, for it is in its essence a 
forcibly imposed state of siege and self-defence inflicted on the many by the few and 
requires cunning, force and falsehood to maintain a front of respectability.”104 
Moreover, he insisted, “[i]t is not the interests of the many (the peoples), as is no 
doubt claimed, but above all the interests of certain princely dynasties and of certain 
classes of business and society, that impel to this nationalism; once one has 
recognised this fact one should not be afraid to proclaim oneself simply a good 
European and actively to work for the amalgamation of nations.”105 Nietzsche, then, 
was similarly not blind to the fact that nationalist sentiments were being promoted in 
order to protect and enhance self-serving interests amongst certain sections of society. 
Those who do so, however, could not be considered, by Nietzsche, to be the ‘good 
Europeans’ which he hoped would evolve in Europe as some point in the future, 
because they did not realise that such a strategy is, strictly speaking, no longer 
intellectually tenable in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’ and that such a strategy is 
still premised on a resentful attitude towards existence. Nietzsche , himself therefore 
clearly objected to the “dangerous carnival of nationaliy-insanity”106 and sought to 
expose the “national lies”107 as “humbug.”108
Conclusion
What emerges, then, from the above consideration of Nietzsche’s writings on 
modem nationalism is that his critique of it, written prior to the advent of the two 
world wars, actually follows a trajectory quite different from the conventional one 
found in the contemporary literature on nationalism. Most studies of modem 
nationalism are, after all, conducted against the background of the devastating effect it 
has had on Europe in the course of two world wars. Scholars of nations and 
nationalism thus do not tire of warning their readers that nationalism can be, and in
103 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 41, p. 52.
104 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 475, p. 228.
105 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 475, p. 228.
106 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 2[3], p. 67.
107 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 2[121], p. 121.
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fact has been, a contributing factor towards war in the twentieth century. Stanley 
Hoffmann, for example, has stated this relationship quite unequivocally when he 
observed that in the twentieth century “destructive nationalism ... had led to the 
devastation of two world wars.”109 Moreover, it seems that the bellicose propensity of 
nationalism has not receded in Europe, as has once again become all too clear during 
the re-emergence of nationalist hostilities in ‘eastern’ Europe and the Balkans. Many 
scholars of nationalism thus accept, either implicitly or explicitly, the nexus between 
nationalism and war and consequently often, and rightly, plead against the spread of 
nationalist ideas.110 Such a critique of nationalism is surely defensible, and, indeed, 
Chapter 3 sought to demonstrate how it was precisely during the world wars that the 
quest for meaning was most evident amongst European societies. At the same time, 
however, it emerged from that chapter that the violent conflicts of the twentieth 
century, by virtue of the suffering they brought about, only ended up intensifying the 
experience rather than remedying it. In this sense, “[ajttempts to escape nihilism 
without revaluing our values so far, they produce the opposite, make the problem 
more acute.111
One of the difficulties, however, with basing the normative critique of 
nationalism on its propensity to cause violence alone, is that it is very difficult to 
apply it to situations, as in contemporary ‘western’ Europe, where nationalist 
sentiments and identities continue to enjoy an embedded and accepted status and 
where they have resurfaced in the contemporary debate on Europe, but where the 
immediate prospect of armed conflict is quite low. Given that western Europe since 
1945 has experienced a prolonged phase of peace, this argument about the violent 
propensity of nationalist sentiments faces difficulties in challenging the status quo of 
European politics. Indeed, defenders of an overarching European identity or political 
union can thus only warn that if, in the long run, nothing is done, there might be war 
on the continent once more. It is here, that Nietzsche’s original critique of nationalism 
regains great contemporary relevance. For, Nietzsche also noted how modem
108 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator,’ 7, p. 179.
109 S. Hoffmann. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate o f  the Nation State” in S. Hoffmann, ed., Conditions 
o f  World Order New York, N Y : 1966, p. 110.
ll0See also Anthony D. Smith. “Nationalism and the Historians” in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed). Mapping 
the Nation: London: Verso: 1996, p. 182.
111 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 28, p. 19.
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nationalism, as a form of incomplete nihilism, is ultimately based on a resentful 
attitude towards existence and is, strictly speaking, no longer intellectually tenable in 
the aftermath of the ‘death of God,’ once the will-to-truth has begun to put itself into 
question. Such a critique, moreover, can still be applied to contemporary European 
politics in a way which a critique based mostly on the violent effects of nationalism 
cannot. In this sense, perhaps, the very originality of Nietzsche’s critique of 
nationalism, may simultaneously also be its greatest strength.
Indeed, within the context of the contemporary debate over the idea of Europe, 
Nietzsche’s critique of modem nationalism as a form of incomplete nihilism would 
lead to a distancing from any attempt to confront the advent of European nihilism in 
this way. As Graham Parkes explains, if one were, in response to the advent of 
European nihilism, to “find meaning of one’s existence in being a certain nationality, 
this would for Nietzsche be a sign that the abysmal depths of the self opened up by 
nihilism had not been properly plumbed.”112 Much in this vein, Nietzsche himself had 
asked in the Gay Science, “|7t]ow can those of us who are children of the future be at 
home in this house of today! We are averse to all the ideals in which anyone today, in 
this brittle and broken time of transition, might feel at home; but as far as the 
‘realities’ of our time are concerned, we do not believe that they will last”U3 What is 
more, Nietzsche wrote towards the end of 1888 “[t]his provocation to self-idolisation 
of the nations is described as great politics, is being experienced almost as a duty and 
taught in this way!!! ... This has to be put to an end -  and I am strong enough for 
this.”114 Indeed, Nietzsche even concluded, “I have taken the spirit of Europe inside 
myself, now I will make my counterstrike!”115 A nationalist response to the advent of 
European nihilism would, therefore, clearly not be the chosen approach of Nietzsche’s 
‘good Europeans.’ In Nietzsche’s view, those who propagate nationalist ideas are 
simply perpetuating the ‘sickness of the century’ and are, in fact, “an enemy of the
1,2 Graham Parkes. “Wanderers in the Shadow o f Nihilism: Nietzsche’s Good Europeans.” History o f  
European Ideas. Vol. 16. No. 4-6 1993: 585-590, pp. 586-87.
113 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 377. Cited in David Krell and Donald L. Bates. The Good European: 
Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and Image. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 19$7, p. 2.
1.4 Nietzsche in a letter to Bonghi at the end o f 1888. Cited in Josef Nolte. Wir guten Europaer: 
Historisch-politische Versuche iiber uns selbst. Tubingen: Narr, 1991, p. 197. Nietzsche thought, 
perhaps somewhat erroneously, that “[t]he love o f fatherlands in Europe is something young and stands 
on weak legs: it falls over easily! One must not let oneself be fooled by the noise they make: small 
children scream the loudest.” Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 3[6], p. 172.
1.5 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1880-1882, KSA 9, 8[77]p. 399.
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good Europeans, an enemy of the free spirits.”116 What still remains to be done in 
greater detail, however, is to trace whether contemporary Europeanists, in turn, escape 
Nietzsche’s critique of incomplete nihilism. It is to this task that the next chapter 
turns.
116 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human II, §87.
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EUROPEAN NIHILISM  AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Nietzsche, the previous chapter argued, understood modem nationalism to be a 
form of incomplete nihilism and thus also considered it to be an inappropriate 
response to the advent of European nihilism. Strategies of incomplete nihilism were, 
in his view, not only intellectually untenable in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’ but 
were also usually based on a resentful attitude towards existence. In the contemporary 
debate, therefore, between those advocating the primacy of national identities on the 
one hand, and those calling for the articulation of a European identity on the other, a 
Nietzschean perspective would yield a position quite critical of the former. Indeed, in 
contrast to those favouring the continued primacy of national identities in Europe, 
Nietzsche thought instead that the problem of European nihilism could only be 
engaged on a European level, which is why he deliberately styled himself as a ‘good 
European,’ that is to say, in his own words, “supra-national.”1 What still remains to be 
investigated in greater detail, however, is whether this European perspective on behalf 
of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ is compatible with the political project of Europe as 
it is currently conceived and whether, contrary to modem nationalism, it actually 
escapes Nietzsche’s critique of incomplete nihilism. What emerges from such an 
investigation, however, is that the contemporary European project can itself be seen as 
constituting a form of incomplete nihilism which merely replicates many aspects of 
the logic of modem nationalism already criticised by Nietzsche, albeit it on a much 
larger scale. Despite their European perspective, therefore, Nietzsche’s ‘good 
Europeans’ may well end up standing in critical relation to both sides of the post-Cold 
War debate on Europe already outlined in Chapter 4.
1. Nietzsche, the ‘Good European ’
Nietzsche consistently preferred to extol the benefits of being a ‘good 
European’ over and above the nationalist ideas that were attaining increased 
importance amongst his contemporaries. “And here I stand now,” he wrote for
1 See Friedrich Nietzsche. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, 
KSA 11, 26[297], p. 229.
155
example in a passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “as [a] European. I cannot do 
otherwise...!” In a letter to his mother he later added that “even if I should be a bad 
German, I am definitely a very good European.”3 Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good 
Europeans,’ moreover, was intended to be very different from the style he associated 
with his German contemporaries in particular. Thus, the ‘good Europeans’ which 
Nietzsche hoped his writings might provoke sometime in the future would clearly not 
resemble the Germans of his day, “in the sense in which the word ‘German’ is 
constantly being used nowadays, to advocate nationalism and race-hatred and to be 
able to take pleasure in the national scabies of the heart and blood poisoning that now 
leads the nations of Europe to delimit and barricade themselves against each other as 
if it were a matter of quarantine.”4 Rather, Nietzsche insisted:
[fjor that we are too openminded, too malicious, too spoiled, also too well 
informed, too ‘travelled’: we far prefer to live on mountains, apart,
‘untimely,’ in past or future centuries, merely in order to keep ourselves 
from experiencing the silent rage to which we know we should be 
condemned as eyewitnesses o f politics that are desolating the German 
spirit by making it vain and that is, moreover, petty  politics: to keep its 
own creation from immediately falling apart again, is it not finding it 
necessary to plant it between two deadly hatreds? Must it not desire the 
etemalisation of the European system o f a lot o f petty states?5
In contrast to many of his German contemporaries Nietzsche himself chose to 
maintain instead that “I look beyond all the national wars and the new ‘Reiche,’ and 
all else that currently stares us in the face. As far as I am concerned I see the gradual 
preparation of the one Europe.”6
Nietzsche’s advocacy of a European perspective, however, was not only 
intended as a foil against German nationalism in particular, but also against what he
2 Friedrich Nietzsche. Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1961, 
‘Among the Daughters o f the Desert,’ p. 319.
3 Nietzsche, in a letter to his mother on August 17, 1886. Cited in David Farrell Krell and Donald L. 
Bates. The Good European: Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and Image. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997, back o f title page.
4 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974, 
377, p. 339.
5 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 377, pp. 339-340.
6 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885, KSA, 11, 37[9], p. 583.
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considered to be the ‘stupidities’ of nationalism in general. “This artificial 
nationalism,” he argued elsewhere, “is as dangerous as artificial Catholicism was, for 
it is in essence a forcible sate of emergency and martial law, imposed by the few on 
the many, and requiring cunning, lies, and force to remain respectable.”7 Nationalism, 
Nietzsche argued in a fashion which recalls much contemporary literature, is an 
invented and artificial form of producing meaning which merely served specific 
commercial and social classes rather than aspiring to promote a cultural rejuvenation 
of Europe as a whole. What is more, it constituted yet another form of what he called 
‘slave morality,’ i.e. a way of existing which required that a greater sense of meaning 
or purpose be attributed to European existence. Not surprisingly, then, Nietzsche 
chose to extol instead “[t]he good European ... laughing about the nations 
[Vaterlander]”^
If Nietzsche’s European bias was partially the result of his dismay over the 
nationalist turn in European, and especially German, politics, he was equally critical 
of any suggestion that a European order should be based on a concept of racial purity. 
Indeed, Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would recognise the benefits of ‘racial’ 
diversity over racial purity. As he himself argued in this vein, “[w]e who are homeless 
are too manifold and mixed racially and in our descent, being ‘modem men,’ and 
consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the mendacious racial self­
admiration and racial indecency that parades in Germany today as a sign of a German 
way of thinking and that is doubly false and obscene among the people of the 
‘historical sense.’”9 After having passed into the initial stages of his madness, 
Nietzsche even proclaimed that “I am having all anti-Semites shot.”10 It was, then, 
both Nietzsche’s distaste for nationalism and racism, as well as his unbelief in their 
ability to honest confront the experience of European nihilism, that led him to address 
his idea of the ‘good Europeans’ to the few amongst his contemporaries who looked 
beyond the domain of nations and races and thought along decidedly European
7 Friedrich Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human. Trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann. London: 
Penguin, 1984, 475, p. 228.
8 See Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885, KSA 11, 32[8], p. 404. As Nietzsche put it in a 
fragment, “against the national [das Nationale] -  the good European.” See Nietzsche, Nachgelassene 
Fragmente 1884-1885, KSA 11, 25[523], p. 150.
9 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 377, p. 340.
10 Cited in Laurence Lampert. Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996, 
p. 9.
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parameters.11 Indeed, he wrote to Georg Brandes at the beginning of December of 
1888, “[i]f we are victorious, we will have the governance of the earth in our hands -  
including world peace... We have abolished the absurd divisions of race, nation, and 
class.”12
In light of these convictions, Nietzsche also went to great lengths to convince 
his own contemporaries that the only way forward was to think along European lines. 
In a note from Human, All Too Human, intended, perhaps, for the politicians and 
businessmen of his day, Nietzsche wrote, for example, that “[cjommerce and industry, 
traffic in books and letters, the commonality of all higher culture, quick changes of 
locality and landscape, the present-day nomadic life of all nonlandowners -  these 
conditions necessarily bring about a weakening and ultimately a destruction of 
nations, or at least the European nations; so that a mixed race, that of the European 
man, has to originate out of all of them, as the result of continual crossbreeding.”13 
Given increased interdependence and cross-border traffic, thinking based on the level 
individual European nations alone would, Nietzsche urged his readers to recognise, 
not suffice in the long run to meet the requirements of Europe in the future. Yet, in 
Nietzsche’s view “[t]he isolation of nations due to engendered national hostilities 
now work[ed] against this goal, consciously or unconsciously, but the mixing process 
goes on slowly, nevertheless, despite those intermittent countercurrents....”14 Indeed, 
“[t]he national stupidities,” he insisted, “should not blind us to the fact in the higher 
regions there already exists a significant amount of interdependence.”15 While 
Nietzsche thought that his thinking, too, would become outmoded one day, he was 
convinced that those who failed to adjust their thinking beyond the nation-state would 
be forgotten long before him. For, he insisted, “[everything is striving for a synthesis 
of European history into the highest cultural and spiritual types -  a kind of centre 
which denies the sickness of the nations.”16
11 The nature o f Nietzsche’s European vision is treated in greater detail in Chapter 7.
12 Cited in Josef Nolte. Wir guten Europaer: Historisch-politische Versuche iiber uns selbst. Tubingen: 
Narr, 1991, p. 197.
13 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, 475, p. 228.
14 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, 475, p. 228.
15 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885, KSA 11, 25[112], p. 42.
16 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885, KSA 11, 25[112], p. 42.
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Nietzsche thus also demanded quite unequivocally from his readers that they 
see through the fa9ade of ‘petty’ nationalism and recognise the value and importance 
of being a 'good European,’ as he did, for example, in the following passage from 
Beyond Good and Evil:
Owing to the pathological estrangement which the insanity o f nationality 
has induced, and still induces, among the peoples o f Europe; owing also to 
the shortsighted and quick-handed politicians who are at the top today with 
the help o f this insanity, without any inkling that their separatist policies 
can o f necessity only be entr’acte policies; owing to all this and much else 
that today simply cannot be said, the most unequivocal portents are now  
being overlooked or arbitrarily and mendaciously reinterpreted -  that 
Europe wants to become one.17
Indeed, Nietzsche added elsewhere, “[t]he spiritual labour of all the deep thinkers of 
this century was really to prepare the ground for a new synthesis and to experiment 
with the future European. Only in their weakest hours, or when they became old, did
1 fithey fall back on the national limits of their V a te r la n d e r It is precisely this 
dynamic of transcending European nationalism which Nietzsche sought to maintain 
and which is why he repeatedly referred to “[y]ou victorious ones, you overcomers of 
time, you healthiest and strongest, you good Europeans! ”19 and why he insisted that 
his readers should choose to be “in one word -  and let this be our word of honour -  
good Europeans, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly obligated 
heirs of thousands of years of European spirit.”20 There is, then, much textual 
evidence to indicate that Nietzsche went to considerable lengths to encourage the 
spread of a European perspective amongst his contemporaries and amongst the 
generations that would follow.
17 Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f  the Future. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1966, 256, p. 196.
18 Nietzsche, Unschuld des Werdens. Cited in Albert Kopf. Der Weg des Nihilismus von Friedrich 
Nietzsche bis zur Atombombe. Munich: Minerva Publikation, 1988, p. 217.
19 Zweite Vorrede zu “Menschliches, Allzumenschliches,”: “Ihr Siegreichen, ihr Zeit-Uberwinder, ihr 
Gesiindesten, ihr Starksten, ihr guten Europaer/” Cited in Nolte, Wir guten Europaer, p. 199. See also 
Krell and Bates, The Good European, p. 7.
20 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 377, p. 340.
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It is, furthermore, Nietzsche’s choice of extolling the benefits of being a ‘good 
European’ over and above the forces of modem nationalism that can be seen as 
retaining great contemporary relevance. His critique of modem nationalism might be 
taken as one of the examples of how his themes can often still be drawn into 
contemporary debates with relative ease. Nietzsche’s recent biographer Lesley 
Chamberlain, for example, emphasises that “[n]ot least, Nietzsche aimed to be 
European, not German, in spirit....”21 In her view, moreover, this attitude is not 
without contemporary relevance, for it is indicative of an “absence of national 
narrowness we can delight in these days, and delight in with a timeless relish too,
99because a European style was part of Nietzsche’s campaign.” Given, in other words, 
that Nietzsche did give his thinking such a decidedly European scope, it is possible to 
bring him into closer intellectual dialogue with the contemporary institutional project 
of Europe. This is all the more possible given that Nietzsche himself had even thought 
that there would, in future, emerge “a European league of nations, within which each 
individual nation, delimited according to geographical fitness, will possess the status 
and right of a canton.”23 The question that arises from this observations, therefore, is 
whether the institutional project of Europe in its current form escapes Nietzsche’s 
critique of incomplete nihilism and whether it is compatible with Nietzsche’s idea of 
the ‘good Europeans.’ For, it must not necessarily follow from the fact that Nietzsche 
was critical of those advocating the primacy of national identities, that he would have 
accepted uncritically those attempts, cited in the introduction of this thesis, to 
advocate the development of an idea of Europe that would serve to counter this trend 
and which would increase the legitimacy of the European Union. Advocates of such 
an idea of Europe are, of course, certainly immune to one of the principal critiques 
that Nietzsche levied against modem nationalism, namely that it addresses the 
problem of European nihilism on too small a scale. It still remains to be seen, 
however, whether they are equally immune to some of the other critiques that 
Nietzsche previously made about the appeal and advocacy of nationalist ideas, 
especially in relation to his understanding of it as a form of incomplete nihilism.
21 Lesley Chamberlain. Nietzsche in Turin: The End o f  the Future. London: Quartet Books, 1997, p. 9.
22 Chamberlain. Nietzsche in Turin, p. 9.
23 Nietzsche, Human All Too Human, ‘The Wanderer and his Shadow,’ 293, KSA 2, p. 684.
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2. Nihilism and the Appeal o f ‘Europe*
Only half a century after his death, and by the time of the Second World War, 
Nietzsche would no longer have had to go to such rhetorical lengths to make his 
advocacy of a more European perspective heard. For, it was precisely the challenge to 
transcend the national boundaries which confronted Europeans during the final years 
of the Second World War. By then, the experience of devastation in the two world 
wars had given rise to a fairly widespread desire to transcend the traditional and 
national boundaries. Through eventually merging the various nations of Europe into a 
larger entity, many hoped, violent conflict between nations might be averted in future. 
Indeed, members of the Resistance no longer saw the national boundaries as 
inviolable. If anything, nationalism was now seen to have been largely responsible for 
the two world wars that ravaged in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. As 
the historian of European integration David Urwin has pointed out in this regard, 
“[resistance views on the future therefore stressed the need to transcend historical 
national boundaries, dismissed as artificial and discredited, in order to rebuild a 
revitalised and genuine European community.”24 These sentiments, moreover, can, in 
the first instance, be seen as being broadly compatible with Nietzsche’s earlier 
critique of nationalism and his advocacy of a European perspective. This is not to say, 
though, that this compatibility translates into an uncritical acceptance of this early 
project.
Where Nietzsche would most certainly have differed with the initial project, is 
with respect to the Christian overtones that it embodied from its outset. While 
Nietzsche had regretted about his own times that, under the conditions characterised 
by the advent of European nihilism “a European politics has become untenable” he 
also insisted that a solution along “Christian perspectives is a malheur.” Nietzsche, 
in other words, did not think that the problem of nihilism could simply be refused by 
Christians, nor did he think that this crisis could be circumvented by a pre-modem 
leap of faith. In the Gay Science he consequently noted quite explicitly that it is 
precisely in this opposition to Christianity that “we are good Europeans and heirs of
24 D. W. Urwin. The Community o f  Europe: A History o f  European Integration Since 1945. London: 
Longman, 1991, p. 8.
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Europe’s longest and most courageous self-overcoming.”26 Yet, it was also this very 
desire to reconstitute the idea of Europe along Christian lines that was initially quite a 
strong one amongst supporters of the integrationist cause. In fact, this attempt to 
reconstitute a Christian version of the European idea actually has a much longer 
history that can be traced back at far back as Novalis’ influential essay entitled 
Christianity or Europe in which he insisted that “[ojnly religion can re-establish
97Europe.” Following Germany’s defeat in the Great War, moreover, Max Scheler had 
similarly argued that the “cultural reconstruction of Europe” must be based on the
• • 951Christian tradition as the common possession of the European peoples. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, in turn, such sentiments were expressed once
• 29again.
Indeed, the Christian interpretation of the European idea would find 
considerable resonance amongst the founding fathers of the institutional project of 
Europe. Schuman, Adenauer and de Gasperi were all men with sincere catholic beliefs 
and simultaneously prominent members of Christian-democratic parties.30 As one 
scholar of European affairs has noted in this vein, “the synthetic idea underlying 
Europe, in the minds of the founders of the EC was Christian”, and “Schuman’s 
vision of European integration was based on Christian individualism and moral 
values.”31 What is more, in a sense even the entire underlying idea of the project of 
European integration is itself still very much a Christian one, centring around a call 
for forgiveness and a quest to overcome the mutual hatred of the nations of Europe. In 
Joseph Weiler’s view, therefore, the European project as a whole actually “resonates
->9
with ... the distinct discourse, imagery and values of Christian Love, of Grace.” 
There can be little doubt, then, that at least some of the most instrumental protagonists
25 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885, KSA 11, 26[336], p. 239.
26 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 357, p. 307.
27 Cited in James Joll “Europe -  An Historian’s View” History o f  European Ideas. Vol. 1, 1980, p. 11.
28 Karl Lowith. Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism. Trans. Gary Steiner. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995, p. 177.
29 See, for example, Winston Churchill’s ‘Something that Will Astonish You’ Speech delivered in 
Zurich on September 19, 1946, in David Cannadine (ed.) Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat: Winston 
Churchill's Famous Speeches. London: Cassell, 1989, pp. 309-314.
30 Joll, “Europe -  An Historian’s View,” p. 11.
31 Jude Bloomfield. “The New Europe: A New Agenda for Research?” in Mary Fulbrook (ed.) National 
Histories and European History. London: UCL Press, 1993, p. 264.
32 Joseph Weiler. “Europe After Maastricht -  Do the New Clothes have an Emperor?” Harvard Jean 
Monnet Working Papers Vol. 12. 1995. http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/JeanMonnet/papers/95
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of an institutionally united Europe had similar hopes and aspirations about the role 
Christianity might have in the Europe to come. This, moreover, is surely 
understandable given that Christianity could be seen as offering a non-nationalist, 
pan-European form of allegiance. Nevertheless, this would not be the strategy pursued 
by Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans.’
To some extent the Christian conception of the European idea remains evident 
even today. According to the Pope, for example, Europe remains “a Christian 
continent” and Christianity is seen by him to have “moulded the civilisation and 
founded the common identity on the European people.” In fact, the European idea 
has been useful for the Vatican which has sought, following the collapse of 
communism, to push the notion of an enlarged, ‘Christian Europe.’34 What is more, 
one scholar notes, “[p]art of the Vatican’s campaign for a ‘new evangelization’ is 
based upon the idea that the failure o f all major efforts to create a secular, non­
religious universalism proves the need for a renewal of Christian spirituality as a
- i f
centripetal force in the world today.” Countering such a conception of Europe is the 
obvious objection that religion has contributed as much to Europe’s division and 
violent conflicts as it has done to conserve European unity. Besides this immediate 
objection, however, there is also a more ‘Nietzschean’ objection to this early aspect of 
the institutional project of Europe. For, in Nietzsche’s view, Christianity had devalued 
earthly existence in favour of the promise of an otherworldly gratification and 
constituted a path which, following the ‘death of God,’ was no longer intellectually 
credible. Indeed, from a Nietzschean perspective, the attempt to articulate a more 
meaningful Europe along Christian lines would signal a worrying relapse into ‘slave 
morality,’ i.e. an attempt to mediate the devastating experience of suffering which 
befell Europe in the first half of the twentieth century by erecting yet another, greater 
ascetic idol. In this respect, the attempts on behajf of the resistance movements also 
showed signs of precisely that way of addressing suffering which Nietzsche found so
/9 5 12ind.html
33 Max Gallo. “Europe without Nations” in J. Peter Burgess (ed.) Cultural Politics and Political 
Culture in Postmodern Europe. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997, p. 384.
34 See P. Chenaux. Une Europe Vaticane? Brussels: Ciaco, 1990 and M. Kettle. “John Paul’s Grand 
Design for Europe” The Guardian 27 April 1990. Cited in Gerard Delanty. Inventing Europe: Idea, 
Identity, Reality. London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 145.
35 Ludo Abicht. “One Nation as God? A Critique o f Metaphysical Nationalism.” Cultural Dynamics 
Vol. 7. No. 2. 1995, p. 262.
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problematic and thus would also lead to a critical distancing between the institutional 
project of Europe, on the one hand, and Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good Europeans’ on 
the other.
Fortunately, though, it is possible to note, from a Nietzschean perspective, 
that although the idea of ‘Europe’ continues to exert its influence as a new idol in 
contemporary politics, it is nevertheless the case that, as Hugh Seton-Watson has 
argued, “[i]n today’s world, allegiance to Christendom, the land of the true faith, can 
have no meaning.”36 In contemporary European societies, in other words, the 
influence of Christianity as a politically mobilising force in insufficient to underpin 
the institutional project of Europe with a greater sense of meaning that would be 
accepted on a widespread and pervasive basis. Indeed, the linking of the institutional 
project of Europe with Europe’s Christian heritage is now largely confined to the 
historiography of European integration and to central and eastern European
intellectuals.37 If, moreover, the Christian reading of the European project is no longer
/
as prominent as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, it would 
also seem that the initial Christian overtones of the institutional project of Europe 
need not, in the contemporary context, necessarily be an impairment for endorsing the 
institutional project of Europe from the Nietzschean perspective. To this extent, it 
would also be conceivable, at least in theory, that a certain reconciliation of these 
perspectives would be possible in the contemporary context.
Importantly, however, the now diminished Christian overtones of the political 
project of Europe do not actually free this project from Nietzsche’s critique of 
incomplete nihilism, i.e. of strategies which apply the same fundamental principle of 
the will-to-truth upon which Christianity is founded, yet redirect it onto the earthly 
realm. For, the institutions of the European Union, even without the recourse to the 
overt language of Christianity, can, like its nationalist predecessor, be seen as 
encouraging precisely such a strategy of incomplete nihilism. Indeed, the initial
36 Hugh Seton-Watson. “What is Europe, Where is Europe: From Mystique to Politique.” Encounter. 
July-August 1985, p. 16. See also Anthony Smith “National Identity and the Idea o f European Unity.” 
International Affairs. Vol. 68. 1992, pp. 55-76.
37 Bloomfield, “The New Europe,” p. 264. For a more recent statement of this case, made in favour o f a 
certain reappropriation o f the Orthodox faith, see Julia Kristeva. The Crisis o f  the European Subject. 
Trans. Susan Fairfield. New York: Other Press, 2000.
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compatibility of the institutional project of Europe with the aforementioned Christian 
aspirations does much to raise precisely this suspicion. The case in favour of such an 
assessment rests on the recognition that the institutional project of Europe still 
benefits substantially in the public domain from the perception that it represents both 
the culmination of European history, as well as the pathway to a peaceful, equitable 
and united European order. Despite their stated inability to articulate a more 
meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era, the institutions of the European 
Union have nevertheless relied in the past, and arguably still continue to rely, on the 
appeal of the underlying telos of peace and unity. To this extent, the European Union 
has also been repeatedly portrayed, and portrayed itself, as the harbinger of a 
European peace for all European peoples and as the structure which will redeem the 
violent history of Europe in the course of the twentieth century. Representatives of the 
institutions of the European Union, as well as the treaty texts which established them, 
have frequently referred to “the contribution which an organised and active Europe 
can make to world peace.” They affirm, moreover, the mentality that “because Europe 
was not united we have had war.” It is this underlying logic, i.e. that the institutions of 
the European Union will redeem the suffering that Europe experienced in the course 
of the twentieth century, which has helped to give the institutional project of Europe 
much of its momentum and has helped it achieve its current level of public 
endorsement and appeal.
In this sense, moreover, the public appeal of the institutional project of Europe 
can also be seen to be based, as is the case with other forms of incomplete nihilism, 
on the attempt to render the experience of suffering meaningful through the erection 
of a greater ideal which is to be pursued. From a Nietzschean perspective, in other 
words, the vision of Europe embodied in the institutional project of Europe can be 
seen to rest on the same psychological principles as its Christian and nationalist 
predecessors; it still expresses the demand for ‘something greater’ to which Nietzsche 
objected and which, in his view, was indicative of ‘slave’ morality. Nietzsche himself 
had already observed about his own times that “[ejvery philosophy that ranks peace 
above war ... that knows some finale, some final state of some sort, every 
predominantly aesthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above,
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permits the question whether it was not sickness that inspired the philosopher.”38 It is 
in this sense, moreover, that the idea of ‘Europe as peace’ embodied in the 
institutional project also remains anathema to Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good 
Europeanism’ -  not, however, because Nietzsche desired war, but rather because such 
an idea constitutes yet another in the series of ascetic ideals which European culture 
has generated in reaction to the experience of suffering and which nevertheless mark a 
resentful attitude both towards life and the experience of meaninglessness.
What emerges upon closer inspection, then, is that although Nietzsche did 
indeed advocate the transcendence of nationalist ideals, and made the case for the 
emergence of the ‘good Europeans,’ this position does not necessarily translate into 
an uncritical acceptance of the institutional project of Europe as it is currently 
conceived. Rather, in the contemporary debate on Europe, a Nietzschean perspective 
would have to call for a more critical assessment, not only of nationalism, but also of 
the kind of Europeanism often embodied in the European Union. Indeed, the first 
critique that derives from a Nietzschean perspective in relation to today’s idea of 
Europe is that, however vacuous it seems to be, it still constitutes a remarkably under­
criticised concept. To this extent, a Nietzschean perspective in the current debate 
would not be incompatible with the recent assessment made by Gerard Delanty when 
he claimed that a more sustained critique of the European idea is long overdue. 
Delanty notes that while there is plethora of studies on nationalism, racism and 
fascism, “there is no systematic and critical study of the idea of Europe in relation to 
the politics of identity in the modem polity. The idea of Europe is a major aspect of 
modem political culture and is astonishingly under-researched. ... nothing has been 
written to dispel the myth of Europe as a unifying and universalising project.” The 
idea of Europe as a mobilising metaphor and as a central aspect of contemporary 
political discourse, then, might well have to be subjected to critical scrutiny, for, its 
appeal may, from a Nietzschean perspective, still be derived from the same principles 
as other forms of incomplete nihilism, such as modem nationalism. The institutional 
project of Europe, especially to the extent that it encourages the articulation of a more 
meaningful idea of Europe, may still be part of the “the tremendous amount of forgery
38 Nietzsche, Gay Science, Preface to the Second Edition, 2, p. 34.
39 Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. vii.
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in ideals,” which, in Nietzsche’s view, were traded in modem Europe.40 Much like 
nationalism in his own day, the implicit idea of Europe upon which advocates of the 
European Union always already draw, seems to rest on “the old habit and seeks 
another authority that can speak unconditionally and command goals and tasks.”41 
The growing discourse on the ‘meaninglessness’ of Europe, moreover, which was 
cited in Chapter 1 of this thesis, only serves to mask the very extent to which the 
European project is always already endowed with a greater sense of meaning. In this 
sense, then, the political project of Europe, even in its current manifestation, also does 
not escape Nietzsche’s critique of strategies of incomplete nihilism and cannot be 
readily equated with Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good Europeans.’
3. Nihilism and the Advocates o f  European Union
If the intrinsic appeal of the institutional project of Europe can be seen as 
ultimately resting on a strategy of incomplete nihilism, then it still remains to be seen, 
from Nietzsche’s perspective, which actors are seeking to promote this form of 
‘meaning.’ It will be recalled from the previous chapter that part of the reason why 
Nietzsche objected to the rise of modem nationalism was because it constituted an 
artificial way of endowing European existence with a greater sense of meaning or 
purpose which was being advocated by European statesmen and businesses, i.e. those 
two groups who, in his account, had little interest in confronting the experience of 
European nihilism honestly and critically. In this vein Nietzsche noted, for example, 
how “[i]t is not the self-interest of the many (the people), as one would have it, that 
urges this nationalism, but primarily the self-interest of certain royal dynasties, as well 
as that of certain commercial and social classes; once a man has understood this, he 
should be undaunted in presenting himself as a good European, and should work 
actively on the merging of nations.”42 This also means that while Nietzsche’s 
European perspective would not have been incompatible with the wish of many of the 
members of the Resistance Movement to transcend the ‘old’ politics of Europe based
40 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Genealogy o f  Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New  
York: Random House, 1967, III, 26, p. 159.
41 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1968,1, 20, p. 17.
42 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, 475, p. 228.
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on nation-states and nationalism, it is nevertheless possible that, in the contemporary 
context, a Nietzschean perspective would still yield a position not uncritical of the 
institutions of the European Union. For, what emerges from a critical investigation of 
the history of the European Union is that, over the course of the past decades, the 
European project has increasingly been assimilated by the same forces which, in the 
course of the nineteenth century, had encouraged the propagation of nationalist ideas. 
Both national government bureaucracies and European businesses, in other words, 
have been largely able to reconcile their interests with the institutions of the European 
Union. This circumstance, moreover, arouses the suspicion that the current 
institutional project of Europe might be yet another way of institutionalising the 
advent of European nihilism and might thus also be anathema to his understanding of 
what constitutes ‘good Europeanism.’ Like its nationalist predecessor, the political 
project of Europe might similarly be seen as a regrettable symbiosis between a 
European population still demanding a greater sense of meaning, and political and 
business elites wishing to fill this vacuum with an institutional project of Europe that 
will serve their respective interests.
Much of the initial progress in the project of European integration, it will be 
recalled, occurred during the 1950s and 1960s, a time when the nation-state was still 
struggling to rebuild its legitimacy in the aftermath of the Second World War and 
when European idealism still ran high. This idealism, moreover, presented a 
significant challenge to the traditional status of national governments.43 It does not 
seem, however, that this dynamic has persisted to this day. Rather, it was eventually 
possible for national governments and bureaucracies to halt further integration and 
realign the project to meet their needs. Ironically, it seems that part of the reason 
accounting for this ability of certain countries to halt, or at least significantly slow 
down, the pace of further European integration, was their ability, in the decade 
following the Second World War, to rehabilitate their credibility and to obtain civic 
loyalties by providing their populations with an impressive amount of material
43 William Wallace. “Rescue o f Retreat? The Nation State in Western Europe, 1945-1993” in Peter 
Gowan and Perry Anderson (eds.) The Question o f  Europe. London: Verso, 1997, p. 26.
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prosperity which they, in turn, had obtained from the economic fruits of integration.44 
To this extent, historians of European integration are today also much more sceptical 
as to whether the political processes leading up to European integration actually 
conformed to the idealist view.45 It seems instead that, in the long run, the national 
governments and bureaucracies have been able to recognise that a European Union is 
not necessarily inimical to their interests.
In this vein, another prominent historian of European integration, Alan 
Milward, has recently provided a very influential revision of the early idealist 
historiography of European integration in favour of one centred more on economic 
integration. The long-term effect of the process of European integration, Milward 
argues, has been not so much the erosion of the modem nation-state as its ‘rescue,’ 
and this by virtue of the fact that economic cooperation provided sufficient material 
prosperity for the emergence of new popular support for the state. Milward goes on to 
note, therefore, that “for many political scientists the process of European integration 
is now seen much more as one directed by the greater powers in their own interests -  
as many diplomatic historians would always have liked to see it -  and not as a new 
and inevitable trend.”46 Over the course of the past decade, moreover, Milward’s 
thesis has received substantial support. Even William Wallace, who differs in crucial 
respects with Milward’s thesis on the history of European integration, concedes that, 
at least up until the end of the 1960s, there was “a positive sum relationship between 
the security and economic frameworks which the institutions of European integration 
... had built, and the maintenance -  or re-establishment -  of national legitimacy and 
autonomy.”47 In fact, Wallace further points out, the continuing economic growth 
afforded by European integration actually assisted national government in achieving 
their narrower political and economic objectives, freeing resources that could, for
44 For the figures o f postwar European economic growth, see, for example, Goran Therbom. European 
Modernity and Beyond: The Trajectory o f  European Societies J945-2000. London: Sage, 1995, 
especially Chapter 7.
45 Wallace, “Rescue o f Retreat?”, pp. 25-26.
46 Alan S. Milward. “The Springs o f Integration” in Gowan and Anderson, The Question o f  Europe, p. 
6. Milward invokes Robert Keohane’s and Stanley Hoffmann’s piece “Conclusions: Community 
Politics and Institutional Change” in W. Wallace (ed.) The Dynamics o f  European Integration, London 
1990 as well as “Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s” in R. O. Keohane and S. Hoffmann, eds., 
The New Europeans Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change, Boulder, 1991 as 
evidence for this trend.
47 Wallace, “Rescue o f Retreat?”, p. 22.
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example, be allocated to welfare programmes.48 In recent years, then, historians of 
European integration have also arrived at a much more sceptical attitude in relation to 
the links between the ‘idealist’ intellectuals on the one hand, and the founding fathers 
on the other.49 In retrospect, it increasingly seems that the long-term impact of the 
process of European integration has not led to a transcendence of the modem nation­
state and its national forms of identification, as it has contributed to preserving and 
perhaps even rehabilitating it.50 It is this circumstance, moreover, which further 
complicates a simple reconciliation between Nietzsche’s notion of ‘good 
Europeanism’ and the institutional project of Europe as it is currently conceived.
What is more, this tendency within the institutional project of Europe has not 
escaped the attention of the wider scholarly community. Thus, Philip Allott, for 
example, observed in his address to the annual conference of the British International 
Studies Association, that “in Europe, there [now] is the best new-old game of all. 
Having tried the exhilarating and virile game of killing each other by the tens of 
millions, our games masters have found a delightful new game to play called 
European integration, a cynical perversion of a wonderful idea.” hi Allott’s view, the 
“wonderful idea is the redeeming of the European peoples from their historical 
inequities in the name of their historic achievements; the recreation of a European- 
wide society, in the richest sense of the word -  ideal, necessary, hypothetical, 
possible, rational.” Allott thus sustains the idealistic vision of the European idea 
already referred to, i.e. the idea of Europe as redeeming Europeans from their 
destructive past. The cynical perversion, on the other hand, is “the system which is 
forming itself in Europe at the moment: a counter-revolutionary conspiracy of the 
public realms under the slogan, Forward to the nineteenth century.”51 In this view, the 
current direction that the European project is heading towards, is marked neither by 
intellectual creativity, nor insight into the profoundly problematic nature of 
articulating a more meaningful Europe, but is rather allowing for the institutional 
project of Europe to serve national and European bureaucracies and governments.
48 Wallace, “Rescue o f Retreat?”, p. 22.
49 Milward, “The Springs of Integration,” p. 11.
50 See Alan Milward. The European Rescue o f  the Nation State. London 1992. Cited in Milward, “The 
Springs of Integration,” p. 9.
51 Philip Allott. “Kant or won’t: theory and moral responsibility.” Review o f  International Studies. Vol. 
23, 1997, pp. 354.
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Importantly, however, it is not only the national governments of Europe which 
have been able to reconcile themselves quite positively with key aspects of the project 
of the European Union. Large businesses and industries, too, have often been able to 
do the same. Indeed, the economic pressures have been equally important in driving 
forward to process to European unification.52 Thus, the desire to expand markets, to 
increase the mobility of labour and to increase investment potential have been a 
similarly important driving force behind the institutional project of Europe.53 Much as 
is the case with national bureaucracies, the project of European integration is often not 
driven by an overriding idea of ‘good Europeanism’ which would seek to address the 
crisis which shook Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, but rather by much 
narrower interests.54 “The money alone,” Nietzsche himself had already penned in 
one of his notebooks, “forces Europe eventually to unite itself,”55 which is also why 
he concluded that the European economic unification would follow at some point in 
the future.56
In many ways, this aspect of the development of the European Union also 
echoes Gellner’s earlier theory of modem nationalism in which he argued that 
nationalism emerged as a necessary adjunct to the process of industrialisation and the 
needs of nineteenth century capitalism.57 By way of analogy, a considerable 
component of the impetus behind the process of European integration can similarly be
r o
seen to he m the interests of large multi-national corporations. This factor, 
moreover, has triggered some harsh assessments of the European Union by the Left in 
recent years. Thus, Gerard Delanty, for example, critically observes that increasingly 
the European Union is marked not by a genuine internationalism but by a “socio-
52 Wallace, The Transformation o f  Western Europe and A. D. Smith, “Towards a Global Culture?” 
Theory, Culture and Society. Vol. 7, 1990, pp. 171-92. Both cited in Cris Shore and Annabel Black. 
“Citizens’ Europe and the Construction of European Identity” in Goddard, Llobera and Shore, The 
Anthropology o f  Europe, p. 277.
53 See G. Smith. Politics o f  Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. New York: Holmes and Meier, 
1972, pp . 297-298.
54 Furio Cerutti. “Can there be a Supranational Identity?” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Vol. 18, 
No. 2. 1992, p. 153.
55 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885, KSA 11, 37[9], pp. 583-84.
56 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887-1889, KSA 13, 11 [235], p. 93.
57 E. Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.
58 See Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 8. Delanty is referring to Ernst Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.
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technical framework for the exploitation of scarce resources and the pursuit of 
unrestrained economic growth.”59 Indeed, he notes, “[w]e find that the idea of Europe 
is becoming the driving force of strategies of macro-political and economic 
engineering, and, above all, the substitution of a new goal, closely linked to the neo- 
liberal political programme, for the traditional social democratic programme.”60 
Nietzsche himself, moreover, had also expressed his own reservations about 
proceeding in this way. Indeed, he noted critically, “[o]nce we possess that common 
economic management of the earth that will soon be inevitable, mankind will be able 
to find its best meaning as a machine in the service of the economy -  as a tremendous 
clockwork, composed of ever smaller, every more subtly ‘adapted’ gears...” What is 
more, Nietzsche added, “[i]t is clear, what I combat is economic optimism: as if 
increasing the expenditure of everybody must necessarily involved the increased 
welfare of everybody.”61
What emerges, then, from a more critical investigation of the European Union 
is that in its current shape it only vaguely reflects the initial vision of the Resistance 
movement and its founding fathers. Furthermore, much like governments and 
international businessmen had, in Nietzsche’s own lifetime, often encouraged 
nationalist identities that promoted their interests, it now seems that they often chose 
to endorse the European Union instead. Following Italian unification, Massimo 
d’Azeglio’s famously proclaimed that “[w]e have made Italy, now we have to make 
Italians.” In the view of one scholar, the situation today is not altogether different 
for those wishing to bring about a more united Europe today. Europe is in the process 
of integrating economically, but those elusive citizens, the ‘Europeans,’ have yet to be 
invented.63 What is more, these actors have now also begun to apply the same 
techniques used for the purposes of nation-building in the nineteenth century. In order 
to ascertain how best to bring about loyalties and affective attitudes to the European 
Union and the European cause, scholars have not so much sought to develop new 
models as they have repeatedly turned to the literature on nationalism for guidance.
59 Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 9.
60 Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 9.
61 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 866, pp. 463-464.
62 This phrase was addressed to the parliament o f  the newly united Italian kingdom. See E. Hobsbawm. 
Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 44.
63 Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 8.
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It is, perhaps, not even a coincidence that the pioneers of regional integration 
theory such as Ernst Haas and Karl W. Deutsch were also pioneers of the literature on 
nation-building and nationalism. Haas actually defined regional political integration 
as a process of collective identity formation, as “the process whereby political actors 
in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation states.”64 This same logic, moreover, is 
reflected in Monnet’s A Ferment o f Change, in which he had argued that:
[t]o establish this new method o f common action, we adapted to our 
situation the methods which have allowed individuals to live together in 
society: common rules which each member is committed to respect, and 
common institutions to watch over the application o f these rules. Nations 
have applied this method within their frontiers fo r  centuries, but they have 
never ye t been applied between them, [emphasis added]
This very logic, moreover, has not been buried in the early literature of European 
integration. Two scholars working on the anthropology of contemporary Europe, for 
example, have recently noted that there are crucial and revealing parallels between the 
attempt to bring about a European citizenry and such attempts at the national level. 
The view, they note, “that the formation of European nation-states provides useful 
parallels, perhaps even a model, for understanding some of the processes involved in 
European political integration and state-formation” is still a widely held belief 
today.65 Throughout the history of the European integration, then, the debate on the 
idea of Europe has remained very firmly grounded within traditional conceptions of 
state organisation; the project of European integration has not so much transcended 
national ideals as it has displaced them to a higher, European level.66 Consequently, 
there would, from the Nietzschean perspective, also be a danger that the institutions of
64 Ernst B. Haas. The Uniting o f  Europe: Political Social and Economical Forces J950-J957. London: 
Stevens & Sons, 1958, p. 16.
65 Shore and Black, “Citizens’ Europe and the Construction of European Identity,” p. 277. See also 
Goran Therbom. “In talking about Europeanism and European identity, we are talking about something 
which might as well be called nationalism, nationality and-or ethnicity.” European Modernity and 
Beyond, p. 242.
66 Thomas Diez. Neues Europa, altes Modell. Die Konstruktion von Staatlichkeit im politischen 
Diskurs der europaischen Gemeinschaft. Frankfurt am Main: Haag + Herchen, 1995, p. v.
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the European Union will not so much transcend its predecessor, as they would 
replicate its logic on an even larger dimension.67
Much, then, like modem nationalism in Nietzsche’s own times, the 
institutional project of Europe is, today, often being advocated by those actors who, in 
Nietzsche’s account, often had little interest in confronting the advent of European 
nihilism. Indeed, for Nietzsche the fact that European governments and European 
businesses endorse the institutional project of Europe may well have raised a certain 
amount of suspicion. For, as Nietzsche himself had noted in one of his fragments, and 
not without irony, “they call the unification of German governments into a single state 
a ‘great idea.’ It is the same type of person who will one day be enthusiastic about the 
united states of Europe: it is the even ‘greater idea.’”68 Many of the contemporary 
advocates of the institutional project of Europe, in other words, are clearly not the 
‘good Europeans’ which Nietzsche hoped would emerge at some time in the future. It 
is for this reason, moreover, that although Nietzsche himself was clearly critical of 
attempts to give a nationalist response to the advent of European nihilism, and while 
he certainly did advocate a European perspective, it not at all clear that he would also 
have endorsed uncritically the institutional project of Europe as it is currently 
conceived. If anything, it increasingly seems that when compared with the 
phenomenon of modem nationalism, the idea of Europe embodied in the European 
institutions often constitutes not so much a qualitative difference as a quantitative one. 
Much like modem nationalism before it, the European Union’s attempt to articulate 
and propagate a more meaningful idea of Europe that would provide the basis for a 
European identity, and that would also enhance the legitimacy of the European Union, 
might equally be seen as a form of incomplete nihilism, i.e. as a way of simply 
substituting one form of meaning for another without genuinely and honestly 
confronting the deeper implications of the advent of European nihilism. In this sense, 
moreover, the contemporary European Union too might be seen as a regrettable 
symbiosis between a European population still demanding a greater sense of meaning, 
and political and business elites wishing to fill this vacuum with an institutional 
project of Europe that will serve their respective interests. In this case, however, its
67 Diez, Neues Europa, altes Modell, p. 1.
68 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1875-1879, KSA 8, 19[74], pp. 357-348.
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initial advantage over nationalist meanings, of addressing the problem on the 
appropriate scale, becomes, perhaps, not so much an asset as a liability.
4. European Nihilism and the European Union
In light of these preceding criticisms of the institutional project of Europe, it 
would seem that the more idealistic promoters of the European project now face a 
crucial question, namely of how to respond to the appropriation of the project by 
those forces in whose partial opposition it was initially set up. Amongst contemporary 
Europeanists, there are, in turn, at least two broad strategies that have been proposed 
in this regard. In the first instance, supporters of the European Union could, of course, 
simply continue with the functionalist course pursued in the past. The founding 
fathers of the institutional project of Europe had chosen to avoid an overtly 
revolutionary process of European federalism, opting instead for a strategy that would 
achieve unification of Europe more gradually, by taking one step at a time and by 
focusing on small specific forms of intergovernmental co-operation. It was hoped that 
by focusing on piecemeal and sectoral integration, co-operation between countries 
was more likely to ensue in the long run, and that such co-operation could, in turn, 
breed a habit of further co-operation which could also induce ever greater steps 
towards integration. Eventually, according to this aspiration, loyalties would begin to 
shift from the nation-states to the supranational institutions. In this way the 
functionalist mode of integration might, over time, even culminate in a federal 
Europe. As Zaki Lai'di has noted, “[ajdhesion to Europe was stronger because it 
involved nothing, or nothing much. It was being put in place without commitment, 
without arousing passions. Europe was, in the full sense of the term, ‘an affair of 
states.’”69 Indeed, the European edifice was being erected without immediately 
affecting the day-to-day lives of Europeans.70
The founding fathers had thus also deliberately adopted a policy that did not 
cast the European question in spiritual or philosophical terms. Instead, it placed
69 Zaki Lai'di. A World Without Meaning: The Crisis o f  Meaning in International Politics. Trans. June 
Burnham and Jenny Coulon. London: Routledge, 1998, p. 72.
70 Lai'di, A World Without Meaning, p. 72.
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economics before politics, making the latter a function of the former, and relied on the 
logic of the market to drive forward the political project of Europe.71 The functional 
approach to European integration was, in this sense, also an example, as Stanley 
Hoffmann points out, of “the old Saint-Simonian dream of depoliticised progress, 
accompanied by one idea that, at first sight, seemed quite political: the idea that the 
gradual dispossession of the nation-state and the transfer of allegiance to the new 
Community would be hastened by the establishment of a central quasi-federal
• » 7 7  » •political system.” Functionalism opted for technical and functional solutions, rather 
than talking of ‘meaning’ and specifying the content of the European idea that 
informed this project. Indeed, Mitrany himself had pointed out that “[t]he functional 
way may seem a spiritless solution -  and so it is, in the sense that it detaches from the 
spirit the things which are of the body.” For, Mitrany further maintained, “[n]o 
advantage has accrued to anyone when economic and other social activities are 
wedded to fascist or communist or other political ideologies; their progeny has always
7Tbeen confusion and conflict.” Mitrany thus cannot be accused of inadvertently 
ignoring questions of meaning and vision in his account of integration. For, he argued, 
it is precisely these notions which any attempt at uniting Europe must resist in the 
short term if it wishes to stand a chance of succeeding in the long run. In any case, the 
‘spiritless’ approach, he argued, would eventually be redeemed by the later 
emergence of a more meaningful and united Europe.
Increasingly, however, precisely this wager on the functional approach to 
European integration is seen by scholars as being both paradoxical and deficient. For, 
in the functional account, the best way of institutionalising a more meaningful idea of 
Europe resides precisely in avoiding overt reflection on the meaning of the European 
idea. This explicit deferment of the question of ‘meaning’ in favour of technical 
solutions is exemplified by Jean Monnet himself, when he wrote, for example, that “I 
have never been in doubt that this process would one day lead us to a United States of 
Europe, but I do not even try to imagine what the political framework will be. There is
71 Stanley Hoffmann. “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited.” Daedalus. Vol. 123. No. 2. 1994, p. 16.
72 Stanley Hoffmann. “Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today” Journal o f  Common 
Market Studies. 21, 1982, p. 29. Cited in Wallace, “Rescue o f Retreat?, p. 26. See also Tony Judt. A 
Grand Illusion? An Essay on Europe. London: Penguin Books, 1996, p. 37.
73 Cited in Brent F. Nelson and Alexander Stubb. (eds.) The European Union: Readings on the Theory 
and Practice o f  European Integration. London: Boulder, 1998, p. 113.
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probably no precedent for what we are preparing.”74 What exactly a meaningful 
Europe will look like, in other words, is the deferred task of later generations. In the 
first instance, in Monnet’s account, the institutional framework must be established. 
Yet, as was noted in the introduction to this thesis, scholars have now begun to 
question this belief that affective associations will result from processes of functional 
integration. For, the result of this deferment has been, as Hoffmann recently noted, 
that there still remains today a vast difference between Europe “as a zone of economic
* * • 7*\integration (this has been achieved) and Europe as a common enterprise.” Despite 
nearly half a century of institutional co-operation and functional integration, and 
despite the widely accepted arguments in favour of market integration, Europe still 
finds it difficult to evoke a sense of meaning socially shared by all the nations and 
peoples of Europe. This critique of functionalism, moreover, is largely compatible 
with Nietzsche’s perspective. For, Nietzsche himself also preferred a more reflective 
approach to the question of Europe. Indeed, from the Nietzschean perspective, the 
functional approach to European integration remains an inadequate response to the 
contemporary impasse, not only because it is itself still based on a strategy of 
incomplete nihilism, but also because it has not been very successful at actually 
challenging the spread of nationalism and national identities in Europe, which, in his 
account, similarly constitute strategies of incomplete nihilism and are thus also very 
much in need of critique. To this extent, it also remains questionable whether a 
continuation of the functional approach in the contemporary context would be 
compatible with Nietzsche’s idea of what constitutes ‘good Europeanism.’
The most prominent response to this shortcoming of the functional approach, 
in turn, has, as was already shown in the introduction to this thesis, been the call by 
Europeanists for the articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe that could serve 
as the basis for a European identity. The ‘post-functionalist’ approach, moreover, 
constitutes the second broad strategy identified by Europeanists for addressing the 
current impasse. In this vein, Jacques Delors, for example, has personally reminded 
his listeners and readers that “[h]istory is only interested in the far-sighted and those
74 Jean Monnet. Memoires. Paris: Fayard, 1976, pp. 615-616. Cited in Lai’di, A World Without 
Meaning, p. 192, fn 19.
75 Hoffmann, “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited,” p. 18.
76 Lai’di, A World Without Meaning, p. 67.
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who think big, like Europe’s founding fathers.” By ‘far-sighted,’ he further explains, 
“I mean being simultaneously capable of drawing on our historical heritage and 
looking to the future. Futurology has a part to play but so has a code of ethics for the 
individual, society and the human adventure. This, frankly is what we most lack 
today.”77 Before him, Jean Monnet himself had already insisted that “[w]here there is 
no big vision, the people perish.”78 More recently, in turn, Vaclav Havel has insisted, 
with the Czech poet Valdimir Holan, that “without genuine transcendence, no 
construction shall ever reach completion.”79 Today, then, the functionalist wager on 
European integration is no longer generally seen to be able to redeem either the 
European Union, nor Europeans at large, from the experience of meaninglessness. 
Rather, there is a perceived need for the explicit articulation of a more meaningful 
idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, as Zaki Lai'di has noted with 
exemplary clarity, “[u]ntil this force [of nationalism] is matched with a project of 
meaning, it is very unlikely to die down or come to a halt.”80 Today, therefore, a 
unified Europe is increasingly seen to also require a common idea of Europe. As 
Nietzsche himself once noted, the “the advance toward universal empires is always 
also an advance toward universal divinities....”81 In this sense, the task formerly 
deferred by an earlier generation of Europeanists has now returned to confront 
contemporary scholars much more directly.
Bearing in mind, however, the discussion of Nietzsche’s European thought 
carried out in the previous chapters, it is now also possible to see why this preferred 
response, like the functionalist one to which it responds, is likely to remain 
problematic for Nietzsche as well as for the ‘good Europeans’ which he hoped would 
emerge in the future. In the first instance, it is, as was already noted in the 
introduction, proving very difficult to actually articulate an idea of Europe that is 
compelling to Europeans at large. Not only is there, according to several scholars, a 
lack of requisite symbolic heritage for Europeanists to draw upon, but the latter would 
also have to contend with the sceptical attitude, already noted in Chapter 4, of
77 Jacques Delors. “A Necessary Union.” Bruges Speech on 17 October 1989. Reprinted in Nelson and 
Stubb, The European Union, p. 58.
78 Cited in Delors, “A Necessary Union,” p. 60.
79 Vaclav Havel. The Art o f  the Impossible: Politics and Morality in Practice: Speeches and Writings 
1990-1996. Trans. Paul Wilson. New York and Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997, p. 246.
80 La’idi, A World Without Meaning, p. 4.
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Europeans in general.82 When the will-to-truth puts itself into question, the 
deployment of new idols remains profoundly difficult as any attempt to articulate the 
true meaning of the earthly existence is likely to remain intellectually unconvincing. 
Nietzsche himself had already noted in this regard that one of the most difficult 
lessons to leam in modem times, is that “[w]hat will not be built any more henceforth, 
and cannot be built anymore, is -  a society (Gesellschaft) in the old sense of that 
word; to build that, everything is lacking, above all the material. All o f  us are no 
longer material fo r a society; this is a truth for which the time has come.”83 The 
public mood in the post-Cold War era may simply be too sceptical to allow for the 
adhesion to an overarching idea of Europe and for the rebuilding of a community 
based around shared ideals. Indeed, the European Song Contest, the new currency, the 
European City of Culture, its European flag and its anthem from the last movement of 
Beethoven’s Ninth symphony have not only failed in providing a genuine European 
identity, but in the eyes of many they also look very much like crude attempts at 
social engineering, reminiscent, to some, of earlier forms of state-sponsored 
propaganda.84
There is, however, also a second and deeper problem which affects any such 
move to delineate a more meaningful idea of Europe. For, from the Nietzschean 
perspective, the fundamental problem that any attempt to constitute this institutional 
project in the symbolic realm confronts, is that it runs the risk of further simulating 
the logic of nationalism, and thus also of incomplete nihilism, but on a much larger 
scale. Indeed, it cannot be without relevance that in seeking to achieve a more 
meaningful attachment to the European project, policy-makers have resorted to the
Of
very same tools of nationalism, such as the flag, the passport, and the anthem. It is 
difficult to see, in other words, how the articulation and deployment of a more
81 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, II, 20, p. 90.
82 Oliver Schmidtke. “Obstacles and Prospects for a European Collective Identity” in U lf Hedetoft (ed.) 
Political Symbols, Symbolic Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 45. Anthony Smith, moreover, notes 
that there is, “no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen 
in battle, no European shrine of kings or saints. When it comes to the ritual and ceremony o f collective 
identification there is no European equivalent o f national or religious community.” “National identity 
and the idea o f European unity” in International Affairs, Vol. 68. No. 1. 1992: 55-76, p. 73. See also 
Michael Heffeman, The Meaning o f  Europe: Geography and Geopolitics. London: Arnold, 1998, p. 2.
83 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 356, p. 304.
84 Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 128
85 Delanty, Inventing Europe, p. 128
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meaningful idea of Europe in response to the perceived inadequacies of functionalism 
would or could avoid replicating this logic of incomplete nihilism. The political 
project of Europe, set up to transcend European nationalism, thus also runs the risk of 
returning to the very strategies their nationalist and Christian predecessors relied
o<r
upon. Much like the nationalists eventually challenged the Christian superstition 
with their own myths, so might the institutional project of Europe now be seen as 
seeking to challenge the nationalist superstition with a more European myth. In this 
case, however, the logic of nationalism and incomplete nihilism of its historical 
predecessors would not so much be transcended, as it would be replicated on a much 
larger scale. Any further step in this direction, moreover, would only serve to 
exacerbate this tension.
In the view of Europeanists, of course, this may nevertheless seem like an 
acceptable price to pay in the sense that the nationalist division of Europe would be 
superseded by a European perspective and thus the problem of the violent nature of 
the twentieth century would be seen to be adequately addressed. Yet, such an 
argument is sound only if the crisis that shook Europe in the course of the twentieth 
century is traced back to the rise of modem nationalism itself. What such a view 
neglects, however, is the possibility that the rise of modem nationalism is not itself 
necessarily at the origin of the violent nature of the twentieth century. Rather, the rise 
of modem nationalism, may, as Nietzsche argued, itself be a response to the 
underlying experience of meaninglessness. In this case, however, the violent nature of 
the twentieth century is due, as was noted in Chapter 3, not only to nationalism per se, 
but also to the underlying logic of the will-to-truth upon which it flourished in the first 
place, namely that the experience of meaninglessness must be avoided in all 
circumstances. It is, in other words, precisely the desire to fend off the experience of 
meaninglessness and to invent a ‘true’ world which is indicative of an incomplete 
form of nihilism, and which serves to fuel potentially violent conflicts. Yet, it would 
also be precisely this logic which any attempt to articulate a more meaningful idea of 
Europe in the post-Cold War era would risk replicating and sustaining. To the extent
86 This fact, moreover, makes Paul Michael Lutzeler’s assessment that Nietzsche simply sought to 
transpose the ideology o f nationalism to the European level with no qualitative difference 
unconvincing. Die Schriftsteller und Europa: Von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart. Munich: Piper, 
1992, p. 200.
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that they do so, moreover, they would also not escape Nietzsche’s critique of 
incomplete nihilism. In this sense, moreover, while a Nietzschean perspective does 
indeed share the suspicion about a merely functionalist strategy for European 
integration, his ‘good Europeans’ would also have to distance themselves from the 
contemporary literature which wishes to remedy the current impasse by articulating a 
more meaningful idea of Europe.
What is more, if Nietzsche’s criticism is taken into account, then the 
institutional project of Europe now faces an even greater dilemma than before. For, 
now it either refuses to constitute itself in the symbolic order and thus serves to leave 
unchallenged traditional, national identities which themselves constitute a form of 
incomplete nihilism and which, from a Nietzschean perspective, need to be 
challenged. Or, alternatively, the institutional project of Europe seeks to constitute 
itself in the symbolic realm by seeking to articulate a more meaningful idea of 
Europe. In this case, however, it only serves to replicate the move of incomplete 
nihilism, which is to escape the experience of meaninglessness through the erection of 
new idols. In doing so, moreover, the institutional project of Europe, understood as a 
mechanism for peace, would also run the risk of exposing itself to a performative 
contradiction. For, from the Nietzschean perspective, which sees precisely this logic 
of incomplete nihilism as operating throughout the violent course of European history 
in the twentieth century, the attempt to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe 
would simply serve to replicate the very structures of European experience which 
have proved so problematic and violent in the past. The quest to articulate a more 
meaningful idea of Europe that could serve as a basis for a European identity might 
thus encourage the very structures of thinking and acting which it is seeking to 
remedy. In this sense, then, both the functionalist path to European integration, as 
well as the post-functionalist strategy which explicitly opts for the deployment of a 
more meaningful idea of Europe, constitute problematic responses -  both from a 
Nietzschean perspective, as well as in light of its own stated aim of redeeming Europe 
from its violent history.
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Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, then, it seems that the broad parameters of the 
contemporary debate on Europe do not promise to adequately address the problem of 
European nihilism and do not provide the adequate conceptual grounds for engaging 
with the experience of European nihilism. ‘Nationalises’ who emphasise .the primacy 
of nationalist sentiments overlook, or deliberately obscure, the fact that the very 
nature of modem nationalism, as a strategy of incomplete nihilism, is to avoid a 
genuine and critical confrontation with the experience of European nihilism. It is, 
moreover, an overly modest and artificial process of producing meaning which, 
however regrettable, still seems convincing to many. While, on a Nietzschean 
reading, Europeanists are thus correct to adjust their thinking to the European level, 
and there was indeed a broadly conceived convergence between Nietzsche’s 
aspirations for Europe, and those who sought to work towards a united Europe in the 
post-war era, the functionalist wager on European integration ended up creating the 
institutions of the European Union which, today, can no longer be seen as the 
embodiment of ‘good Europeanism’ as Nietzsche understood it. Rather, these 
institutions have become substantially assimilated by the very forces which Nietzsche 
lamented in regard to his discussion of modem nationalism at the end of the previous 
century, and which he hoped would be displaced by a more European perspective. 
“[N]ihilistic values,” Nietzsche once noted, “hold sway under the holiest of names.” 
Both the nationalist response, as well as the counter-response on behalf of Europeans 
to develop a European identity, constitute strategies of incomplete nihilism. Such 
strategies are, from a Nietzschean perspective, not only dangerous and intellectually 
unconvincing in the aftermath of the ‘death of God,’ but they are also ultimately 
based on a resentful attitude towards existence and are thus also inappropriate 
responses to the advent of European nihilism. In the contemporary predicament, 
therefore, neither the nationalist approach, nor the functionalist one, nor, for that 
matter, the attempt to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe constitute, from the 
Nietzschean perspective, an appropriate way of addressing the problem of European
87 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Anti-Christ. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 1990.6, pp. 129- 
130.
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nihilism. Nor would any of these strategies be pursued by the ‘good Europeans’ 
whom he hoped might emerge in future.
Importantly, however, Nietzsche himself did not, despite this critique, seek to 
actively work against the amalgamation of nations. For, as he noted in Beyond Good 
and Evil, “[t]he very same conditions that will on the average lead to the levelling and 
mediocritisation of man -  to a useful, industrious, handy, multi-purpose herd animal -  
are likely in the highest degree to give birth to exceptional human beings of the most 
dangerous and attractive quality.”88 Indeed, he added, “[i]n accordance with the 
slowly arising democratic order of things (and its cause, the intermarriage of masters 
and slaves), the originally noble and rare urge to ascribe value to oneself and on one’s 
own and to ‘think well’ of oneself will actually be encouraged.. ..”89 It is in this sense, 
moreover, that Nietzsche could also suggest that “this process will probably lead to 
results which would seem to be least expected by those who naively promote and 
praise it, the apostles of ‘modem ideas.’”90 Despite his severe reservations, in other 
words, Nietzsche nevertheless placed his wager on proceeding with the uniting of 
Europe, for this would not only work towards challenging the national identities of 
Europeans, but it might also inadvertently facilitate the emergence of what Nietzsche, 
in turn, considered to be the ‘good Europeans.’ What still remains to be investigated 
in greater detail, therefore, is how Nietzsche himself proposed to engage with the 
advent of European nihilism, i.e. what his own notion of a ‘good European’ entails. 
Having considered Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism, as well as his 
critique of both sides in the contemporary debate on Europe, it is, in fact, now 
possible to turn towards precisely this task.
88 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 242, p. 176.
89 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 261, p. 209.
90 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 242, p. 176.
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“WE GOOD EUROPEANS...”
If both the ‘national’ and ‘European’ sides in the contemporary debate on 
Europe are seen, by Nietzsche, as strategies of incomplete nihilism, and thus also as 
inappropriate responses to the advent of European nihilism, then the final question 
that remains, is what would actually constitute a more reasonable response to the 
current impasse? Having, in other words, elaborated those strategies which 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ would not choose to pursue in response to the advent of 
European nihilism, it is now necessary to investigate what exactly Nietzsche had in 
mind when he referred to these ‘good Europeans’ whom he hoped might come about 
in the future, and who would, in his view, engage in a more honest and sensible 
confrontation with the advent of European nihilism. The task of this chapter, 
therefore, is to delineate in greater detail what Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘good 
Europeans’ entails, and to probe whether Nietzsche’s corpus really is, as two scholars 
have recently suggested, “too culture-bound, too excessively European” for thinking 
about the idea of Europe in the contemporary context.1 For, it may well turn out that 
such an assessment is premature. Indeed, what emerges from such an investigation is 
a conception of a ‘good European’ that transcends the logic of nationalism without, 
however, simply replicating the logic of incomplete nihilism on an even larger scale. 
Rather, Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good European’ is one who pursues a strategy of a 
more complete nihilism and thereby opens up a conceptual space in the contemporary 
debate on Europe that does not posit an essentialist idea of Europe, and that 
nevertheless does not fall back onto a merely technical and functional approach to 
European governance.
1 “After all,” they further point out, “he was a classicist, who specialised in Greek literature and 
philosophy, and an admirer o f Rome; he did not open his eyes to Africa or the Orient; Venice is as 
close to China as he ever got, and German translations are as close as he came to Huckleberry Finn." 
David Farrell Krell and Donald L. Bates. The Good European: Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and 
Image. Chicago and London: The University o f Chicago Press, 1997, p. 1. For similar assessments see 
Paul Liitzeler. Die Schriftsteller und Europa: Von der Romantik bis zur Gegenwart. Munich: Piper, 
1992, p. 200 and Ofelia Schutte “Nietzsche’s Cultural Politics: A Critique.” The Southern Journal o f  
Philosophy. Vol. XXXVII Supplement. 1999: 65-71. It should not be overlooked, however, that 
Nietzsche was very knowledgeable about Oriental as well as Indian philosophy.
185
1. Complete Nihilism
In the first instance, Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans,’ or ‘free spirits’ as he also 
frequently referred to them, are distinguished by their unwillingness to erect new idols 
in order to replace the old God that has ‘died.’2 Any such attempt to replace the ‘dead 
God’ with a new idol would, in Nietzsche’s view, constitute a form of incomplete 
nihilism which, as Martin Heidegger pointed out in his study of Nietzsche, seeks to 
“replace the former values with others, but it still posits the latter always in the old 
position of authority that is, as it were, gratuitously maintained as the ideal realm of 
the suprasensory.” The attempt to erect new idols in the aftermath of the ‘death of 
God’ is likely to simply replicate this logic of ascetic ideals that traditionally 
accompanied Europe’s Christian-Platonic cultural heritage. This logic, moreover, 
remains problematic for Nietzsche not only because it is intellectually unconvincing 
in the aftermath of the ‘death of God,’ but also because it is ultimately still premised, 
like its Christian predecessor, on a resentful attitude towards existence. In addition to 
these criticisms of incomplete nihilism made by Nietzsche himself, moreover, it is 
also possible, with the benefit of hindsight, to add an additional objection to such 
strategies of incomplete nihilism. For, these very strategies were also implicated in the 
violent conflicts that contributed towards Europe’s division in the course of the 
twentieth century and against the background of which the institutional project of 
Europe was initiated. As Chapter 3 argued, often it was precisely the attempt to 
reconstitute a greater form of meaning which served to fuel many of the violent 
conflicts that hindered the unity of Europe in the course of the twentieth century. 
While not having experienced these conflicts himself, Nietzsche had nevertheless 
realised in relation to incomplete nihilism, not only that “we live in the midst of it” 
but also that such “[ajttempts to escape nihilism without revaluing our values so far:
2 Nietzsche often used the expression ‘good Europeans’ and ‘free spirits’ interchangeably. In the 
preface to Beyond Good and Evil, for example, Nietzsche refers to “we good Europeans and free, very 
free spirits....” Friedrich Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f  the Future. 
Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1966, Preface, p. 3. See also Henning Ottmann. 
Philosophie und Politik bei Nietzsche. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1987, p. 125 and Josef Nolte. Wir 
guten Europaer: Historisch-politische Versuche iiber uns selbst. Tubingen: Narr, 1991, p. 202. 
Nietzsche, moreover, continues to accord his notion o f a ‘good European’ a central role until his 
collapse in 1889. See Nolte, Wir Guten Europaer, p. 203.
3 Martin Heidegger “Nietzsche’s Word God is dead” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt: New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 69.
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they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute.”4 Or, as he put it more 
succinctly, “[t]he fight against [nihilism] strengthens it.”5 And yet, as the previous 
two chapters have sought to demonstrate, both the spread of nationalist ideas, as well 
as the attempt to counter this trend by articulating a more meaningful idea of Europe, 
still constitute contemporary examples of precisely such strategies of incomplete 
nihilism which Nietzsche sought to resist.
In light of this critique of incomplete nihilism, then, Nietzsche’s ‘good 
Europeans’ are also likely to refuse to partake in an engagement with the advent of 
European nihilism that consists of positing new idols that are ultimately derived from 
Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage. Indeed, Nietzsche himself wrote quite explicitly 
that “[n]o new idols are erected by me; let the old ones learn what feet of clay mean.”6 
What is more, he insisted, “we men o f conscience who do not want to return to that 
which is outlived and decayed, to anything ‘unworthy of belief,’ be it called God, 
virtue, truth, justice, charity; we do not permit ourselves any bridges-of-lies to ancient 
ideals; we are hostile to every kind of faith and Christianness existing today; hostile to 
all romanticism and fatherland-worship.”7 Nor did Nietzsche himself want to be 
considered a new idol. If anything, he counselled his readers to be suspicious of him, 
which is why, for example, he had Zarathusta famously instruct his listeners to:
[g]o away from me and resist Zarathustra! And even better: be ashamed of  
him! Perhaps he deceived you ... One repays a teacher badly if  one always 
wants to remain nothing but a pupil. And why do you not want to pluck at 
my wreath? ... You say you believe in Zarathustra? But what matters 
Zarathustra? You are my believers -  but what matter all believers? You 
had not yet sought yourselves: and you found me. Thus do all believers; 
therefore all faith amounts to little.8
4 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1968, 28, p. 19.
5 Friedrich Nietzsche. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, KSA 12, 
5[57], p. 206.
6 Friedrich Nietzsche. Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random 
House, 1967, Preface, 2, pp. 217-218.
7 Friedrich Nietzsche. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices o f  Morality. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982, Preface, 4, p. 4.
8 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Preface, 4, p. 220.
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In fact, for Nietzsche the ability to dissent was the really great achievement of 
European culture, as well as the most important “step of all steps for the free spirit.”9 
In his view, however, Pauline Christianity had largely denied precisely this 
possibility, which is why he insisted all the more that “[i]t is a matter of course with 
me, from instinct. I am too inquisitive, too questionable, too exuberant to stand for 
any gross answer. God is a gross answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers -  at bottom 
merely a gross prohibition for us: you shall not think!”10 By way of analogy, the 
invitation to see the nation, or even the idea of Europe, as the highest source of 
meaning in European existence would constitute yet another ‘gross’ answer, a 
prohibition against critical reflection. Instead of recommending any such strategy of 
incomplete nihilism to the ‘good Europeans’ who he hoped might emerge in future, 
Nietzsche extolled instead the benefit of pursuing a strategy of complete nihilism.
What does such a strategy of complete nihilism entail? In the case of a strategy 
of complete nihilism, Nietzsche argued, the deeper implications of the advent of 
European nihilism are accepted, and there is subsequently no eager attempt to escape 
these implications.11 A strategy of complete nihilism, in other words, proceeds not by 
rejecting of the advent of nihilism in European culture, but with the recognition that it 
must rather take this development as its starting point. It is also precisely this strategy 
of complete nihilism which Nietzsche recommended to the ‘good Europeans.’ “One 
could conceive,” Nietzsche noted in this vein, “of such pleasure and power of self- 
determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith 
and every wish for certainty, being practised in maintaining himself on insubstantial 
ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the free  
spirit par excellence.”12 Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans,’ then, would opt to accept the 
implications of the advent of European nihilism, i.e. the collapse of the highest values 
hitherto, rather than trying to legislate new values or idols in the quest to fill the 
vacuum left behind by the ‘death of God.’
9 “Das Widersprechen-Konnen ... ist das eigentlich Grosse, Neue, Erstaunliche unserer Kultur -  der 
Schritt aller Schritte des befreiten Geistes.” From the Aphorismensammlung ‘Sanctus Januarius.’ Cited 
in Nolte, Wir guten Europaer, p. 141.
10 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Why I Am So Clever,” 1, p. 236.
11 See, for example, David Toole. Waiting fo r Godot in Sarajevo: Theological Reflections on Nihilism, 
Tragedy and Apocalypse. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998, p. 37.
12 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974, 
347, p. 290.
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Indeed, the ‘good Europeans’ were deemed by Nietzsche to be ‘free spirits’ 
precisely in the sense that they no longer believed that there was a need for a greater
meaning or purpose underlying European existence. “What alone can be our
doctrine?” Nietzsche asked, and replied:
[t]hat no one gives man his qualities -  neither God, nor society, nor his 
parents and ancestors, nor he himself.... No one is responsible for man’s 
being there at all, for his being such and such, .... The fatality o f  his 
essence is not to be disentangled from the fatality o f all that has been and 
will be. Man is not the effect o f some special purpose, o f a will, an end.13
And, indeed, for Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ and ‘free spirits’ “the demand for 
certainty is not ... the inmost craving and the deepest need ....” Rather, Nietzsche 
recommended to them instead “the magic of the opposite way of thinking, not to be 
denied the stimulation of the enigmatic character.”14 He insisted, furthermore, that 
their starting point would have to be a “[d]eep aversion towards resting once and for 
all in any total interpretation of the world.” 15 In addition, then, to having understood 
the deeper implications of the ‘death of God,’ and in addition to their criticism of a 
nationalist response to European nihilism, Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ are 
distinguished, in the first instance, by their preference of a strategy of complete 
nihilism which accepts the deeper implications of the advent of European nihilism 
described in Chapter 2. This second and deeper phase of Nietzsche’s genealogy of 
European nihilism entails the first phase, i.e. the challenge of Christianity through 
modem science, but it also extends further in the sense that it additionally recognises 
the problematic nature of the will-to-truth itself. Within the context of this second 
phase all ideals now seem incommensurate, including that of modem science within 
the context of which the will-to-truth still remains operational.
13 Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight o f  the Idols and The Antichrist. Trans. R. J. Hollingdale. London: 
Penguin, 1990, ‘The Four Great Errors,” 8, p. 65.
14 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 2[155], p. 142. What is more, he insisted, 
“[o]ne should not let oneself be misled: great intellects are sceptics.” Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 54, p. 
184.
15 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 470, p. 262.
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2. Nietzsche -  A Nihilist ?
Does this adoption of a more complete form of nihilism by the ‘good 
Europeans’ not mean, however, that their position is also inherently nihilistic? The 
Czech philosopher Jan Patocka, for example, has suggested that “Nietzsche’s offense 
against contemporary European civilisation as nihilistic ... [is] itself nihilistic....”16 
By way of analogy, are Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans,’ by advocating a more 
complete form of nihilism, not similarly caught in the midst of a debilitating nihilism 
that is incapable of believing in anything? In response to this question it must be 
noted that Nietzsche himself, in fact, anticipated this very question. In The Genealogy 
o f Morals, for example, Nietzsche thought that he might well be asked: “What are you 
really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?” Nietzsche replied, however, 
with the following response: “But have you ever asked yourselves sufficiently how 
much the erection of every ideal on earth has cost? How much reality had to be 
misunderstood and slandered, how many lies have had to be sanctified every time? If 
an ideal is to be erected an ideal must be destroyed: that is the law! -  let anyone who 
can show me a case in which it is not fulfilled!”17 According to Nietzsche, in other 
words, it is not clear that those who erect and propagate ascetic ideals in the aftermath 
of the ‘death of God’ have also attained the moral high ground. For, Nietzsche argued, 
it is precisely in the quest to erect new ideals -  be they national, European, or 
otherwise -  that the diversity of existence is reduced and, to varying degrees, 
destroyed. In this sense, the erection of ascetic ideals itself destroys what for 
Nietzsche is an ideal of a very different kind, namely an existence which resists being 
encompassed by such ascetic ideals.
In a second passage, moreover, Nietzsche again demonstrated that he was very 
aware of the question of whether he is a nihilist, noting that “I have tried to deny 
everything. Oh, tearing down is easy, but constructing!” Yet, he does not proceed to 
address it before pointing out to his readers that “even tearing down seems easier than
16 Jan Patocka. “Europe and the European Heritage until the End o f the Nineteenth Century” in 
Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History. Trans. Erazim Kohak. Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 
93.
17 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Genealogy o f  Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New  
York: Random House, 1967, II, 24, p. 95.
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it is: we are so determined down to the heart’s core by the impressions of our 
childhood, the influence of our parents, and our upbringing, that those deeply rooted 
prejudices are not so readily eradicated by rational arguments or mere force of will.”18 
Thus, the Christian-Platonic conviction, for example, that ascetic ideals are utterly 
necessary for human felicity, was so ingrained in European culture that a pervasive 
critique of such values was, in itself, no small achievement. It is worth noting, 
therefore, that irrespective of whether Nietzsche presents a generally acceptable 
alternative in the contemporary debate on Europe, his critique of prevailing patterns 
of thinking remains, at least in his own view, a formidable intellectual achievement.
With these caveats in mind, then, it is possible to turn more explicitly towards 
the question of whether Nietzsche was, in the end, a nihilist. The view that Nietzsche 
was indeed such a nihilist was put forward in a forceful manner in 1965 by Arthur 
Danto in his book Nietzsche as Philosopher,19 In his book Danto concludes that 
“Nietzsche’s is a philosophy of Nihilism.”20 If Danto is correct, then there is little 
hope that Nietzsche can assist the contemporary scholar of International Relations in 
successfully addressing the problem of European nihilism. Indeed, if  Nietzsche’s
work does mark such “a deep and total Nihilism”21 which “is not an ideology but a
00 • metaphysics,” then Nietzsche’s corpus might have to be abandoned in the attempt to
come to terms with the problem of European nihilism. Importantly, however, there is
a substantial amount of evidence within Nietzsche’s own corpus to suggest that,
contrary to the argument of Danto and others, Nietzsche neither considered himself,
O'!
nor his idea of the ‘good Europeans,’ to be nihilistic.
A review of Nietzsche’s references to nihilism does, of course, reveal that 
there are a few passages which, upon a cursory reading, might convey the impression 
that he did consider himself to be a nihilist. Thus, in his posthumously published
18 Krell and Bates, The Good European, pp. 31-32.
19 Arthur Danto. Nietzsche as Philosopher. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
20 Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 80. Danto uses the term ‘Nihilism’ in the upper case to 
emphasise the centrality o f this notion to Nietzsche’s corpus.
21 Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 31.
22 Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, p. 30.
23 Richard Schacht has gathered much o f this textual evidence in his essay “Nietzsche and Nihilism: 
Nietzsche and Danto’s Nietzsche” in Making Sense o f  Nietzsche: Reflections Timely and Untimely. 
Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1995, p. 37. The subsequent account, therefore, draws 
substantially on his essay.
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notes from The Will to Power, for example, Nietzsche wrote that “it is the measure of 
strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves, without perishing, the merely 
apparent character [of things], the necessity of lies. To this extent, nihilism, as the 
denial of a truthful world, of being, might be a divine way of thinking.”24 In other 
notes Nietzsche also argued that nihilism can be a form of strength. Nietzsche wrote, 
for example, how “[njihilism ... can be a sign of strength: the spirit may have grown 
so strong that previous goals ... have become incommensurate.” Furthermore, “[i]t 
could be a sign of a crucial and most essential growth ... that the most extreme form 
of pessimism, genuine nihilism, would come into the world.” With reference to 
himself, Nietzsche even observed, “[t]hat I have hitherto been a thorough-going 
nihilist, I have admitted to myself only recently.”27 Finally, in the preface to this 
planned, but abandoned, book Nietzsche also intended to refer to himself quite 
explicitly as “the first perfect nihilist of Europe.”
Despite these pronouncement by Nietzsche himself, however, there is also 
much evidence to suggest that Nietzsche nevertheless did not consider himself to be a 
nihilist. After all, of the copious remarks that Nietzsche did make on the subject of 
nihilism, these are the only ones that can be used in support of the view that Nietzsche 
actually considered himself to be a nihilist.29 What is more, in the preface to his 
planned book The Will to Power, where these notes appear, Nietzsche also remarked 
that “one should make no mistake about the meaning of the title that this gospel of the 
future wants to bear, lThe Will to Power: An Attempt at a Revaluation o f  All Values' -  
in this formulation a countermovement finds expression, regarding both principle and
9 30task: a movement that in some future will take the place o f  this perfect nihilism.” 
The goal of Nietzsche’s intellectual endeavour, in other words, can be seen to be that 
of moving beyond the experience of European nihilism. What is more, whenever 
Nietzsche did refer to himself as a nihilist, he always did so in the past tense, or 
pointed out the he had subsequently moved beyond being one. Thus, when Nietzsche, 
for example, referred to himself as “the first perfect nihilist of Europe,” the passage
24 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 15, p. 15.
25 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 23, pp. 17-18.
26 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 112, p. 69.
27 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 25, p. 18.
28 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Preface, 3, p. 3.
29 Schacht, Making Sense o f  Nietzsche, p. 36.
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continues to point out that he is one “who, however, has even now lived through the 
whole of nihilism, to the end, leaving it behind, outside himself.”31 Similarly, when 
Nietzsche claimed that he has hitherto been a nihilist, he means precisely that, he once 
saw himself as a nihilist but no longer does so.
One must also, however, be sceptical of whether Nietzsche ultimately 
understood himself to be a nihilist in light of the many critical comments that he 
made about nihilism and nihilists. “Nihilism,” Nietzsche maintains, “represents a 
pathological transitional stage (what is pathological is the tremendous generalisation, 
the inference that there is no meaning at all).”32 In The Will to Power, furthermore, 
Nietzsche also notes how “[t]he nihilistic movement is merely the expression of 
physiological decadence.”33 What is more, Nietzsche’s critical attitude towards 
nihilism is also demonstrated by the fact that he locates its origins in the Christian- 
moral interpretation of existence for which he had great distaste: “It is in one 
particular interpretation, the Christian-moral one, that nihilism is rooted.”34 Indeed, he 
added, “[t]he belief in ... aim and meaninglessness, is the psychologically necessary 
effect once the belief in God and an essentially moral order becomes untenable. 
Nihilism appears at that po in t.... One interpretation has collapsed; but because it was 
considered the interpretation, it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in
existence ” This “as if,” moreover, is of crucial importance. Indeed, and as will
emerge below, in Nietzsche’s view this conclusion is, in fact, premature.
The fact that Nietzsche did not consider himself to be a nihilist and that he 
indeed wished to move beyond the experience of nihilism is further supported by 
many of his published writings as well. Thus, in Beyond Good and Evil, for example, 
Nietzsche was moved to remark that “there may actually be puritanical fanatics of 
conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain something to lie down 
on -  and die. But this is nihilism and the sign of a despairing, mortally weary soul.”
30 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Preface, 4, p. 3.
31 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Preface, 3, p. 3.
32 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 13, p. 14.
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 38, p. 24.
34 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 1, p. 7.
35 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 55, p. 35.
36 Schacht, Making Sense o f  Nietzsche, p. 37.
37 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 10, p. 16.
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In the Antichrist Nietzsche made yet another dismissive comment on nihilism, noting 
that: “[s]ome have dared to call pity a virtue.... To be sure -  and one should always 
keep this in mind -  this was done by a philosophy that was nihilistic and had inscribed 
negation o f  life upon its shield.”38 In light of such passages it is necessary to 
reinterpret the initial remarks that Nietzsche made and which have led some 
commentators to conclude that Nietzsche was in fact a nihilist.39 Rather, what 
Nietzsche seems to be conveying in such passages is that nihilism has arrived in 
European culture and that its arrival is, based on his analysis of Christianity, to some 
extent necessary and inevitable. When Nietzsche does affirm nihilism, therefore, he 
does it not for its own sake, but only as a necessary first step in revaluing traditional 
European culture. Nihilism thus brings with it new possibilities and it is these 
possibilities rather than nihilism itself which Nietzsche occasionally embraces.
Finally, the conclusion that Nietzsche does not consider himself to be a nihilist 
is also corroborated by his critical stance towards the ‘last man.’ It is the ‘last man’ 
which, in Nietzsche’s account, has forfeited the question of meaning in return for 
material gratification. A society composed of these ‘last men,’ it will be recalled from 
Chapter 4, is one which is content to aim primarily at its self-preservation.40 Indeed, 
as Michel Haar notes in this regard, the last man is “a will satisfied with 
meaninglessness, with non-sense, a will happy that there is no longer any sense or any 
meaning to look for, a will having found a certain comfort in the total absence of 
meaning and a certain happiness in the certainty that there is no answer to the 
question ‘why?’”41 It is an existence in which the advent of European nihilism has 
shifted from the ‘anxious inequietude’ of the ‘madman’ to the much more complacent 
quietude of the ‘last man.’42 In doing so, moreover, the ‘last man’ is, in Nietzsche’s 
view, not true to the entire array of human experience presented to him by Europe’s 
heritage. On the one hand, then, Nietzsche is indeed critical of the highest values that 
have traditionally directed European culture. On the other hand, however, he similarly
38 Nietzsche, Antichrist, 7, p. 130.
39 Schacht, Making Sense o f  Nietzsche, p. 37.
40 Cited in Keith Ansell-Pearson. An Introduction to Nietzsche as Political Thinker: The Perfect 
Nihilist. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 105-106.
41 Michel Haar. “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language” in David B. Allison (ed.) The New Nietzsche. 
New York: Dell, 1977, p. 13.
42 Michel Haar. Nietzsche and Metaphysics. Trans. Michael Gendre. Albany: State University o f New  
York Press, 1996, p. 11.
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does not wish to abandon the inner space and distance that this tradition has instilled 
upon Europeans. For, despite his criticism of Christianity as slave morality, Nietzsche 
nevertheless granted that, historically, it constituted the soil upon which “man first 
became an interesting animal, ... only here did the human soul in a higher sense 
acquire depth and become evil....”43 The attempt to simply refuse the question of 
meaning, as the ‘last man’ does, would, in Nietzsche’s account, be just as nihilistic as 
the postulating of ascetic ideals resentful of earthly existence. There is, then, 
substantial evidence amongst Nietzsche’s corpus to suggest that he did not consider 
himself, nor his idea of the ‘good Europeans’ which he advanced, to be nihilistic.
Nor, for that matter, did Nietzsche seem to think that his strategy of a more 
complete form of nihilism would necessarily deliver the ‘good Europeans’ into the 
nihilistic predicament of the ‘last man.’ As he writes in a passage from the preface to 
Beyond Good and Evil which is worth quoting at some length:
But the fight against Plato or, to speak more clearly and for ‘the people,’ 
the fight against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure o f millennia -  for 
Christianity is Platonism for ‘the people,’ -  has created in Europe a 
magnificent tension o f the spirit the like o f which had never yet existed on 
earth: with so tense a bow we can now shoot for the most distant goals. To 
be sure, European man experiences this tension as need and distress; twice 
already attempts have been made in the grand style to unbend the bow -  
once by means of Jesuitism, the second time by means o f the democratic 
enlightenment which, with the aid o f freedom o f the press and newspaper- 
reading, might indeed bring it about that the spirit would no longer 
experience itself so easily as a ‘need.’ ... But we who are neither Jesuits 
nor democrats, nor even German enough, we good Europeans and free, 
very free spirits -  we still feel it, the whole need o f the spirit and the whole 
tension o f its bow. And perhaps also the arrow, the task, and -  who 
knows? -  the goal 44
In contradistinction to the ‘last man,’ then, Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ still 
recognise the inner depth cultivated by Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage. Indeed, 
while Nietzsche’s intellectual efforts sought to dispel all those idols which humans
43 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, I, 6, p 33.
44 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Preface, pp. 2-3
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had elevated above existence and which, in his view, often served to devalue earthly 
existence, Nietzsche did not desire, nor did he think, that in attacking these idols he 
left modem Europeans in the position of the ‘last man’ who forfeited a reflective 
depth about European existence. In fact, in Nietzsche’s view, the utter absence of a 
meaningful conception of European existence would be just as nihilistic as the 
positing of a metaphysical ideal divorced from earthly experience, and consequently 
he welcomed the abandonment of the human interpretation of its existence as little as 
he did the articulation of any ‘absolute’ forms of meaning.
How, though, does Nietzsche’s strategy of complete nihilism escape, in his 
view, the relapse into the scientific, materialistic and atheistic worldview of the ‘last 
man’? Is, moreover, Anthony Smith not correct when he notes that the new Europe’s 
tme dilemma is “a choice between unacceptable, historical myths and memories on 
the one hand, on the other a patchwork, memoryless scientific ‘culture’ held together 
solely by the political will and economic interest that are so often subject to 
change”?45 While a Nietzschean perspective would indeed find renewed European 
‘myths’ unacceptable, it does not necessarily fall back into this culture of 
‘meaningless,’ scientific governance. The reason why this is so, is that Nietzsche’s 
strategy actually works in the opposite direction from the one that predominates 
amongst Europeanists today. Rather than seeking to challenge the scientific and 
technical nature of European culture through the positing of renewed idols, 
Nietzsche’s strategy chooses to push what is already falling and to press ahead 
towards the second and even deeper phase of European nihilism already described in 
Chapter 2. Such a strategy of complete nihilism pushes ahead with the problem of 
European nihilism until it reaches the point where it exposes the underlying telos that 
remains even within the scientific understanding of existence. This deeper phase of 
nihilism, it will be recalled, entails the challenge of Christianity through modem 
science, but it also pushes ahead to the point where the will-to-truth puts itself into 
question, raising profound questions even about the status of modem science.
45 Anthony D. Smith. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” in Peter Gowan and Perry 
Anderson (eds.) The Question o f  Europe. London: Verso, 1997, p. 338.
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Indeed, in Nietzsche’s view, it was one of modem science’s great deceits to 
appear as meaninglessness and disinterested when, in fact, it was not. It will be 
recalled from Chapter 2, that Nietzsche argued instead that modem science, too, 
despite its claims to objectivity, still rests on the underlying value of truth, and that it 
is thus also part of the much longer will-to-truth that runs through large parts of the 
European tradition. As Nietzsche had argued, “[t]hat which constrains these men [the 
modem scientists], however, this unconditional will to truth, is faith in the ascetic 
ideal itself even if as an unconscious imperative -  don’t be deceived about that -  it is 
the faith in a metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth, sanctioned and 
guaranteed by this ideal alone (it stands or falls with this ideal).”46 Indeed, he insisted 
further, “[n]o doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is 
presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, 
nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this ‘other world’ -  look, must they not 
by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world?”47 In its own way, 
therefore, modem science too still retains its underlying telos, i.e. that of truth, and 
thus also constitutes a form of incomplete nihilism which seeks to escape the human 
world of flux and uncertainty.48 “[W]e men of knowledge of today,” Nietzsche wrote 
in this vein, “we godless men and anti-metaphysicians, we, too, still derive our flame 
from the fire ignited by a faith millennia old, the Christian faith, which was also 
Plato’s, that God is tmth, that truth is divine.”49 What is more, he concluded, these 
scientists and atheists “are far from being free  spirits: fo r  they still have faith in 
truth”50 Despite its appearance to the contrary, then, modem science still constitutes 
an ascetic ideal. Indeed, Nietzsche insisted, “this ‘modem science’ -  let us face the 
fact!- is the best ally the ascetic ideal has at present, and precisely because it is the 
most unconscious, involuntary, hidden, and subterranean ally!”51 This also means, 
moreover, that the worldview and methods of modem science are not beyond 
Nietzsche’s critique. Indeed it is very much in need of critique, as are, according to
46 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 151.
47 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 344, pp. 282-283.
48 See also Elisabeth Kuhn. Friedrich Nietzsches Philosophie des europaischen Nihilismus. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter, 1992, p. 244.
49 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 152.
50 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 150.
51 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 25, p. 155.
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Nietzsche’s strategy of complete nihilism, all other forms incomplete nihilism. “Free 
spirits,” Nietzsche concluded in this vein, “take liberties even with science.”52
Nietzsche thus also went to great lengths to illuminate the harmful 
consequences that might ensue from putting the primacy of meaning in the realm of 
modem science. In Beyond Good and Evil, for example, Nietzsche noted that science 
and technology in the modem era, as much as religions and moralities in the past, “do 
not want to be a means of education and cultivation in the philosopher’s hand but 
insist on having their own sovereign way, when they themselves want to be ultimate 
ends and not means among other means.”53 Moreover, in section 373 of The Gay 
Science Nietzsche asks his readers whether:
we really want to permit existence to be degraded for us like this -  reduced 
to a mere exercise for a calculator and an indoor diversion for 
mathematicians? Above all, one should wish to divest existence o f its rich 
ambiguity: that is a dictate of good taste.... That the only justifiable 
interpretation o f the world should be one in which you  are justified because 
one can continue to work hard and do research scientifically, in your sense 
(you really mean, mechanically?) -  an interpretation that permits counting, 
calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching, and nothing more -  that is a 
crudity and naivete, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy.... A 
‘scientific’ interpretation o f the world, as you understand it, might 
therefore still be one o f the most stupid o f all possible interpretations o f the 
world, meaning that it would be one o f the poorest in meaning.. ..”54
Nietzsche’s strategy of complete nihilism, then, also clearly extends into the realm of 
modem science. It is also in this way, moreover, that Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘good 
European’ who engages in a strategy of complete nihilism cannot, strictly speaking, 
be said to fall back on a merely scientific world-view. If anything, Nietzsche’s 
critique of modem science does much to alleviate the modem experience of 
meaninglessness because the more subtle understanding of the nature of modem
52 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 180, p. 203. This is, however, not to say that they would abandon the 
scientific spirit altogether. Thus, in one of his letters, Nietzsche wrote that “Europe is necessary for me 
because it is the seat o f science on the earth.” KSB 7:773. Cited in Laurence Lampert. ‘“Peoples and 
Fatherlands’: Nietzsche’s Philosophical Politics.” The Southern Journal o f  Philosophy. Vol. XXXVII 
(Supplement) 1999: 43-63, p. 44.
53 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 62, p. 74.
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science also serves to lessen the impact and authority of the claims of modem science 
and its status as a cultural force in modem Europe. Nietzsche’s strategy thus also puts 
him outside Anthony Smith’s characterisation; his strategy of a more complete 
nihilism leads neither to the articulation of new myths, nor does it merely collapse 
into a scientific and technical worldview. Rather, it seeks to expose the myths that 
underlie both strategies, even the endeavours of modem science. Not only, then, did 
Nietzsche consider himself not to be a nihilist, but he also did not think that the 
strategy of complete nihilism which the ‘good Europeans’ were to pursue, would lead 
them into a nihilistic predicament.
To recapitulate, the two defining characteristics of the ‘good Europeans’ 
delineated by Nietzsche so far are, firstly, that they recognise the advent of European 
nihilism and accept its profound implications and, secondly, that, in responding to this 
development, they do not seek articulate new idols to replace the ‘old God.’ In 
Nietzsche’s account, moreover, such a strategy of complete nihilism does not leave 
the ‘good Europeans’ in the situation described by Nietzsche under the heading of the 
‘last man’ and which Nietzsche found to be nihilistic in the sense that it no longer 
believed in a deeper meaning underlying European existence. Indeed, the way in 
which the ‘good European’ remains distinct from the ‘last men’ is, in the first 
instance, through the former’s appreciation of Europe’s longer Christian-Platonic 
heritage as well as an appreciation for the ‘spiritual depth’ it cultivated amongst 
Europeans. It is this depth, moreover, which, in contradistinction to the ‘last men,’ 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ wish to retain. In the second instance, moreover, 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ also differ from the perspective of the ‘last man’ in that 
they find the latter position untenable, or at least contradictory. For, according the 
strategy of complete nihilism advocated by the ‘good Europeans,’ the conviction of 
the ‘last man’ that there is no greater meaning underlying existence is, paradoxically, 
itself still based on a metaphysical principle, namely that of truth. “Unconditional 
honest atheism,” Nietzsche noted in this vein, is '‘'‘not the antithesis of that ideal [the 
will to truth], as it appears to be; it is rather only one of the latest phases of its 
evolution, one of its terminal forms and inner consequences.. ..”55 Contrary to the ‘last
54 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 373, p. 335.
55 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 27, p. 160.
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men,’ in other words, the ‘good Europeans’ recognise that the incredulity which the 
‘last men’ display towards metaphysics following the ‘death of God’ itself still rests 
on a metaphysical value. In this way, the strategy of complete nihilism adopted by 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ also does not deliver them into the condition of the 
‘last man.’
What nevertheless still remains to be investigated, however, is how the ‘good 
Europeans’ can both accept and embrace a strategy of complete nihilism, one which is 
pervasive enough to extend even into the realm of modem science, and yet still 
consider this strategy to be an affirmative one that escapes the pitfalls of a debilitating 
nihilism. Indeed, as Richard Schacht openly concedes in relation to Danto’s account, 
“the logical illegitimacy of the generalisation [that Nietzsche is a nihilist] by itself 
does not serve to establish that some other interpretation of the world is in fact either 
possible or correct; and it remains to be seen what Nietzsche intends to propose along 
these lines.”56 The question that Nietzsche still faces, in other words, is how one can 
overcome the experience of nihilism without actually falling back on substituting 
ideals that themselves remain nihilistic.57 In order to illuminate how the strategy of a 
more complete nihilism pursued by the ‘good Europeans’ can still be an affirmative 
one, Nietzsche introduced one final distinction into his analysis of complete nihilism, 
namely that between passive nihilism and active nihilism. It is to a consideration of 
this distinction that the next two sections turn.
3. Europe’s Passive Nihilism
In Nietzsche’s account, both passive and active nihilism are forms of complete 
nihilism. Contrary to strategies of incomplete nihilism, therefore, strategies of passive 
and active nihilism both readily accept the implications of ‘death of God,’ i.e. that 
new idols based on the will-to-truth are no longer intellectually credible. Despite this 
shared assessment, however, passive and active strategies of nihilism also differ from 
each other in their respective responses to this realisation. Nietzsche associated the 
former type of complete nihilism, i.e. passive nihilism, with the pessimism of
56 Schacht, Making Sense o f  Nietzsche, p. 39.
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Schopenhauer.58 Passive nihilism, Nietzsche argued, is the nihilism that despairs upon 
recognising the implications of the ‘death of God.’ In Nietzsche’s view, moreover, it 
was also precisely this ‘passive’ and pessimistic form of complete nihilism that was 
the most likely to prevail in Europe following the ‘death of God.’ Alan Schrift has 
described Nietzsche’s notion of passive nihilism in greater detail, noting that “[a]s a 
symptom of decline, ‘passive nihilism’ is the expression of a weary, exhausted will 
which has searched in vain to locate the highest values: aim, unity, Being. Having 
grown dissatisfied with the unsuccessful search for these highest values, passive 
nihilism devalues not only these values but goes on to devalue the world as well, 
insofar as the world ought to have manifested these values.”59 It is an assessment 
shared by William Connolly, who has similarly pointed out that “[t]he passive nihilist 
admits the inability to ground his highest values in a transcendent standard, but this 
admission leads him to devalue this world, to despise the world because it has 
deserted his ideals. ... He becomes passive, withdrawn, pessimistic.”60 Passive 
nihilism thus refers to the nihilism of a spirit or culture too exhausted to do more than 
passively succumb to the emptiness that threatens to engulf it.61 Indeed, Nietzsche 
himself described how “[t]he strength of the spirit may be worn out, exhausted so that 
the previous goals and values have become incommensurate and no longer are 
believed.”62
It is, however, also precisely this passive form of complete nihilism which 
Nietzsche wished to single out and criticise and which would not be form of complete 
nihilism that his ‘good Europeans’ would pursue. “The nihilist’s eye,” Nietzsche 
noted in this vein, “idealises in the direction of ugliness.” Indeed, he considered this 
kind of nihilism to be dangerous for Europe given that it was reminiscent of the 
“nihilistic catastrophe that finished Indian culture.”64 In his view, the greatest danger 
with the passive form of complete nihilism is that it might lead to a severe “decline
57 Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, p. x.
58 Toole, Waiting fo r  Godot in Sarajevo, p. 37.
59 Alan D. Schrift. Nietzsche and the Question o f  Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction. London: Routledge, 1990, p. 56.
60 William E. Connolly. Political Theory and Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, p. 15.
61 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 22-23, pp. 17-18.
62 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 23, p. 18.
63 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 21, p. 17.
64 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 64, p. 43.
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and recession of the power of the spirit” marked by Hamlet-like inaction.65 In Beyond 
Good and Evil, for example, Nietzsche noted how the ‘death of God’ in Europe might 
lead to “the worship of the stone, stupidity, gravity, fate, the Nothing.... All of us 
already know something of this.”66 Interestingly, a consideration of the contemporary 
literature on the idea of Europe also reveals that much of the current debate on the 
idea of Europe actually emulates precisely this response to the inability to articulate a 
more meaningful idea of Europe. Many contemporary scholars of European affairs, in 
other words, have set out in the quest of seeking to distil an ‘aim’ or ‘unity’ to the 
European idea and, in their inability to identify a ‘higher purpose,’ a ‘clear identity,’ 
or a ‘common enterprise,’ to use Hoffmann’s criteria, have arrived at largely 
frustrated and pessimistic accounts of contemporary European culture. In doing so, 
moreover, they bear witness to the prevalence, in the contemporary debate, of the 
response of passive nihilism outlined by Nietzsche.
In order to understand why the conclusion reached by passive nihilists may 
nevertheless be premature, it is necessary to recall why, in Nietzsche’s view, 
Europeans are actually prone to understand the advent of European nihilism as 
discouraging and problematic. In Nietzsche’s account, it will be recalled from Chapter 
2, this pessimistic response of passive nihilism is likely to ensue because of Europe’s 
Christian-Platonic heritage which had accustomed European culture to positing a 
deeper meaning underlying all events. Implicit in Nietzsche’s account, therefore, is 
the crucial recognition that a pessimistic assessment of modem European culture is 
ultimately still derived from Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage itself. It is precisely 
by virtue of having previously judged existence on the basis of the Christian-Platonic 
standard which modem Europeans inherit, that modem European culture is largely 
interpreted as being meaningless and that the experience of nihilism emerges in 
modem Europe. “For why has the advent of nihilism become necessary ?” Nietzsche 
asked, and promptly replied, “[bjecause the values we have had hitherto thus draw 
their final consequence; because nihilism represents the ultimate logical conclusion of 
our great values and ideals -  because we must experience nihilism before we can find 
out what value these ‘values’ really had.” In Nietzsche’s view, the advent of passive
65 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 22, p. 17.
66 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 55, p. 67.
67 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Preface, 4, p. 4.
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nihilism was the price that Europeans had to pay for having been Christians for over 
two thousand years.
According to Nietzsche, then, the origins of the European experience of 
meaninglessness, or nihilism, are also not to be found primarily in the organisation of 
society, or the economic and political structures which govern it, but in its self- 
understanding. Indeed, in his view it was “an error to consider ‘social distress’ or 
‘physiological degeneration,’ or worse, corruption as the cause of nihilism.” For, 
Nietzsche maintained, this would be to mistake the symptoms of nihilism for its 
causes. Rather, he argued, “it is in one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral
/ • o
one, that nihilism is rooted.” The cause of the experience of nihilism, Nietzsche thus 
insisted, is the result of a particular interpretation of the world, and of human 
existence, which has governed the cultural horizon of occidental humanity for 
virtually two thousand years: the Christian-moral interpretation of the world. Once 
this heritage had become increasingly untenable in the European imagination, modem 
Europeans would habitually yearn for the lost form of meaning previously posited by 
Christianity, but would no longer be able to readily partake in it. The categories 
“‘aim,’ ‘unity,’ ‘being’ which we used to project some value into the world -  we pull 
out again; so the world looks valueless.”69 “One interpretation,” it will be recalled, 
“has collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation, it now seems as if 
there were no meaning in existence at all.”70
To Nietzsche, then, it was also quite comprehensible that many Europeans 
would find the advent of European nihilism to be a discouraging development in 
European culture. In this vein, he explained, for example, how in modem Europe “we 
can no longer believe those dogmas of religion and metaphysics, once we have the 
rigorous method of tmth in our hearts and heads,” and yet how “the development of 
mankind has made us so delicate, sensitive and ailing that we need the most potent 
kinds of cures and comforts -  hence arises the need that man might bleed to death
71 •from the tmth he has recognised. After having sought a ‘meaning’ m all events, and
68 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 1, p. 7.
69 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 12 A, p. 13.
70 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Book One, 55, p. 35.
71 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, Section Three, 109, p. 78.
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after having come to believe that some goal is to be achieved through the process, 
modem Europeans would subsequently find the revelation that there is no such 
meaning or goal as distressing and dissolving. In modem Europe, Nietzsche 
concluded, one “forbids oneself every kind of clandestine access to afterworlds and 
false divinities -  but cannot endure this world though one does not want to deny i t ”12 
This paralysis, moreover, can all too easily result in passive nihilism.
Importantly, however, the very fact that the desire to identify a deeper • 
meaning underlying European existence still derives from Europe’s Christian-Platonic 
heritage also means that this pessimistic conclusion is not the only one that can be 
drawn. “The philosophical nihilist,” Nietzsche insisted, “is convinced that all that 
happens is meaningless and in vain; and that there ought not to be anything 
meaningless and in vain.” “But,” he crucially intervened “whence this: there ought not 
to be? From where does one get this ‘meaning,’ this ‘standard’?”73 Thus, while the 
former attitude towards nihilism has predominated in the course of the twentieth 
century, and arguably still constitutes the most frequent response to the inability to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe, it is neither the only possible response, 
nor necessarily the preferable one. Indeed, Nietzsche himself was quite critical of this 
reaction to the advent of European nihilism.
This is particularly true, moreover, of his famous ‘madman’ passage in the 
Gay Science, of which so much of the contemporary literature lamenting the absence 
of an overarching idea of Europe is reminiscent. This passage of Nietzsche’s is meant 
precisely to capture the mood of passive nihilism. The passage is still symptomatic 
and diagnostic rather than prescriptive. In Nietzsche’s view, it does not, in fact, 
constitute the only, nor even the most appropriate response to the advent of European 
nihilism.74 As Robert Pippin notes, in this passage:
Nietzsche is clearly trying most of all to draw attention to, rather than 
express or identify with, the melancholic tone, both o f the announcement 
and perhaps of the coming culture o f melancholy that we noted above, the
72 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 12 A, p. 13.
73 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 36, p. 23.
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tone appropriate to the belief that a kind o f  death has occurred, that we 
were responsible, and that this death results only in some unbearable, 
frightening absence.75
While many commentators have taken this to be Nietzsche’s response to the advent of 
European nihilism, it is, in fact, precisely this mood which Nietzsche wishes to 
diagnose and address, rather than himself adopt or indeed prescribe to his ‘good 
Europeans.’
In retrospect, Section 125 of the Gay Science can thus also be seen as already 
containing, in symbolic form, both of the primary responses to the ‘crisis of meaning’ 
currently evident in the European debate. On the one hand, it entails the people in the 
market place who laugh at the madman, i.e. those who have given up the quest for 
meaning, settling instead for a scientific account of existence which aims mostly at 
material gratification and discards the ‘why’ question as being largely irrelevant, 
meaningless or unanswerable. It is this attitude that broadly corresponds to the 
functional approach to European integration which eschews overt question of 
meaning and focuses on piecemeal, functional co-operation. Importantly, however, 
this worldview is still, despite its appearance to the contrary, based on the will-to- 
truth of Europe’s longer Christian-Platonic heritage which remains operational within 
the realm of modem science and which now seems to expose all metaphysical ideals 
as unnecessary and incredible. It is this residual will-to-truth, moreover, which means 
that Nietzsche’s “good Europeans” distance themselves from this attitude.
On the other hand, this famous passage of Nietzsche’s also anticipates the 
more contemporary response in the European debate, i.e. the expression of despair 
and melancholy at the inability to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe that 
will enhance the legitimacy of the European institutions and provide the basis for a 
European identity capable of mitigating against the rise of nationalist and racist 
violence. This view, in turn, corresponds to the passive nihilism of the ‘madman’ 
recounted by Nietzsche in the passage. Initially, moreover, this view seems closer to
74 Robert B. Pippin. Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfaction o f  European High 
Culture. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p. 151.
75 Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem , p. 148.
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Nietzsche’s for, unlike the ‘last man,’ Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ did indeed 
understand the profound implications of the ‘death of God’ and wished to salvage the 
spiritual depth afforded by Europe’s Christian-Platonic tradition. Despite this 
proximity, however, this response too is not, in the end, that of the ‘good Europeans.’ 
For, unlike the passive nihilism of the ‘madman’ and the contemporary Europeanists 
cited in the introduction to this thesis, the recognition of the profound implications of 
the ‘death of God’ does not trigger amongst the ‘good Europeans’ the experience of 
melancholy and the corresponding desire for redemption from this event. Rather, it 
provokes amongst them a much more appreciative response which, in turn, manifests 
itself in the second and more active form of complete nihilism.
4. The Active Nihilism o f Nietzsche’s ‘Good Europeans’
In contrast to this predominantly pessimistic reaction to the advent of 
European nihilism, Nietzsche insisted instead that, at a minimum, the experience of 
complete nihilism is ‘ambiguous. ’ The advent of European nihilism, in other words, 
can indeed be a sign of a weakened spirit, but, at the same time, it can also be the sign 
of a strengthened spirit.77 It is, moreover, this latter aspect of nihilism as the sign of a 
strengthened spirit which Nietzsche, in turn, wished to emphasise. Much in this vein 
he wished to point towards a form of nihilism that does not succumb to passive 
resignation, but which rather takes a more active form instead. The aim, in turn, of 
this more active form of complete nihilism is, as David Toole explains, “to clear the 
way so that one can replace those values with new ones, not in the way that 
incomplete nihilism proposes, but with a vigor that in fact leads not only to new 
values but to a whole new conception of value itself. Gone, in other words, are the
78structures of authority so deeply imprinted by the tales of the suprasensory world.”
This active response to the ‘death of God’ which Nietzsche recommends to the 
‘good Europeans,’ moreover, is different from the previous and passive nihilism in 
that it additionally recognises the questionable character of the Christian-Platonic
76 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 22, p. 17.
77 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 22, p. 17.
78 Toole, Waiting fo r  Godot in Sarajevo, p. 37.
206
heritage itself and its understanding of existence. In the response of the more active 
nihilism, in other words, there is no prima facie reason why there should be a greater 
meaning underlying all events and consequently also no a priori reason why the 
inability to articulate such a greater meaning underlying European existence should 
necessarily lead to a pessimistic account of European culture. Conversely, there is 
also no initial reason why the inability to articulate an idea of Europe that delineates a 
‘higher purpose,’ a ‘clear identity,’ or a ‘common enterprise’ -  to use Hoffmann’s 
criteria -  should be a cause for great concern. Indeed, to claim the absence of meaning 
in contemporary Europe is, in Nietzsche’s account, still to judge European existence 
according to criteria which have themselves come under critical scrutiny in the 
aftermath of the ‘death of God’.79 It is, then, by recognising the questionable status of 
the Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage itself, that Nietzsche could insist that the 
pursuit of an active nihilism actually constitutes a sign of strengthened spiritual 
vitality, in the sense that “the spirit may have grown so strong that previous goals ...
O A
have become incommensurate.” “It could,” he insisted, “be the sign of a crucial and 
most essential growth, of the transition to new conditions of existence, that the most 
extreme form of pessimism, genuine nihilism, would come into the world.”81
Much in this vein, then, Nietzsche also invited his ‘good Europeans’ to 
recognise what he actually saw as the enormous liberating potential inherent in the 
advent of European nihilism, that nihilism could even signal a divine way of thinking. 
As Nietzsche noted in a posthumously published fragment from the Will to Power, 
“[t]he most extreme form of nihilism would be the view that every belief, every 
considering-something-true, is necessarily false, because there simply is no true 
world. Thus: a perspectival appearance whose origin lies in us (in so far as we 
continually need a narrower, abbreviated, simplified world).” Moreover, he concluded 
in this note, “it is the measure of strength to what extent we can admit to ourselves, 
without perishing, the merely apparent character, the necessity of lies. To this extent, 
nihilism, as the denial of a truthful world, of being, might be a divine way o f
79 In this sense it is interesting that it was Francis Bacon himself who once pointed out in relation to his 
revolutionary ideas, “I cannot be fairly asked to abide by the decision o f a tribunal which is itself on 
trial.” See the Preface o f Francis Bacon. The Great Instauration in Francis Bacon Works. Edited by J. 
Spedding, R. L. Ellis, and D. D. Heath. 14 vols. 1847-1874. New York: Garret Press, 1968. Cited in 
Laurence Lampert. Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996, p. 40.
80 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 23, pp. 17-18.
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thinking. Michael Haar further explains Nietzsche’s important reference to nihilism 
as a ‘divine way of thinking’ in greater detail, noting that “[n]ihilism is not overcome 
simply because the essential metaphysical distinction ceases to be of value. In order to 
transform ‘complete’ nihilism into ‘consummated’ nihilism ... it is necessary that we 
pass from a recognition of the dissolution to an active, an affirmative dissolution.” 
Indeed, Haar argues:
[t]he new affirmation includes an act o f destruction whereby all the 
relations issuing from the difference are destroyed. This unity o f creation 
and destruction at the core o f a force supremely affirmative (active 
nihilism) comprises a perspective that Nietzsche also calls ‘Dionysian’: the 
perspective o f the joyous, pure affirmation o f the unity o f  contraries. It is 
this latter sense -  namely an invalidation of all metaphysical differences 
and as a radical abolishment o f the ‘true world,’ as a negation o f the 
singular God (Christian representative o f the world) -  that ‘nihilism might 
indeed be a divine manner o f thinking’: delivered from the paralysis 
effected by the Singular, the creative instinct o f Multiple gods would be re­
animated. This ‘divine’ form o f nihilism prefigures and essential 
transition.83
Once this is realised, in Nietzsche’s account, there would be novel opportunities for 
the development of European culture which is why he also insisted that “from such 
abysses [of nihilism], from such severe sickness, also from the sickness of severe 
suspicion, one returns newborn ... with merrier senses, with a second dangerous 
innocence in joy, more childlike and yet a hundred times subtler than one has ever 
been before.”84
From this perspective, then, the advent of European nihilism is not even seen 
as a disaster. Rather, “[i]t must come, as the traditional world view must go, if a new 
world view is to take its place; and the fact that it is coming may be due at least in part 
to the fact that some feel strong enough to try to do without the traditional world 
view.”85 Indeed, Nietzsche pointed out how the advent of European nihilism was
81 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 112, p. 69.
82 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 15, pp. 14-15.
83 Haar, “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language,” pp. 15-16.
84 Nietzsche, Gay Science, Preface 4, p. 37.
85 Schacht, Making Sense o f  Nietzsche, p. 40.
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simultaneously a moment of the “the greatest courage” for Europeans,86 and how the 
‘death of God’ was “the most terrible, most questionable, and perhaps also the most 
hopeful of all spectacles.”87 Ultimately, Nietzsche even concluded that “I praise I do
o o
not reproach, its arrival.” Indeed, in the form of his ‘good Europeans,’ Nietzsche 
himself actually wished to encourage a countermovement which “will in some future 
or other slough off that consummate nihilism; and yet which presupposes it, logically 
and psychologically, and can actually only come to that nihilism and out of it.”89 It is, 
paradoxically, only by accepting and passing through the experience of nihilism that 
the feeling of meaninglessness may eventually cease to be experienced as distressing.
Nietzsche’s own invitation, then, to the ‘good Europeans’ whom he hoped 
might emerge in the future, was to pursue this more active strategy of complete 
nihilism, i.e. to see the arrival of nihilism as a new source of renewed strength for the 
‘European spirit.’ In the hands of the strongest, Nietzsche noted, nihilism “is only an 
additional hammer and tool with which to create a new set of wings.”90 Those who 
would take up this invitation, Nietzsche metaphorically referred to as ‘free spirits’ and 
‘good Europeans.’ Such an attitude and position, moreover, would constitute precisely 
the opposite of the passive nihilism of a weakened spiritual vitality, i.e. a more active 
nihilism of intellectual strength and creativity. In this vein, he also repeatedly referred 
to the positive aspects of the experience of nihilism, and emphasised the recovery it 
provides from previous constraints. A philosopher like himself, Nietzsche explained, 
“heals himself differently; he heals himself, for example, through nihilism. The belief 
that there is no truth, the nihilist belief, is a great stretching of the limbs for one who, 
as a warrior of knowledge, incessantly lies in battle with hateful truths.”91 One of 
Nietzsche’s most important insights, then, about the nature of European nihilism was 
that, despite the fact that it is often experience, and continues to be experienced, as 
disquieting and disorienting, it also entails a vastly creative and liberating potential, 
both intellectually and spiritually. Indeed, Nietzsche insisted, one now realises that 
“[b]ecoming must be explained without recourse to final intentions.... Becoming does
86 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 2[129] p. 128.
87 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 27, p. 161.
88 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887-1889, KSA 13, 11 [119], p. 56.
89 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Preface, 4, pp. 3-4.
90Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 2[101], p. 111.
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not aim at a final state, does not flow into ‘being.’”92 Once this potential within the 
experience of European nihilism is recognised, moreover, Europe’s Christian-Platonic 
heritage could be increasingly left behind, enabling new opportunities to eventually 
open themselves up for European culture.93
The response of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ to the onset of European 
nihilism is, therefore, also quite different from the attitude displayed by many of the 
contemporary scholars and drawn attention to at the outset of this thesis. For, this 
response is not formulated in the pessimistic and melancholic tone frequently 
encountered in the debate on the idea of Europe today. Rather, Nietzsche noted in the 
Gay Science how this response to the experience of nihilism is “not at all sad and 
gloomy, but rather like a new, difficult to describe kind of light, happiness, relief, 
amusement, encouragement, dawn....” He added, moreover, that “we philosophers 
and ‘free spirits’ feel, when we hear the news that ‘the old god is dead,’ as if  a new 
dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonition, 
expectation. At long last the horizon appears free to us again.”94 Nietzsche’s own 
response to the ‘death of God,’ in short, was one o f ‘cheerfulness.’95
In Nietzsche’s own view, then, the task for modem Europeans is to cultivate 
an attitude towards European nihilism as a creative strength and appropriate it as a 
tool assisting in a comprehensive revaluation and rejuvenation of European culture. It 
is also precisely this attitude of openness inherent in a strategy of active nihilism, 
moreover, which Nietzsche singled out as the last defining characteristic of the ‘good 
Europeans.’ Indeed, he insisted, “[w]e are, in one word -  and let this be our word of 
honour -  good Europeans, the heirs of Europe, the rich, oversupplied, but also overly 
obligated heirs of thousands of years of European spirit.”96 These ‘good Europeans’
91 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1887-1889, KSA, 13, 11[108], p. 51. Note Trans. Carr, The 
Banalization o f  Nihilism, p. 44.
92 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 708, p. 377.
93 As Nietzsche noted in the Gay Science. “A dangerous resolve. — The Christian resolve to find the 
world ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad.” 130, p. 185.
94 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 343, p. 280.
95 In 1886 Nietzsche thus also added a fifth book to The Gay Science. The first aphorism o f Section V 
(343) is written under the heading “The Meaning o f Our Cheerfulness’ and notes how “[t]he greatest 
recent event - that ‘God is dead,’ that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable -  is 
already beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe.”
96 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 377, p. 340.
210
might “redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal but also from that which 
was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism; this 
bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates the will again and restores 
its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this antichrist and antinihilist; this victor 
over God and nothingness -  he must come one day”91 In addition, therefore, to 
having understood the implications of the ‘death of God,’ and in addition to refusing 
the articulation of new idols to replace the old God, the third and final defining 
characteristic of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ is to understand the liberating and 
creative potential which is, in fact, afforded to European culture by the advent of 
European nihilism. For, Nietzsche noted in this vein, at long last “our ships may 
finally venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of 
knowledge is permitted again; the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has
Q Q
never yet been such an ‘open sea.’” What Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ and ‘free 
spirits’ discover with the advent of European nihilism, then, is not a pessimistic world 
which has deserted their ideals, but rather a creative experience of freedom and a 
‘great separation’ from previous constraints which have directed European thinking 
for over two thousand years." This experience of freedom, for Nietzsche, is the 
‘decisive event’ for the ‘free spirit’ as well as the ‘good European,’ and is marked by 
a “dangerous curiosity for an undiscovered world [which] flames up and flickers in all 
the senses.”100 It is, in turn, precisely this ethos of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans,’ of 
pursuing a thinking that is more free than it is ‘true,’ which can be said to constitute a 
vibrant alternative to the predominantly pessimistic assessments of contemporary 
European culture which predominate today. In this case, however, the current inability 
to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe would not so much be a sign of a 
weakened ‘spiritual vitality’ as it would be the sign of a strengthened and, in 
Nietzsche’s view, ‘free’ spirit. Indeed, it would be the sign of a ‘good European.’
97 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, II, 24, p. 96.
98 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 343, p. 280.
99 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, Preface, 3, p. 6.
100 Nietzsche, Human, All too Human, Preface, 3, p. 6.
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Conclusion
What Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good European’ can offer to the contemporary 
scholar of European affairs, then, is the recognition that it is also possible to 
understand the advent of European nihilism, and the self-overcoming of past values, 
not as a negative and pessimistic development of European culture, but as a 
necessary, and indeed welcome, development in European culture that affords many 
new possibilities previously unrealised in European culture. The key to understanding 
Nietzsche’s way out of the ‘crisis of meaning’ in Europe, in turn, is to understand that, 
in a sense, the entire realisation of this crisis is still itself ultimately very much bound 
up with Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage. It is precisely the incessant will-to-truth 
of this tradition which drives Europeans first to articulate a more meaningful idea of 
Europe within the context of Christianity, and which, under modem conditions, 
subsequently bars the articulation of a more meaningful idea of Europe conceived 
along these or similar lines. As Nietzsche insisted in this vein, “we men of knowledge 
of today, we godless men and anti-metaphysicians, we, too, still derive our flame 
from the fire ignited by a faith millennia old, the Christian faith, which was also 
Plato’s, that God is truth, that truth is divine The incredibility of metaphysical 
values, in other words, itself still hinges on the will-to-truth having reached its highest 
stage. Without the incessant will-to-truth of Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage, 
there would neither be the need to articulate a ‘more meaningful’ idea of Europe, nor, 
for that matter, would there even be a ‘crisis’ of European nihilism in the absence of 
such an idea. The appropriate way to engage the ‘European crisis of meaning’, 
therefore, is, in Nietzsche’s account, not the articulation of new ideas of Europe which 
will challenge the ‘meaningless, scientific’ understanding of existence and which will 
reactivate Europe’s will-to-truth. These ideas are likely to be criticised and 
undermined in the aftermath of the ‘death of God,’ and are thus also likely to make 
the experience of meaninglessness more acute. Rather, the way out of this ‘crisis’ is a 
more trenchant critique of Europe’s heritage centred around the will-to-truth, and the 
realisation that the perception of a ‘crisis’ is itself very much implicated in this 
heritage. As Nietzsche himself insisted in this regard, “No! You ought to leam the art 
of this-worldly comfort first; you ought to leam to laugh, my young friends, if  you are
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hell-bent on remaining pessimists. Then, perhaps, as laughers, you may some day 
dispatch all metaphysical comforts to the devil -  metaphysics in front.”102
By way of analogy, Europe’s ‘identity crisis,’ or its ‘crisis of meaning’ as it is 
variously referred to in the contemporary debate, can be bemoaned and lamented, as 
is so often done. At the same time, however, in Nietzsche’s account it could also be 
seen as an invitation to critically rethink the state of Europe in the late twentieth 
century and to consider the conceptual framework for a Europe which finds itself 
embedded in an ever changing world. As Karen Carr explains, in Nietzsche’s view:
[ejither European culture would perish, under the nothingness that ensues 
from the death o f God and the self-dissolution o f Christianity, or the 
experience o f the empty, mendacious character o f Platonic-Christian 
metaphysics would purge it o f a way o f viewing the world as was both 
debilitating and false, thereby opening the way for healthier forms o f self- 
expression.
In doing so, moreover, Nietzsche also puts to the contemporary scholar of 
international relations a perspective on Europe which cannot be easily ignored in our 
attempts to delineate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era.
Indeed, in Nietzsche’s account it was precisely those aspects of the European 
tradition which had traditionally been seen as signs of spiritual vitality which turn out 
to actually be its opposites. It was the ascetic ideals of the past which emerge as signs 
of a declining spirit arid which were intricately bound up with the resentment of what 
Nietzsche referred to within his discussion of ‘slave morality.’ Conversely, it could 
similarly be the very absence of a more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold 
War era which could be indicative of a strengthened ‘spiritual vitality,’ rather than a 
weakened one. “T he self-overcoming o f nihilism” in this account, consists precisely in 
the attempt to say “yes to all that has previously been denied and rejected.”104 This 
insight, perhaps, also explains why Nietzsche himself once insisted that “I have a
101 Nietzsche, Genealogy o f  Morals, III, 24, p. 152.
102 Nietzsche, Birth o f  Tragedy, Preface ‘Attempt at a Self-Criticism,’ 7, p. 26.
103 Carr, The Banalization o f  Nihilism, pp. 48-49.
104 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 9[164], p. 432.
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subtler sense of smell for the signs of ascent and decline than any other human being 
before me; I am teacher par excellence of this - 1 know both, I am both ... I turned my 
will to health, to life, into philosophy.”105 Himself realising the radical nature of his 
thinking, moreover, and indeed anticipating the resistance it was likely to encounter, 
Nietzsche wrote to Brandes explaining that “[m]y task is quite singular this time: I’ve 
asked myself what mankind has always hated, feared, and despised the most -  and 
precisely out of this I’ve made my gold.”106 Nietzsche thus challenged a central 
assumption that runs through much of European intellectual heritage, namely that a 
more meaningful idea of Europe needs to be postulated.
What is more, Nietzsche insisted, “[l]et us not undervalue this: we ourselves, 
we free spirits, are already a ‘revaluation of all values’, an incarnate declaration of 
war and victory over all ancient conceptions of ‘true’ and ‘untrue.’”107 In 
contradistinction, therefore, to Plato’s initial question of whether it would be possible 
to imagine a city where the idea of a city was no longer recognisable at all, the 
Nietzschean perspective places its wager on the possibility of a Europe consisting of 
‘good Europeans’ who do not necessarily share a fixed idea of Europe. Nietzsche 
himself was even quite optimistic about this prospect in the long term, noting in 
Human, All too Human:
[t]hat there could someday be such free spirits, that our Europe will have 
such lively, daring fellows among its sons o f tomorrow and the day after 
tomorrow, real and palpable and not merely, as in my case, phantoms and a 
hermit’s shadow play: I am the last person to want to doubt that. I already 
see them coming, slowly, slowly; and perhaps I am doing something to 
hasten their coming when I describe before the fact the fateful conditions 
that I see giving rise to them, the paths on which I see them coming?108
In this sense, then, it might also not at all be necessary to possess a more meaningful 
idea of Europe in order to demonstrate one’s spiritual vitality as a ‘good European.’ 
Of course, the challenge of Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ may initially seem
105 Cited in Aloni, Beyond Nihilism, p. vii.
106 A. J. Hoover, Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Thought. London: Praeger, 1994, p. 21.
107 Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 13, p. 135.
108 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, Preface, 2, pp. 5-6.
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unconventional; but then again, and as Jacques Darras has noted more recently, 
“Europe would not be Europe if it were to fail to find a new way to cope with an old 
dilemma.”109
109 Jacques Darras. Beyond the Tunnel o f  History. London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 60.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis began, it will be recalled, by drawing attention to the fact that 
many European policy-makers and scholars have, in the course of the 1990s, sought 
to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe which would serve to enhance the 
legitimacy of the European Union and which could provide the basis for a European 
identity capable of mitigating against the rise of nationalist and racist violence in 
Europe. Over the course of the past decade, however, and despite several valiant 
efforts, the attempt to articulate such an idea has proved profoundly difficult. The 
question that subsequently emerged, therefore, was why it is actually proving so 
difficult to articulate a more compelling vision of Europe in the post-Cold War era, 
and how, concomitantly, this difficulty might be addressed. In light of this impasse, 
the thesis set out to analyse the contribution that Nietzsche’s European thought could 
make towards addressing the contemporary predicament, focusing in particular on his 
discussion of European nihilism and his response to this development in terms of his 
idea of the ‘good Europeans.’ After having carried out this analysis, several 
conclusions may be drawn, both in terms of our understanding of the contemporary 
impasse, and in terms of our response to this predicament.
1. The ‘Crisis o f  Meaning9 in the European Debate
The first set of conclusions that can be reached, relates to the ability of 
Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism to enhance our understanding of the 
contemporary impasse. Indeed, what emerged from analysing Nietzsche’s discussion, 
is that the contemporary ‘crisis of meaning’ in the European debate is not novel, but is 
rather only the most recent manifestation of a much longer and more fundamental 
problem, the origins of which can be traced back at least to the end of the previous 
century. Already towards the end of the nineteenth century, Nietzsche had drawn 
attention to the absence of an overarching idea of Europe. More specifically, he 
illustrated how Europeans had traditionally rendered their existence meaningful by 
means of the will-to-truth, i.e. by postulating the existence of a ‘true’ or ‘real’ world 
in which the deeper meaning of existence was to be located. This, for example, could
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take the shape of the ideal world of forms, as it did with Plato, or the promise of a 
redeeming afterlife, as was the case with Christianity. In either case, however, the 
positing of ‘meaning’ rested on a metaphysical distinction between a ‘true’ world with 
fixed attributes, and a merely ‘apparent’ world characterised by flux and uncertainty. 
Yet, as Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism also showed, it was precisely this 
distinction that became untenable in modem times. Indeed, Nietzsche’s account 
illustrated how the emphasis of tmth, especially within Christianity, had, over time, 
given rise to scientific accounts of existence which revealed the existence of God, and 
that of a redeeming afterlife, to be mere fictions, thereby provoking the experience of 
meaninglessness. Nor has the problem of European nihilism disappeared from 
European culture since the end of the nineteenth century, as an analysis of the 
historical continuities between Nietzsche’s own discussion of European nihilism and 
the contemporary situation sought to demonstrate. The first conclusion, therefore, that 
can be reached on the basis of an analysis of Nietzsche’s European thought, is that the 
current impasse must be seen within the larger context of modem, European history 
and the problems of articulating a more meaningful conception of European existence 
within the cultural configuration of European modernity.
In the second instance, Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism can also 
go a substantial way towards explaining why this experience of meaninglessness 
persists to this day and why this experience leads to a predominance of pessimistic 
accounts of contemporary European culture. For, in Nietzsche’s account, it is due to 
the lengthy and formative influence of Christian-Platonic forms of thinking on 
European culture, that the experience of meaninglessness persists even after the ‘death 
of God.’ A culture based on the pursuit of tmth, and accustomed to addressing its 
suffering by inventing an ideal or ‘true’ world in order to give its existence a greater 
sense of meaning, will perceive the inability to articulate such an idea as a loss and as 
a shortcoming. One interpretation, Nietzsche noted in this regard, had collapsed, but 
because it had traditionally been the interpretation through which to render existence 
meaningful, European existence took on the appearance of being meaningless in the 
aftermath of the ‘death of God.’ This disappointment would, Nietzsche thought, be 
capable of lasting for many decades, even centuries. In the second instance, therefore, 
Nietzsche’s account can illuminate our understanding of the contemporary impasse by 
accounting for the persistence of the European experience of meaninglessness to this
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day, and by showing why, in light of Europe’s lengthy Christian-Platonic heritage, 
this experience frequently leads to pessimistic accounts of European existence.
Finally, Nietzsche’s discussion of European nihilism can also, by virtue of 
drawing attention to the true depth and magnitude of the problem of nihilism, enhance 
our understanding of why it remains so difficult to actually articulate a more 
meaningful idea of Europe to this day. Thus, Anthony D. Smith, for example, has 
recently characterised the contemporary predicament as consisting of “a choice 
between unacceptable, historical myths and memories on the one hand, on the other a 
patchwork, memoryless scientific ‘culture’ held together solely by the political will 
and economic interest that are so often subject to change.”1 The shift in European 
culture from a theistic to a more scientific understanding of the existence meant that 
metaphysical attempts to articulate a greater meaning underlying European existence 
would be deemed to be incredible almost a priori. What is more, the deeper 
implications of the advent of European nihilism also entailed the questioning even of 
modem science itself. For, what had begun to put itself into question with the advent 
of European nihilism, was the underlying will-to-truth which had shaped the structure 
of European thinking for over two millennia, including that of modem science. In this 
sense, modem existence also appears, in Nietzsche’s words, to be “a hiatus between 
two nothingnesses,”2 i.e. an existence caught between myths that now seem 
unacceptable on the one hand, and a pervasive feeling of meaninglessness on the 
other. This ‘crisis’ runs very deep indeed and is not easily remedied. It requires, in all 
likelihood, a very different form of thinking. By drawing attention to the depth and 
magnitude of this problem, moreover, Nietzsche’s European thought can still assist 
the contemporary scholar in understanding why it continues to prove so difficult to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe, even today.
There are, then, at least three different ways in which Nietzsche’s analysis of 
the advent of European nihilism can enhance our understanding of the contemporary 
impasse confronted by scholars of European affairs. Indeed, in retrospect it seems
1 Anthony D. Smith. “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity” in Peter Gowan and Perry 
Anderson (eds.) The Question o f  Europe. London: Verso, 1997, p. 338.
2 Friedrich Nietzsche. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988, KSA 12, 
10[34], p. 473.
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that much of the evolution of the European debate actually follows, in broad outlines, 
Nietzsche’s genealogical account of the advent of European nihilism. Thus, the 
question of Europe’s meaning began to emerge as Europe ceased to be the ‘Christian 
continent.’ The subsequent inability to identify an underlying meaning for European 
existence following the ‘death of God’ partially served to fuel two world wars during 
which the idea of Europe as the Christian continent could no longer be readily 
discerned. Amongst the devastation left behind by two world wars, the ‘founding 
fathers’ of the institutional project of Europe opted for an idea of Europe that was 
closer to the altered configuration of European societies where science had 
increasingly begun to replace Christianity as the formative cultural structure. Yet, 
nearly half a century later, and as the straightjacket of Cold War politics was 
removed, it emerged that a ‘spiritless’ and ‘scientific’ Europe was not sufficient in 
order to evoke a meaningful response to the European project. In this vein, scholars 
have sought, over the past decade, to retrieve the cultural space they abandoned 
earlier and to recover a more meaningful understanding of the European idea. Yet 
another decade later, however, many of these scholars have been disappointed in their 
quest, seeing only the remnants of a Europe whose ‘spiritual vitality’ is, in their view, 
too badly shattered to give birth to a new horizon. In doing so, moreover, they testify 
to the prevalence, in the contemporary debate, of the response already referred to by 
Nietzsche as passive nihilism. In this sense, then, an analysis of Nietzsche’s European 
thought can indeed go some way towards enhancing our understanding of the current 
predicament that Europe continues to face.
2. Responding to the Experience o f  Meaninglessness
In addition to these above conclusions, however, there is also a second set of 
conclusions that can be reached after analysing Nietzsche’s European thought. These, 
in turn, relate to the question of how to best respond to the current inability to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe. For, with an analysis of Nietzsche’s 
European thought in mind, it is no longer self-evident that the most appropriate 
response to experience of meaninglessness is to seek the articulation of a more 
meaningful idea of Europe along the lines demanded by Hoffmann and others. Such a
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move would, in Nietzsche’s account, constitute a strategy of incomplete nihilism and, 
as the thesis has shown, there are several reason for objecting to such strategies. In the 
first instance, and as was noted in Chapter 3, it was precisely such strategies that were 
implicated in the violent nature of European history in the twentieth-century. Seeking 
to reactivate the will to truth by identifying the ‘true’ meaning of existence as residing 
in such notions as the nation, class, or race is thus a dangerous endeavour, if only, 
because in the absence of external criteria, the decision of the veracity of such 
‘meanings’ is ultimately deferred to the use of force. With the benefit of hindsight, 
therefore, it is possible to identify the danger which generally accompanies such 
strategies, including any contemporary strategy to re-activate the will-to-truth in the 
name of ‘Europe.’
Nietzsche himself, of course, did not witness the twentieth century, but he did 
nevertheless argue that “[ajttempts to escape nihilism without revaluing our values so 
far: they produce the opposite, make the problem more acute” and that “[t]he fight 
against [nihilism] strengthens it.”4 For, even without witnessing the course of 
European history in the twentieth century, Nietzsche had his own reasons for 
objecting to strategies of incomplete nihilism. Firstly, such strategies were, in his 
view, intellectually untenable in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’ because the 
implications of the latter are precisely that the will-to-truth has begun to put itself into 
question. Simply reactivating the will-to-truth may please old habits and thus achieve 
considerable success, but they can hardly be the appropriate response to a crisis whose 
implications entail precisely the calling into question of Europe’s traditional will-to- 
truth itself. What is more, Nietzsche also thought, in the second instance, that such 
strategies are, much like their Christian-Platonic predecessors, indicative of a 
resentful attitude towards existence because they seek to reduce the diverse and 
fluctuating conditions of existence into one that is fixed. They lead to a withdrawal 
from the ambiguous aspects of existence and towards the devotion of ascetic ideals. In 
light of these two reservations, then, the current attempt to articulate a European ideal 
must equally be treated with reservations from a Nietzschean perspective.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche. The Will to Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: 
Random House, 1968, 28, p. 19.
4 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, KSA 12, 5[57], p. 206.
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This critique of strategies of incomplete nihilism thus also places Nietzsche 
and his idea of the ‘good Europeans’ in critical opposition to those writers, cited at the 
outset of the thesis, who wish to articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the 
post-Cold War era. It is, after all, difficult to see how, despite their often benevolent 
intentions, these recent attempts to develop a more compelling vision of Europe could 
actually escape the logic of incomplete nihilism. Would not any attempt to articulate a 
more meaningful idea of Europe simply end up returning to the very language and 
logic perpetuated by Europe’s Christian-Platonic heritage? Would such an attempt not 
culminate in the eventual postulation of an inner essence or an overriding telos to 
European existence, as had been the case with traditional attempts to endow European 
existence with a greater sense of meaning? Indeed, it is precisely this kind of language 
which has, in fact, already resurfaced in the contemporary debate on the idea of 
Europe. As was noted in Chapter 1, Stanley Hoffmann, for example, linked his 
understanding of what would constitute a more meaningful idea of Europe to such 
related notions as the ability to delineate a clear ‘purpose,* with having a ‘sense of 
direction,’ a ‘clear identity,’ a ‘higher purpose,’ a sense of ‘projet,’ and a ‘common 
enterprise.’5 According to Hoffmann, a lack of these attributes signals a lack of 
‘spiritual vitality.’ Nor, as was also shown in Chapter 1, is Hoffmann alone in 
exhibiting such concern. Rather, the inability to articulate a more compelling vision of 
Europe has, over the course of the past decade, led to a proliferation of pessimistic 
accounts of contemporary European culture which lament the inability to produce a 
more compelling vision of Europe and which take this ‘failure’ to be indicative of a 
damaged and fading ‘spiritual vitality.’ Although a Nietzschean perspective is 
certainly compatible both with their plea for greater reflection about the institutional 
project of Europe and with their view that the functional approach alone is inadequate, 
in Nietzsche’s view the answer to the contemporary impasse cannot be the challenge 
of a supposedly ‘meaningless’ and scientific European culture with a more 
meaningful idea of Europe. For, any such notion is likely to be reminiscent of the 
logic of incomplete nihilism which he wished to challenge and which he sought to 
replace with a more complete and active form of nihilism.
5 Stanley Hoffmann. “Europe’s Identity Crisis Revisited.” Daedalus. Vol. 123. No. 2. 1994, pp. 1, 1, 1, 
15, 15, 18.
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Not only, moreover, would such an attempt simply be reminiscent of this 
traditional way of thinking, but it might, from the Nietzsche perspective, have the 
even more adverse effect of actually perpetuating the logic of incomplete nihilism in 
contemporary Europe. Put differently, the attempts to articulate a more meaningful 
idea of Europe, as well as the copious references to the ‘crisis of meaning’ witnessed 
in the post-Cold War era, run the combined risks of perpetuating this traditional 
language of ascetic ideals, and drawing the majority of the debate onto this ground. 
Indeed, much of the contemporary literature on the European ‘crisis of meaning’ can 
be understood as an implicit incitement to attempt to reactivate the will-to-truth and to 
postulate some greater meaning underlying European existence.6 This also means, 
however, that the call by European policy-makers to articulate a more compelling 
vision of Europe is potentially self-fulfilling in the sense that, as Henry Staten has 
recently argued, “the very claim that human beings need transcendence might itself be 
the cause of human beings coming to feel the need for transcendence, and we can 
have no fair test of the matter until we have an instance of a society in which such 
claims have been thoroughly extinguished.” Yet, as Staten argues further, “[t]o date, 
we have no such instances (in the West, at least), nor any that come remotely close; 
what we do have is societies that exist in the shadow of Christian transcendentalism.8 
In this vein, moreover, Nietzsche himself had already pointed out with regard to the 
role of the Church in the Middle Ages, that “the universal institution of the Church 
was reflecting artificial needs, based on fictions, which, if  they were not yet present, it 
first had to produce (need for redemption.)”9 By way of analogy, in seeking to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe, and by constantly invoking a ‘European 
crisis,’ European policy-makers and scholars may well be encouraging and sustaining 
practices which, in light of Nietzsche’s analysis, as well as the violent nature of the 
twentieth century, remain problematic.
6 As J. Peter Burgess has argued in this vein, “[cjultural identity cannot recall a time when it wasn’t a 
question o f  cultural identity, when cultural identity was not in question, when some form o f  
disequilibrium, dispersion, rupture was not present, sounding the alarm and the call to redefining, re­
establishing the identity presumed lost or threatened. There was never not crisis.” J. Peter Burgess. 
“European Borders: History O f Space/Space Of History.” www.ctheory.com/a-european_borders.html.
7 Henry Staten. ‘“Radical Evil’ Revived: Hitler, Kant, Luther, Neo-Lacanianism.” Radical Philosophy. 
No. 98, 1999, p. 13.
8 Staten, ‘“Radical Evil’ Revived,” p. 13.
9 Friedrich Nietzsche. Human, All Too Human. Trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann. London: 
Penguin, 1984, 476, p. 230.
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There is, in fact, some evidence to suggest that this process is already taking 
place. One scholar of European affairs, for example, has recently pointed out how 
“[t]he very aim of a more thorough European integration has fostered a political fight 
over collective and political identities on the continent” and that “[t]he endeavour to 
generate a European collective identity has produced new or re-established competing 
forms of social exclusion.”10 The attempt to articulate a more meaningful idea of 
Europe, in other words, has already begun to lead to a contest over collective 
identities in Europe and has drawn much of the European debate onto this terrain. 
From the Nietzschean perspective, however, this move is strategically questionable 
not only in the sense that the European perspective has a comparative disadvantage 
vis-a-vis more established national identities, but also because the very attempt to 
articulate a more compelling vision of Europe actually draws the European project 
into practices which are themselves in need of critical evaluation. It is in this very 
context, moreover, that Nietzsche himself also set out to philosophise with a hammer, 
the tap of which would expose the hollowness of traditional idols and which would 
also destroy those ideals which were no longer credible following the ‘death of God.’ 
In the contemporary debate, in turn, it would be not only the ‘nationalises’ who 
would fall within the realm of Nietzsche’s criticism, but, to the extent that they 
approximate a form of incomplete nihilism which embodies a form of teleology or 
essence, also the Europeanists.
In addition to enhancing our understanding of the contemporary predicament, 
then, a study of Nietzsche’s European thought also casts doubt on whether the best 
response to this impasse is, as several scholars have argued, to seek the articulation of 
a more meaningful idea of Europe. For, from the perspective of Nietzsche’s ‘good 
Europeans,’ this would not necessarily be the most appropriate strategy to pursue in 
response to the contemporary predicament. Nietzsche himself, for one, clearly did not 
think that it was necessary to respond to the advent of European nihilism through the 
erection of new European idols. Nor did he himself seek to offer such idols. “No new 
idols,” he wrote quite explicitly “are erected by me; let the old ones learn what feet of 
clay mean.”11 Rather, he insisted, “[ojverthrowing idols (my word for ‘ideals’) -  that
10 Oliver Schmidtke. “Obstacles and Prospects for a European Collective Identity” in U lf Hedetoft (ed.) 
Political Symbols, Symbolic Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, p. 44.
11 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Preface, 2, pp. 217-218.
224
comes closer to being part of my craft.12 Similarly, Nietzsche’s revaluation of values 
does not mean, as Walter Kaufmann has rightly pointed out, “a table of new virtues, 
nor an attempt to give us such a table.”13 Rather, it is instead “a courageous becoming 
conscious,”14 especially of the problematic nature of Europe’s historical asceticism 
which, as David Krell and Donald Bates note, include “its religion, its science, its 
scholarship, [and] its lust for power.”15 Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ and ‘free 
spirits,’ in turn, would constitute precisely such a revaluation of traditional values. 
“Let us not undervalue this,” Nietzsche noted in this regard, “we ourselves, we free 
spirits, are already a ‘revaluation of all values,’ an incarnate declaration of war and 
victory over all ancient conceptions of ‘true’ and ‘untrue.’”16 In addition to enhancing 
our understanding of the contemporary predicament, therefore, an analysis of 
Nietzsche’s European thought also casts considerable doubt on whether the best way 
to confront the contemporary impasse in the European debate is the attempt to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe along traditional lines.
3. Europe’s ‘Spiritual Vitality’
Does, however, such a critique of the contemporary literature on the European 
idea not simply contribute further towards Europe’s already fragile ‘spiritual vitality?’ 
This too must not necessarily be the case. For, a final and equally important 
conclusion that can be derived from an analysis of Nietzsche’s European thought, is 
that the conception of ‘spiritual vitality’ informing much of the contemporary debate 
is one which is quite contestable. In Nietzsche’s own view, for example, it was 
precisely the attempt to fix a more meaningful idea of Europe that beckoned a 
declining spirit, resentful of existence. “One has deprived reality,” he noted in this 
vein, “of its value, its meaning, its truthfulness, to precisely the extent to which one
12 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Preface, 2, pp. 217-218.
13 Walter Kaufmann. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. 4th ed. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1968, pp. 110-111.
14 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 1007, p. 521.
15 David Farrell Krell and Donald L. Bates. The Good European: Nietzsche’s Work Sites in Word and 
Image. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1997, p. 3.
16 Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, 13, p. 135.
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has mendaciously invented an ideal world.”17 Inventors of ‘ideal* worlds are usually 
those incapable or unwilling to accept the ambiguous and diverse aspects of existence 
and whose ascetic ideals substitute the meaningfulness of earthly existence in favour 
of fictitious, ascetic ideals. From Nietzsche’s perspective, therefore, it is precisely the 
positing of higher idols and ideals which devalues life and can thus be said to be
• ► •  1Rnihilistic. To this effect, Nietzsche also repeatedly insisted that the modem 
“inference that there is no meaning at all” was a “tremendous generalisation” that was 
“pathological” in being so extreme.19 While he did acknowledge that “the world is not 
worth what we believed,” he also suggested that, far from having no meaning, “the 
world could be worth much more than we believed.”20 Indeed, modem pessimism is,
in his view, “an expression of the uselessness of the modem world -  not of the world
•  ^ 1and of existence.” It was, he concluded, above all a symbol of modem man’s lack of 
humility that led him to deny the meaning of existence simply because he could not 
see it. What an analysis of Nietzsche’s European thought further suggests, therefore, 
is that it may be precisely those who call for the articulation of new ideals and who 
offer pessimistic accounts of European culture in the absence of such ideals, who are 
indicative of weakened ‘spiritual vitality’ on behalf of Europeans.
It is at this point, moreover, that Nietzsche’s own idea of the ‘good Europeans’ 
also becomes particularly important; for, it, in turn, allows for a very different 
understanding of what actually constitutes a culture’s ‘spiritual vitality.’ Nietzsche 
himself had insisted that the ‘free spirits’ and ‘good Europeans’ do not need an end or 
goal for existence in order to demonstrate their ‘spiritual vitality.’ Rather, he argued, 
“[i]t is a measure of the degree of strength of the will to what extent one can do 
without meaning in things, to what extent one can endure to live in a meaningless
23world because one organises a small portion o f it in o n e s e l f . Correspondingly, 
Nietzsche’s is also a vision of Europe which does not seek to close off and fix, in 
advance, the meaning of the European idea, but one which is premised on a
17 Nietzsche. Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House, 
1967, Preface, 2, pp. 217-218.
18 “Nihilist and Christian: they rhyme [in German Nihilist und Christ]], and do not merely rhyme...” 
Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, 58, p. 194.
19 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 13, p. 14.
20 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 32, p. 22.
21 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, 1 [194], p. 54.
22 Nietzsche, Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, 2[109], p. 114.
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“[profound aversion to responding once and for all in any one total view of the 
world” and a “refusal to be deprived of the stimulus of the enigmatic.”24 In fact, it is 
not even so much a vision of an ‘idea of Europe’ as it is a notion of ‘good Europeans.’ 
Nietzsche’s own response, in other words, takes his readers away from overarching 
and essentialising ideas and back towards persons. In order to be such a ‘good 
European,’ however, Nietzsche also maintained that “[o]ne must have liberated 
oneself from many things that oppress, inhibit, hold down, and make heavy precisely 
us Europeans today.” Indeed, for Nietzsche it was “part of the nature of the free 
spirit ... that he has released himself from tradition, be it successfully or 
unsuccessfully.” In this sense, the acceptance of a strategy of active and complete 
nihilism which Nietzsche recommended for the ‘good Europeans’ also does not, as it 
might initially appear, lead to a philosophy of nihilism, but rather, on the contrary, to 
a preparation for that kind of ‘good European’ who is more tolerant of the inherent 
ambiguity of existence, including its suffering and disappointments, without seeking 
to escape this existence by recourse to Christian metaphysics, or ascetic philosophy. 
As Randall Havas concludes in this regard, “[overcoming nihilism, on this reading, is 
not so much a matter of replacing old values with new ones, as it is coming to value 
something where previously one, in effect, valued nothing.”27 Nietzsche’s idea of the 
‘good Europeans’ can thus be seen to suggest a very different conception of ‘spiritual 
vitality.’
For Nietzsche, then, ‘spiritual vitality’ would also consist precisely in the 
ability to exist without the reliance on greater idols or ideals. Indeed, the strategy of 
the ‘good Europeans’ to pursue a more active nihilism seeks precisely to turn 
Europeans away from their history of ascetic ideals, and to bring them closer to the 
primacy of human experience and its interpretative capacity. As Michael Haar notes 
in this vein, Nietzsche “makes us see what the concern with primary causes and 
ultimate ends and the quest for the originary and the unconditional dissimulate to us
23 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 585, p. 318.
24 Nietzsche, Will to Power, 470, p. 262.
25 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 380, p. 342.
26 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 225, p. 140.
27 Randall Havas. Nietzsche’s Genealogy: Nihilism and the Will to Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1995, p. xiv.
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because with them we lose sight of the elementary perspectives of the living being.”28 
Similarly, the impossibility of positing new idols and meanings underlying European 
existence, and the fact that all meanings posited by human beings ultimately must 
remain questionable, are, for Nietzsche, not a reason for despair but rather a symbol 
of what William Connolly has described as the “protean diversity of life” and
• O Qexistence’s “ambiguous conditions of possibility.” Indeed, as Nietzsche himself put 
it:
[b]ut to stand in the midst of this o f this rerum concordia discors and o f  
this whole marvellous uncertainty and rich ambiguity o f existence without 
questioning, without trembling with the craving and the rapture o f such 
questioning, without at least hating the person who questions, perhaps even 
finding him faintly amusing -  that is what I feel to be contemptible, and 
this is the feeling for which I look first in everybody. Some folly keeps 
persuading me that every human being has this feeling, simply because he 
is human. This is my type o f injustice.30
Where others seek to reduce the ambiguity of existence, Nietzsche sought to affirm it, 
and it is this affirmation, in turn, which entails resisting the articulation of a more 
meaningful idea of Europe which would reduce this diversity. This also means, 
however, that it is not so much the ‘good Europeans’ who are nihilistic but rather, as 
Connolly points out, he “who refuses to affirm when the ambiguity of existence 
comes into view ... [and who] would rather endorse nothing at all than affirm the 
ambiguity of existence.”31 Put differently, the strategy of active nihilism pursued by 
Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ is not nihilistic because it aims at undermining 
precisely those values which, with Nietzsche’s analysis in mind, can themselves be 
seen as nihilistic.
On the basis of this transvaluation of values, moreover, Nietzsche 
subsequently also went to great lengths to convey to his readers that his message for 
Europe was, in the end, an affirmative one, reminding his readers that “negating and
28 Michel Haar. Nietzsche and Metaphysics. Trans. Michael Gendre. Albany: State University o f New  
York Press, 1996, p. xii.
29 William E. Connolly. “Suffering, Justice, and the Politics o f Becoming.” Culture, Medicine and 
Psychiatry Vol. 20. No. 3. 1996, p. 257, 258.
30 Nietzsche, Gay Science, 2, pp. 76-77.
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destroying are conditions of saying Yes.”32 With specific reference to himself, he 
noted how “I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am nevertheless the 
opposite of a No-saying spirit.”33 It is a character trait that he had even endowed 
Zarathustra with. As Nietzsche explained in his autobiography:
[t]he psychological problem in the type o f Zarathustra is how he that says 
No and does No to an unheard-of degree, to everything to which one has 
so far said Yes, can nevertheless be the opposite o f a No-saying spirit; how 
the spirit who bears the heaviest fate, a fatality of a task, can nevertheless 
be the lightest and most transcendent -  Zarathustra is a dancer -  how he 
that has the hardest, most terrible insight into reality, that has though the 
‘most abysmal ideal,’ nevertheless does not consider it an objection to 
existence, not even to its eternal recurrence -  but rather one reason more 
for being himself the eternal Yes to all things, “the tremendous, unbounded 
saying Yes and Amen.” -  “Into all abysses I still carry the blessings o f my 
saying Yes.” -  But this is the concept o f  Dionysos once again.34
What is more, Nietzsche concluded, “in the Dionysian symbol the ultimate limit of 
affirmation is attained.” It is precisely this affirmative spirit that Nietzsche wished to 
instil upon the ‘free spirits’ and ‘good Europeans’ whom he hoped would emerge at 
some point in the future. “A freed spirit,” he noted in this vein, “stands in the midst of 
the universe with a joyful and trusting fatalism, in the faith that only what is separate 
and individual may be rejected, that in the totality everything is redeemed and 
affirmed -  he no longer denies.” To this extent the message of Nietzsche’s ‘good 
Europeans’ can indeed be seen as being an affirmative, rather than a nihilistic one, 
and Nietzsche’s European thought can thus also be seen as offering an important 
corrective towards more recent accounts which emphasise the pessimistic nature of 
European culture in the post-Cold War era.
31 William E. Connolly. Political Theory and Modernity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988, pp. 167-168.
32 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Why I am a Destiny,’ 4, p. 328.
33 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Why I am a Destiny,’ 1, p. 327.
34 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘Zarathustra’, 6, p. 306.
35 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, ‘The Birth o f Tragedy,’ 1, p. 271.
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Conclusion
In the end, then, the most important contribution that Nietzsche’s notion of the 
‘good Europeans’ can make to the contemporary debate on the European idea, is to 
demonstrate that it might not at all be necessary to articulate a more meaningful idea 
of Europe in order to demonstrate one’s ‘spiritual vitality’ as a ‘good European.’ 
Indeed, what his idea of the ‘good Europeans’ shows, is that a very different answer 
is, in fact, possible to Plato’s initial question of whether one could imagine a city 
where the idea of a city was no longer recognisable. For, contrary to a plethora of 
literature on the idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era, it may indeed be possible to 
imagine Europeans peacefully coexisting with each other without articulating a more 
meaningful idea of Europe. Concomitantly, rather than seeing the current inability to 
articulate a more compelling vision of Europe as being indicative of a lacking 
‘spiritual vitality’ and as an obstacle to proceeding with the political project of 
Europe, it might be precisely this inability, indeed this active unwillingness, which 
could form the cornerstone for advancing with this project in the course of the twenty- 
first century. In this sense, there would also be no reason why the current inability to 
articulate a more meaningful idea of Europe in the post-Cold War era should be seen 
as a formidable obstacle to the advancing with the political project of Europe in the 
twenty-first century.
The question that remains, then, is whether Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘good 
Europeans’ does not simply take us back to a metaphysics of a different kind, namely 
a metaphysics of immanence? It may, in fact, very well do so. For, as Jan Patocka 
once noted, “[t]he constant shaking of the naive sense of meaningfulness is itself a 
new mode of meaning, a discovery of its continuity with the mysteriousness of being 
and what-is as a whole.”36 Correspondingly, while Nietzsche does not offer his 
readers a new ‘meaning’ of the European idea along traditional lines, he nevertheless 
does provide them with a vision of the ‘good Europeans’ that is in itself meaningful, 
albeit in a very different way, namely precisely in its absence to fix to the meaning of 
the European idea. Nor, however, is this necessarily a debilitating factor. For, to quote
36 Jan Patocka. “Does History Have a Meaning?” in Heretical Essays in the Philosophy o f  History. 
Trans. Erazim Kohak. Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 61.
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Michel Haar once more, “[i]f Nietzsche’s last word takes us back towards a 
metaphysics of immanence or within immanence, it leads us also perhaps not to the 
direct reestablishing or validating of metaphysics, but to reevaluating and rethinking 
its concept, once this concept has been freed of its reactive, negative, essentially 
pejorative charge and of its status as an obstacle to overcome.” If, in other words, 
Nietzsche does remain a metaphysician in one form or another, his metaphysics is one 
of a very different kind, and one which is arguably less likely to lead to a repetition of 
the violent struggles witnessed by Europeans during the past century. It is, moreover, 
also one that is likely to be intellectually more convincing than the articulation of 
renewed myth about the meaning of the European idea and one which is also less 
resentful in relation to the diverse and ambiguous aspects of existence.
Indeed, the kind of European existence that Nietzsche’s ‘good Europeans’ 
would, perhaps, cultivate in the end, is the one he had Zarathustra once describe in the 
following terms: “Not riddle enough to scare human love from it, not solution enough 
to put to sleep human wisdom -  a humanly good thing was the world to me today, of 
which such bad things are said.”38 Such a ‘Europe’ consisting of Nietzsche’s ‘good 
Europeans’ would be one which avoids nationalist and racist interpretations of 
existence. It is, moreover, one which refuses to fix the deeper meaning of the 
European idea and thus also remains open to those who currently remain outside the 
borders of the European Union. At the same time, however, it is a conception of what 
it means to be a ‘good European’ that also seeks to address the problem of the 
increasing globalisation of the ‘last man’ through combating the refusal to cultivate, 
within existence, an important reflective depth. In this account, in short, 
Europeanisation would manifest itself not so much in the attempt to articulate a ‘true’ 
idea of Europe, but rather in the encouraging of the emergence of those ‘good 
Europeans’ who “can actually tolerate free thoughts,”39 and who can share in an 
experience of freedom that has long been lost in the political project of Europe.40 To
37 Haar, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, p. xiii.
38 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, ‘Of the Three Evil Things,” 1. Cited in Bonnie Honig. “Nietzsche and the 
Recovery o f Responsibility” in Political Theory and the Displacement o f  Politics. Ithica: Cornell 
University Press, p. 42.
39 Nietzsche in a letter to Malwida von Meysenburg from October 1874. Cited in A. J.Hoover. 
Friedrich Nietzsche: His Life and Thought. London: Praeger, 1994, p. 18.
40 As John Rajchman has rightly pointed out, “Nietzsche is the philosopher who separates the problem 
of freedom from the problem of acquiring the truth about ourselves, who would free us from the
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recover this experience of freedom, in turn, is the challenge of Nietzsche’s European 
thought, of which such equally bad things have been said.
tyrannies o f such truths through an analysis o f their histories. He separates our freedom from the 
knowledge o f our nature.” Michel Foucault: The Freedom o f  Philosophy. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985, p. 121.
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